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Abstract 
Paternalistic employment relations have been a tradition supported by the 
government in Taiwan whilst trade unions were brought in to support political 
development and economic growth. The government promulgated a ‘harmony 
culture’ in order to control employment relations, and in the 1980s set up the 
campaign of the ‘factory as one family, factory as one school’ to encourage 
employers to inculcate paternalistic beliefs in their employees’ everyday working 
lives. Authority, benevolence and morality, the characteristics of paternalistic 
management, make workers docile and loyal to management and stunt the 
sense of collective identity. 
This qualitative research selects one primary case, a privatised enterprise 
SteelCo and its union Steel-U, to conduct participant observation, in-depth 
interviews with union officers, labour representatives and management, surveys 
of union members, and documentary analysis of official documents and meeting 
minutes. One supplementary case is a state-owned enterprise SugarCo with its 
union Sugar-U; this mainly involved in-depth interviews with union 
representatives and limited access to some documents. 
Corporate trade unions take advantage of the paternalistic tradition to gradually 
develop their organisations as recognised by employers. Implementing non-
union representation is a practice of paternalistic ideology, offering trade unions 
another platform on which to work with management. Workers identify both 
themselves and the trade union as parts of the enterprise family rather than 
seeing the union as an agent of collectivity. The union has to be a service 
provider offering welfare and benefits to attract members before triggering any 
mobilisation. 
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To conclude, paternalism has helped corporate trade unions to establish 
themselves in state-owned and privatised workplaces, and empowered trade 
unions to engage legitimately, effectively and autonomously in workplace affairs. 
To revitalise themselves from the paternalistic ideology, trade unions are 
expected to take the route of partnering unionism with the manipulation of non-
union representation in a top-down process of shaping labour’s collective 
identity. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Industrial Relations in Taiwan 
As one of the four Asian Tigers1, Taiwan has been renowned for its rapid 
industrialisation and praiseworthy economic miracle since the 1960s. In order to 
support economic growth, however, the Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang 
(KMT, 國民黨)2, dominated industrial relations and played an important part in 
shaping the systems of worker representation, including both union and non-
union mechanisms (Pan, 2001, Wei, 2003, Wu, 1999). The idea of the ‘factory 
as one family (以廠為家)’ had been implemented in workplaces, state-owned 
factories in particular, to help maintain labour loyalty and docility for the sake of 
industrial peace. Under this principle, employers are responsible for looking 
after their employees, including essential needs such as accommodation, 
education and so on. In the meantime, workers are expected to help promote 
the development of their factory. 
Taiwan has been famous for the democratisation and liberalisation of its politics 
as well. After the presidential election in 2000, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP, 民進黨)3, as a pro-labour party, took power for the first time and 
made more effort to implement industrial democracy (Chen et al., 2003). During 
its eight years in power, the DPP government promulgated new labour 
legislation to enlarge legal protection of general workers. 
Nevertheless, the KMT took back the presidency in 2008. It continued the 
reform of labour legislation following the liberalisation and democratisation 
                                            
1 The four Asian Tigers or Asian Dragons are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
2 http://www.kmt.org.tw/. 
3 http://www.dpp.org.tw/. 
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movement. As a result, the three pillars of Taiwanese collective labour 
legislation - the Labour Union Act (工會法), the Collective Agreement Act (團體
協約法), and the Act for Settlement of Labour-Management Disputes (勞資爭議
處理法) - are responsible for the massive transformation since 1 May 2011 and 
a new era of labour rights is anticipated. 
In 2016, there was a third change of government when the DPP won both the 
presidential election and the parliamentary election in January. It was also the 
first time that a female president had been elected in Taiwan. Following the 
triumph of the general elections in December 2014, the DPP came finally to full 
power. However, people were wondering whether the new DPP era would bring 
a brighter future. 
Clearly, Taiwanese industrial relations have been mediated by the government, 
no matter which party holds power. In general, labour rights have not been the 
priority of government since the state always focuses on economic development 
and social stability. Therefore, trade unions were originally conceived to support 
these goals rather than protecting labour interests. Whether trade unions would 
be able to represent collective rights is an issue for this research to investigate. 
In contrast to previous labour studies on Taiwan, such as Chiu (2010, 2011) 
and Ho (2003a, 2003b, 2008), this research examines the limitation of 
governmental paternalism from a different perspective. Rather than criticising 
the inability of trade unionism in Taiwan, which has been commonly discussed 
in the past, this research analyses how trade unions in fact have been able to 
obtain accountable power and resources from the paternalistic tradition. This 
perspective has not yet been seen in Taiwanese labour studies and is the most 
original contribution of this work. 
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First, a brief introduction to the political transition, economic growth, ‘factory as 
one family’ paternalistic ideology and changes of industrial relations in Taiwan. 
The focus of this research, research questions and the structure of the thesis 
are also addressed. 
 
1.1. Political Transition in Taiwan 
The Nationalist Party had governed Taiwan since 1949 (following its earlier rule 
in mainland China after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912) as 
an authoritarian and conservative government. The logic of its ruling, similar to 
other dictatorial political powers, was that a smaller group of the political and 
business elite could best formulate and rationalise the political economy (Öniş, 
1991). The industrial policy was developed through cooperation and interaction 
between these politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders, and resulted both 
in industrial peace and in the kind of industrial relations which lacked the voice 
or autonomy of trade unions. Until the 1980s, unions used to play the weakest 
role in the Taiwanese industrial system, being subject to the state as well as to 
capital (Chen et al., 2003, Lee, 1999, Shieh, 1997, Wu, 1999). 
The KMT government entirely manipulated the system of trade unions in order 
to put its industrial policy into action as well as to secure political resistance to 
the communists in China (Lee, 1995). Trade unions were set up to help 
economic development and maintain the current political power. Following anti-
communist principles, the government implemented martial law from 1949 
onwards. As a result, all kinds of social movements were strictly controlled if not 
forbidden by the government. Trade unions mainly served political and 
economic purposes instead of advocating the collective voice and rights of 
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workers during the period of industrialisation. Buchanan and Nicholls (2003: 206) 
call the regime one of ‘paternalistic labour politics’ because its central purpose 
was much more to do with labour cooperation than labour coercion. 
The DPP, which was established in 1986, one year before the lifting of martial 
law, was the first opposition party in Taiwan. It was pro-labour and it initiated all 
kinds of social movements concerned with political justice, human rights, the 
environment, and so on. It aimed to defy the supreme authority of the KMT and 
also to pursue political freedom and democracy in Taiwan. In addition, social 
movements were flourishing during the late 1980s and early 1990s, whilst 
several serious demonstrations challenged the sole authority of the Nationalist 
government (Chu, 1993, Ho and Broadbent, 2011). 
The year 2000 was a remarkable turning point in the political history of Taiwan: 
the DPP won the presidential election for the first time after taking part in local 
and parliamentary elections and ended the rule of the KMT, which had not been 
interrupted in more than fifty years. The DPP won the presidential election again 
in 2004, and was expected to transform Taiwanese industrial relations as well 
as generating sovereign trade unionism (Chen et al., 2003). However, the DPP 
government, although it had a broader channel for participation in political 
issues, moved in more and more conservative ways since increasing numbers 
of activists had been offered positions in government (Ho, 2005, Ho, 2010b). 
During the eight years of its rule, the DPP government nevertheless aimed to 
relax the tension in workplaces, for instance by a policy of building partnerships 
between labour and management, amending labour legislation, and reinforcing 
the mechanisms for non-union worker representation. The KMT, however, took 
back the presidency after the elections in 2008 and secured it again in 2012 for 
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another four years. In addition, this party also dominated the parliament, the 
Legislative Yuan (立法院)4, securing 81 of its 113 seats in 2008 and 64 of them 
in 2012, as well as most of the local authority posts (12 of 17 county 
magistrates in 2009). The DPP on this basis started a wholesale internal 
transformation to reinforce its position as the most influential opposition party. 
Nevertheless, the two experiences of party alternation ended with questions 
about the future of democracy in Taiwan. Fell (2010) argues that the ways in 
which voters and the political elites deal with democratic challenges, such as 
political corruption, the balance between international and cross-strait relations, 
reform of the electoral system and so on, will influence the direction of the 
country’s democracy. 
2016 saw the third party reversal, when the DPP candidate won the presidential 
election in Taiwan as the first ever female president. It was also the first time for 
the DPP to dominate the parliament with 68 of the 113 seats, whereas the KMT 
merely secured 35 seats and became the main opposition party. Before the 
president and legislators were elected, the DPP had a triumph in the general 
elections of 2014, which included 4 out of 6 municipal mayors and 9 of the 16 
county magistrates; at this time only 1 municipal mayor and 5 county 
magistrates represented the KMT. Now that the DPP is finally in power for the 
first time, it is expected to introduce a series of changes affecting all the critical 
issues in society. So far, the reform of the pension system and youth 
employment have been addressed, among other things, but here seems to be 
no emphasis on a collective labour voice. 
                                            
4 The Legislative Yuan (立法院) is the highest national legislative body. All legislators are elected by the 
people. For more information, see the official website http://www.ly.gov.tw/. 
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In this trend of political thinking and change for so many decades, trade unions 
have been treated negatively, as mere political means. The pressing question 
these days is what trade unions may do in Taiwan and how they may do it. 
 
1.2. Economic Growth in Taiwan 
Economic growth has been one of the government’s major concerns. In the 
1950s, in order to grow the economy rapidly and steadily, the Nationalist 
government implemented the national industrialisation policy by developing 
strategic industries, such as transportation, electricity, petroleum, 
petrochemistry, steel and telecommunications, as state-owned and public 
enterprises on the one hand; and furthermore helped trade unions to root 
themselves in these enterprises, on the other. Trade unions were employed as 
peripheral institutions supporting the political, economic and ideological 
strategies of the state instead of representing the collective power of workers 
(Chen et al., 2003, Lee, 1999). Consequently, Lee (1999) argues that 
Taiwanese industrialisation from the 1950s to the 1970s was a quiet process 
without any labour movement. The authoritarian state prevented workers from 
any political involvement with the purpose of developing industry and the 
economy (Deyo, 1989b, Deyo, 1997). Wang (2001b) infers that a flexible 
Taylorist labour regime was in place up to 1980. 
Later the rapid but stable economic growth in Taiwan consisted for decades of a 
series of industrial policies (Chow, 1990, Clark, 1991, Lee, 1995): first, post- 
war reconstruction until the early 1950s, when the government applied a policy 
of land reform to decentralise capital from the big land owners in order to 
reduce poverty and develop agriculture; second, import substitution during the 
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1950s, when the country mostly received American aid and imported products 
for use in industrialisation in order to save foreign exchange and develop light 
industry; third, export expansion in the 1960s-1970s, when labour-intensive 
production was developed to expand exports and to increase foreign investment; 
fourth, a second phase of import substitution in the 1970s, allowing the country 
to start developing heavy industry and complete fundamental construction; and 
finally, an industrial upgrade since the 1980s, with high-tech and service 
industries leading the economy, when the main concern of development was to 
produce high added value with low pollution. 
Lee (1996) argues that following the series of governmental policies, a hard-
working and well-ordered labour force has been the greatest contribution to the 
country’s rapid economic growth. In addition, during the period 1981 to 1988, 
governmental sponsorship helped to achieve sustainable economic growth, and 
official support aided private businesses to advance their technology, improve 
production, and eventually develop a service sector (Maeda et al., 1996). Over 
and above these economic strategies, Lee (2004: 30) finds that ‘the link with the 
global economy’ is the main factor in Taiwan’s prospering economy. In addition, 
long-term loans by domestic banks have indeed helped Taiwan to participate in 
international markets (Deyo, 1989a: 35). After 2000, unavoidably, the 
government still put economic growth and capital interests as its dominant 
priority (Lee, 2002). Economic globalisation has affected labour income and 
employment, and as a result overseas direct investment and a foreign 
workforce have increased the national income and economic growth but at the 
same time have disadvantaged employment opportunities (Lee, 2006). 
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An imperative characteristic of economic development in Taiwan is the dual 
structure of industry, which consists of large public enterprises as well as small 
and medium-sized enterprises (Lee, 1999). According to the official criteria (see 
Table 1-1), small and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan are: (1) enterprises 
in manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying industries with capital less 
than 80 million NT$5 or with fewer than 200 workers; (2) enterprises in other 
commerce and service industries, businesses with revenue in the preceding 
year of less than 100 million NT$ or with fewer than 100 employees (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2015b, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015a). 
Table 1-1 Criteria for Identifying Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Micro Business in Taiwan 
Sectors 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Micro 
Businesses 
Basic Criteria Exception 
Manufacturing, 
construction, mining, 
quarrying 
Capital < 80 million 
NT$ 
Employees < 
200 persons 
Employees < 5 
persons 
Commerce, service 
Preceding year 
revenue < 100 million 
NT$ 
Employees < 
100 persons 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, R.O.C. (2015a) 
                                            
5 The New Taiwan Dollar NT$ is the currency in Taiwan. £1 was approximately NT$38 in March 2017. 
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According to the official statistics, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (2015a) 
indicates that the aggregate number of registered small and medium-sized 
enterprises at the end of 2014 hit the highest record in recent years, consisting 
of 1.35 million 3,049 small and medium-sized enterprises running in Taiwan, 
approximately 97.61% of all enterprises. 50.67% of small and medium-sized 
enterprises have been run for less than 10 years, and 79.72% are in the service 
sector. In terms of labour force, 8.66 million 9,000 people were working in them 
(78.25% of the total work force), whilst 6.32 million 9,000 people were employed 
by small and medium-sized enterprises (72.44% of the total employment). 
In the 1980s, following the governmental policy of upgrading industries, small 
and medium-sized enterprises were forced to change their businesses to admit 
foreign investment and so on, since most of these enterprises were still good at 
labour-intensive production alone (Smith, 2000). However, Wang (2001a) notes 
that setting up small and medium-sized enterprises is in fact the easiest way to 
become socially mobile, because there are more barriers to local Taiwanese 
receiving higher education, which results in different choices of vocation from 
those available to their counterparts among the ethnic mainlanders in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, in support of economic growth, small firms are encouraged by the 
state to subcontract with large manufacturing industries (Deyo, 1990). Besides, 
the spread of industrialisation in various urban and rural sites has given 
everyone, especially people from farming family, the opportunity to become a 
manual worker, and has therefore prevented the development of a strong class 
identity (Sen and Koo, 1992). Shieh (1992) argues that Taiwan is a ‘boss island’ 
grounded on subcontracting networks and hierarchies of producing units. 
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Nevertheless, small and medium-sized enterprises have been the main 
foundation of the growth in economic exports since the 1960s (Lee, 2004). 
Most of today’s large public enterprises were set up during the period when 
heavy industry was being developed, and the characteristics of industry and the 
existence of trade unions are providing workers with more job security and low 
labour turnover. Unlike the experience in Latin American countries where labour 
militancy always follows export integration, Taiwan is an extraordinary case in 
which industrial peace has supported economic growth for a long time, because 
an authoritarian state controlled labour relations and plentiful small and 
medium-sized enterprises have sprung up. Besides, the policy of land reform 
saved Taiwan from class struggle during the period of export expansion (Chu, 
2001, Minns and Tierney, 2003). As an important element, land reform 
facilitates liberal economics and small businesses (Chu, 2001, Cooney, 1996, 
Minns and Tierney, 2003). The landlord class was diminishing whilst the group 
of small owners significantly enlarged (Koo, 1987). 
Moreover, Hsieh (2011) argues that the small and medium-sized enterprises 
were based on an egalitarian rural social structure. This characteristic plus the 
wide opportunities for education set the industrialisation of small and medium-
sized enterprises in rural areas. In addition, the state provided common benefits 
to industries rather than to specific firms. Eventually, class consciousness 
remained untroubled because rural people had more chance of changing 
careers in the process of industrialisation. There was no clear impression of 
class identity because most people believed that hard work would improve their 
lives and change their status. 
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Yet workers in state-owned enterprises which were owned in the past by 
Japanese and were later controlled by the Nationalist government in the early 
post-war era, initially suffered from and resisted inter-ethnic conflicts at this time. 
Their working status in such workplaces entitled them to certain welfare and 
other benefits, such as accommodation and free education for their children; 
these proved to be enough to keep them docile and quiet under the 
authoritarian regime in order to maintain their improved status (Ho, 2014). 
Therefore, Chu (2001) argues that workplace paternalism, authoritarianism, and 
free markets were the three main contributors to the country’s economic 
development and labour silence. The government manipulated local unions and 
the personnel of enterprises and forced businesses to pay for various forms of 
worker support, such as benefits, accommodation, education and so on. 
Obviously, the economic miracle in Taiwan stifled the development of trade 
unions: anti-capitalist movements were weakened by economic profits and the 
working class tended to pay attention only to personal money-making, without 
any concern for the collective consciousness. 
As a result, economic growth has been the main concern not only of the 
government but also of the society. People have focused on gaining individual 
wealth, and the importance of the labour voice has been ignored at all levels. In 
the circumstances of paternalism and individualisation, the question may in fact 
be whether trade unions may develop in Taiwan at all. 
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1.3. ‘Factory as One Family’ 
To support industrial development, the Nationalist government promulgated a 
‘harmony culture’ in order to control employment relations and mounted the 
campaign of the ‘factory as one family, factory as one school (以廠為家，以廠為
校)’ to ask employers to take control over trade unions and also to encourage 
workers to incorporate the belief in paternalism into their everyday working lives 
(Wang, 2010: 63). The policy of the ‘factory as one family, factory as one school’ 
was initiated in 1982 in order to promote labour loyalty to enterprises and also 
to anticipate welfare infrastructure that employers would provide (Chiu, 2002). 
For example, the former Premier of the Executive Yuan (行政院)6 Sun Yun-
Suan (孫運璿) emphasised the policy of the ‘factory as one family, factory as 
one school’ when he made an opening speech to a meeting of the Chinese 
Federation of Labour (CFL, 中華民國全國總工會)7 (Sun, 1982): 
… To help the government improve economic growth, I would like to 
call on everyone to practise the ‘factory as one family, factory as one 
school’ movement. ‘Factory as one family’ means we run a factory as 
a big family, and all are brothers and sisters without distinguishing 
labour and management. Morality is the essence of our society; any 
interpersonal relationship is expanded from family relationships, and 
this is the characteristic of our culture which should be enhanced in 
                                            
6 The Executive Yuan (行政院) is the highest executive organ led by the premier, who is appointed by 
the president. More information can be found at the official website http://www.ey.gov.tw/. 
7 The Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL, 中華民國全國總工會) was first set up in 1948 in Nanjing, 
China and was later resumed in 1951 in Taiwan. It was the only legal national body of labour unions 
before the liberalisation of trade unions in 1997 (http://www.cfl.org.tw/). 
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the workplace. Employers treat employees as family members, and 
employees take their factory as their business and do their best to 
help the company. Everyone works together to share bliss and 
misfortune together, so enterprises continue to develop and 
employee rights are strictly protected … 
In another speech to a national meeting of young representatives from different 
factories, Sun (1983) listed a few methods for practising ‘factory as one family’ 
movement: 
… In order to respond to future change and challenge, enterprises 
have to encourage the ‘factory as one family, factory as one school’ 
movement … The purpose of ‘factory as one family’ is to unite 
everybody in the factory to adapt to changes in international 
economic conditions and improve production techniques, in order to 
enhance the spirit of sharing bliss and misfortune together. I propose 
three ideas for business owners: (1) Implement factory meetings, 
improve communication and work together to solve any problems; (2) 
Increase social activities, introduce team work and be actively 
concerned for your employees’ lives. (3) Do not simply lay off 
employees, but set up a fund for keeping workers in employment and 
overcoming short-term difficulties together in hard times … 
These examples show how the Nationalist government disseminated the 
propaganda to both labour and management as a nationwide ideology. Besides, 
quite a few enterprises in Taiwan are family-run, and this particular 
characteristic has made employer paternalism the specific basis of workplace 
culture (Kleingartner and Peng, 1991). 
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Workers working in different types of firm may demonstrate various responses 
to management authorities. Bu et al. (2001b) find that employees in small family 
businesses are the most likely to be docile to their employers without much 
objection. In addition, people employed in small family businesses as well as 
state-owned enterprises usually comply with enterprise policies and supervisors’ 
demands. 
Moreover, a paternalistic style of management may be more likely than an 
authoritarian style to deal legally with the issue of plant closure. Management 
with ‘paternalist bargaining and consulting’ industrial arrangements usually 
follow legal requirements when they have to shut down a factory, but industrial 
arrangements which are under authoritarian control tend to abuse labour rights 
(Wu, 2010a). 
As in Japan, large enterprises in Taiwan paternalistically control workers over 
accommodation, uniforms and so on (Cumings, 1987). Besides, the Factory Act 
(工廠法) first introduced in 1929 embodies the state requirement for factory 
management to act paternalistically (Deyo, 1989a, Thompson, 1996). For 
example, a factory should provide and pay for the education of its child workers 
and apprentices, establish worker deposit and cooperative associations, build 
housing for its labour, contribute to a workers’ welfare fund, and so on. 
In Ho’s (2010a) fieldwork in a Taiwanese sugar refinery, he observed that the 
slogan ‘the factory as one family’ was painted on the walls. From his interview 
notes, he finds that ‘the daily activities of workers and their family members 
developed a collective rhythm’ (Ho, 2010a: 569), for instance by broadcasting 
company-positive music every morning in the company residences as well as 
tranquil music every afternoon after work. 
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Furthermore, even though the essence of paternalistic capitalism nowadays 
seems to be gradually changing, paternalistic employment relations persist in 
Taiwan and are still influential in managerial styles (Chou, 2002). It is an 
important characteristic which cannot be ignored in examining industrial 
relations there. 
Questioning how trade unions may develop under the ideology of paternalism, 
this research goes on to investigate the challenge to the trade unions 
established by the government and their possible future. 
 
1.4. Changing Industrial Relations in Taiwan 
The economic growth and political stability in Taiwan interacted with each other 
without interruption from any labour concerns (Clark, 1991). The Nationalist 
government, as we have seen, dominated industrial relations in Taiwan for 
several decades, enacting all kinds of labour legislation, manipulating the 
system of trade unions as a supplementary means of authority and intervening 
further in industrial conflicts. 
Scholars in general have three main arguments in their criticism of the silent 
period of labour in Asia: the Confucianism embedded in the culture and society 
enshrining some shared values of paternalism and obedience; the rapid 
industrialisation and economic growth which quickly improved the terms and 
conditions of individual employment; and the governmental manipulation of 
industrial relations (Deyo, 1989a: 5-6). Among the critics, Deyo (1989a) 
believes that the economic and social structural context of these characteristics 
plays a far more important role in the resulting subordination of labour in Asia. 
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Nevertheless, it has been the political and economic characteristics, rather than 
capital-class struggles, which are much more influential than Confucianism; for 
example, the small family owned companies, and the exclusive control of the 
KMT which sought to split the mainlanders from the local Taiwanese (Minns and 
Tierney, 2003). The people were more concerned with ethnicity and individual 
wealth. 
The enactment of the Labour Standards Act (勞動基準法) in 1984 and the lifting 
of martial law in 1987 were two landmarks of industrial relations in Taiwan in the 
1980s. The state began loosening the constraints on industrial relations and 
also set up the Council of Labour Affairs (勞工委員會) in 1987 (Chen et al., 
2003, Kleingartner and Peng, 1991). Before 1987, however, the state treated 
the legal system ‘as a regulatory tool of government rather than as a means of 
protecting citizens against the state or resolving private disputes’ (Cooney, 1996: 
3); collective labour legislation was a governmental manipulation of social 
control, but individual labour legislation was not in the state’s interests (Cooney, 
1996: 5). 
The KMT tended to centralise and control the trade union system as its 
subsidiary by helping the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL) to expand as the 
national labour federation (Chang and Bain, 2006, Chen et al., 2003, Cooney, 
1996, Rice, 2006). Therefore, the CFL functioned as the KMT’s agent to secure 
labour support instead of acting as the national representative of labour 
movements (Ho, 2006a). Unfortunately, labour legislation in Taiwan consists of 
a variety of labour regulations without actual power or punishment, which have 
rarely been enforced (Lauridsen, 1995). 
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In Taiwan, there are four fundamentals of labour law: the ‘Labour Union Act’, 
the ‘Collective Agreement Act’, the ‘Act for Settlement of Labour-Management 
Disputes’ and the ‘Labour Standards Act’. The former three are the core of the 
collective labour rights and all of them were announced between 1928 and 1930, 
whilst the government was established about twenty years later. Still, these 
laws were not significantly modified until 2000. 
The Labour Standards Act, first announced in July 1984 and modified most 
recently in December 2016, is the foundation and core of national labour 
legislation in Taiwan. It was enacted to provide minimum standards in working 
conditions, protect workers’ rights and interests, improve relationships between 
employees and employers and promote social and economic developments. 
The terms and conditions of any agreement between an employer and a worker 
should meet the minimum standards provided by this regulation. The initiative of 
the Labour Standards Act came from the state as a means to ‘strengthen the 
government’s paternalistic people-centred image’ (Chu, 2001: 457). 
Democracy and liberalisation have gradually transformed the industrial relations 
system as the voice of labour has emerged (Rice, 2006). However, both the 
KMT and the DPP chose the same approach, state corporatism, to intervene in 
industrial relations (Chang and Bain, 2006). Reforming the labour legislation 
has been an ongoing process, whichever party undertook it. After two rotations 
of political parties in 2000 and 2008, the three labour laws, as the pillars of 
collective rights, were substantially modified, whilst the amendment of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement Act was first passed in January 2008, followed 
by the Act for Settlement of Labour-Management Disputes in July 2009 and 
eventually the Labour Union Act in June 2010. These significant modifications 
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were implemented on 1 May 2011 and are expected to bring in a new era of 
industrial relations. 
The Labour Standards Act, however, was announced in 1984, under 
international economic pressure led by the United States. It included 86 articles 
and is now the only basis of legislation for individual labour rights, setting up the 
minimum standards of working conditions and terms, in such areas as the range 
of businesses it applies to, the definition and regulation of labour contracts, 
wages, working hours, child labour and female workers, retirement, and 
compensation for occupational accidents. Employers or businesses which 
violate this Act shall be fined. The enactment of the Labour Standards Act in 
fact protects workers’ wages (Tsai, 2004). Other labour provisions or 
stipulations about individual workers are, therefore, ordained in terms of the 
Labour Standards Act, for example, the Regulations for the Fixing of the Basic 
Wage (基本工資審議辦法), the Regulations of the Leave-Taking of Workers (勞
工請假規則), the Regulations for Implementing Labour-Management Meetings 
(勞資會議實施辦法), the Regulations for the Management, Repayment, 
Collection and Allocation of the Arrears Wage Debts (積欠工資墊償基金提繳及
墊償管理辦法), and the Regulations for the Allocation and Management of the 
Workers' Retirement Reserve Funds (勞工退休準備金提撥及管理辦法). 
In recent years, the ruling of the DPP marked a period of abundant legal 
reforms including labour legislation (Fell, 2007). Several modern labour laws 
were promulgated, such as the Act for Protecting Workers from Occupational 
Accidents (職業災害勞工保護法) in October 2001, the Act of Gender Equality in 
Employment (性別工作平等法) in January 2002 and the Act for Worker 
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Protection from Mass Redundancy (大量解僱勞工保護法) in February 2003. 
There was also a draft of the National Pension Act (國民年金法) in 2002 which 
was finally passed by the Legislative Yuan in August 2007. The network of 
protecting labour rights in Taiwan, with these stipulations enacted, seemed to 
be strengthening, especially respecting individual labour rights. 
Moreover, the uppermost executive institution of labour affairs was the Council 
of Labour Affairs, which was founded in 1987, in order to respond to the 
demand for greater labour protection. Important labour affairs were divided into 
six departments, namely, the Department of Labour Relations (勞資關係處) 
which was responsible for trade unions, works councils, industrial disputes, etc.; 
the Department of Labour Standards (勞動條件處) for basic labour rights as 
working conditions and terms; the Department of Labour Welfare (勞工福利處) 
for labour education and related labour services; the Department of Labour 
Insurance (勞工保險處) for occupational accident insurance; the Department of 
Labour Safety and Health (勞工安全衛生處) for labour safety and health training 
and assessing occupational diseases; and the Department of Labour Inspection 
(勞工檢查處) for inspecting working conditions in workplaces and reporting 
contraventions by employers and businesses. 
The Council of Labour Affairs was eventually upgraded to the Ministry of Labour 
(勞動部)8 in February 2014, following the amendment of the Organisation Act of 
the Executive Yuan (行政院組織法), which was enacted in January 2012. 
                                            
8 The Ministry of Labour (勞動部) was set up on 17 February 2014 according to the Organisation Act of 
the Ministry of Labour (勞動部組織法), based on the Organisation Act of the Executive Yuan (行政院組
織法). See the official website http://www.mol.gov.tw/ for more information. 
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Nowadays the Ministry of Labour consists of six departments, namely, the 
Department of General Planning (綜合規劃司), the Department of Employment 
Relations (勞動關係司), the Department of Labour Insurance (勞動保險司), the 
Department of Labour Standards and Equal Employment (勞動條件及就業平等
司), the Department of Employment Welfare and Retirement (勞動福祉退休司) 
and the Department of Legal Services (勞動法務司). It also has five subordinate 
institutions: the Bureau of Labour Insurance (勞工保險局), the Workforce 
Development Agency (勞動力發展署), the Bureau of Labour Funds (勞動基金運
用局), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (職業安全衛生署) and 
the Institute of Labour, Occupational Safety and Health (勞動及職業安全衛生研
究所). 
After 2000, the DPP legitimised the autonomous unions, including the Taiwan 
Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU, 全國產業總工會)9, the Chinese General 
Labour League (CGL, 中華民國全國勞工聯盟總會)10 and the National Trade 
Union Confederation (NTUC, 中華民國全國聯合總工會)11, along with the CFL 
(Chang and Bain 2006). However, each organisation still has a close 
relationship with a different political party; for example, the CFL and the CGL in 
general support the KMT, and the TCTU has built close ties with each ruling 
party during different governments. Clearly, both the KMT and the DPP employ 
                                            
9 The Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU, 全國產業總工會) was set up on 1 May 2000 as the 
second nationwide trade union after the establishment of the CFL, and was the first one recognised by 
the DPP. Its official website can be found at http://www.tctu.org.tw/. 
10 The Chinese General Labour League (CGL, 中華民國全國勞工聯盟總會) was set up on 15 July 2000 as 
the third nationwide trade union. It had in fact split from the CFL. 
11 The National Trade Union Confederation (NTUC, 中華民國全國聯合總工會). Official website 
http://www.ntuc.org.tw/ is not accessible in July 2016. 
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the trade union system to promote social and economic policies in the 
workplace, and trade union organisations at the national level usually act as a 
political party’s agents, mobilising workers in various elections (Chiu, 2002). 
Nevertheless, for the first time in history, the DPP let independent labour 
activists get involved in the decision-making process of governmental policies 
(Fell, 2012). 
The Labour Union Act in Taiwan was first introduced in 1929 and amended in 
2000 and 2010; it regulates the establishment, membership, officers, meetings, 
operational funds, supervision, protection, dissolution, federated organisations, 
basic organisations and penal provisions of trade unions. According to Article 6 
of the Labour Union Act, before the revision enacted in May 2011, two types of 
trade union are distinguished: industrial unions (產業工會) and craft unions (職
業工會). More than 30 employees of the same industry in the same area or in 
the factory or workshop can form and join an industrial union, whilst workers 
exceeding the number of 30 without a constant employer but with same 
professional skills can organise a craft union. At the end of 2010 the rate of 
organised trade union membership was 37.3%, whilst the organisation rate of 
industrial unions was only 14.6%; that of craft unions was 53.4% (Ministry of 
Labor, 2014). 
The industrial unions in state-owned enterprises were initially brought into being 
by the state’s industrial strategies. In consequence these enterprises regarded 
industrial unions as basic to the organisation and also agreed to develop trade 
unions as auxiliary means for the state and the enterprises (Chen et al., 2003, 
Shieh, 1997). In addition, if a union legally exists in the enterprise and is 
registered to the local labour administrative bureau, membership of it is 
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compulsory, according to Article 12 of the Labour Union Act. When a worker 
starts working in a unionised workplace, s/he is automatically enrolled in its 
union. Hence, the industrial unions in state-owned enterprises have been more 
or less well-organised as well as sufficiently financed by its numerous members. 
However, following the modification in 2010 which was implemented on 1 May 
2011, trade unions are now of three types, corporate unions (企業工會), 
industrial unions and craft unions. Corporate unions, in accordance with the 
Company Act (公司法), are organised by employees of the same industry or 
workplace, of the same business entity, or of enterprises with controlling and 
subordinate relationships between each other; or, in accordance with the 
Financial Holding Company Act (金融控股公司法), by employees of a financial 
holding company and its subsidiaries. Therefore, most workplace unions which 
used to be called industrial unions now have to rename themselves as 
corporate unions. Industrial unions in this latest definition are organised by 
workers in the same industry and they come close to the definition of industrial 
unions in Western countries. Craft unions are set up by people with the same 
professional skills. The government statistics show that at the end of 2013 the 
aggregate organisation rate of trade union membership was 34.3%, and that 
there were 884 corporate unions, 101 industrial unions and 4,064 craft unions 
(Ministry of Labor, 2014). 
In 1985, based on the provision of Article 83 of the Labour Standards Act, the 
Regulation for Implementing Labour-Management Meetings was announced (to 
be revised in 2001, 2007 and 2014). Article 83 of the Labour Standards Act 
defines that: 
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A business entity shall hold meetings regularly to coordinate worker-
employer relationships, promote worker-employer cooperation and 
increase work efficiency, and the rules for calling such meetings shall 
be drawn up by the Central Competent Authority in concert with the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and then reported to the Executive Yuan 
for approval.  
Labour-management meetings (勞資會議) form one official category of the 
worker representation systems in Taiwan. At the moment, according to 
government statistics, the implementation of labour-management meetings has 
gradually increased, especially in the private sector (Ministry of Labor, 2014). 
Worker representation systems in Taiwan have been formalised for a long time. 
The first kind of worker representation systems can be traced back as far as the 
1929, at a time when the Nationalist government stipulated the Factory Act 
initiating ‘factory committees (工廠會議)’ in workplaces. The factory committee 
was organised once a month by the same number of representatives of both 
workers and employers to discuss issues regarding employment relations, such 
as increasing work efficiency, improving the relationship between factory and 
workers, assisting the practice of work contracts and factory rules, reforming the 
terms and conditions of work in the factory, and planning workers’ fringe 
benefits. 
In 2000, the DPP government proposed a neo-centrist labour policy, which led 
to some legal reforms and many labour policies different from those by the 
previous Nationalist government, in order to emphasise the pro-labour 
impression that it wanted to create and to show its determination to transform 
the situation of Taiwanese industrial relations (Ho, 2006c). For example, 
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industrial democracy and development of autonomous trade unions are fresh 
policies embodied, for example, in the Protection of Workers against Collective 
Redundancies Law and the Equal Employment of Gender Law. The DPP also 
proposed legal amendments of the existing labour laws, such as the Labour 
Union Act, the Act for Settlement of Labour-Management Disputes and the 
Collective Agreement Act, which are the three pillars of the legislation of 
collective labour rights in Taiwan. 
Its aim in these actions was to make the DPP itself the real voice of Taiwanese 
labour rights and the representative of minorities in society. Moreover, the DPP 
even declared its ambition to build a new ‘labour-management partnership’ at 
the workplace level of Taiwanese industrial relations. ‘Building [a] labour-
management partnership’ means practising industrial democracy at work and 
there are many methods of realising it. According to the legislation on industrial 
relations in Taiwan, one proposed method is holding labour-management 
meetings which can act powerfully and efficiently and it also means reinforcing 
worker representation systems, including worker directors (勞工董事) and other 
legal councils within workplaces such as employee welfare committees (職工福
利委員會). 
The KMT continued to reform labour legislation after the DPP lost the 
presidency and eventually the KMT finalised the amendment of the Labour 
Union Act, the Act for Settlement of Labour-Management Disputes and the 
Collective Agreement Act in 2010 and implemented new labour regulations from 
1 May 2011. This was a turning point of industrial relations and had a strong 
impact on the system of trade unions, such as making it easier for trade unions 
to organise multiple and industry-wide systems, the official prohibition of unfair 
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labour practices and establishment of a relief system, protection of bargaining in 
good faith, re-formalisation and fortification of dispute behaviours, and 
recognition of dispute agents (Chang, 2010b). 
Lin (1997) compares industrial relations in different workplaces owned by 
Taiwanese, Americans and Japanese people, and notes that Japanese 
enterprises have a higher rate of unionisation, though employment relations in 
the three ownerships are not significantly different from each other. More to the 
point, unionised workplaces always implement better health and safety terms 
and conditions, and enterprises setting up a grievance system in general 
provide better conditions of welfare and benefits as well as health and safety. In 
addition, it has been reported that Taiwanese people feel stronger support for 
trade unions and expect more aggressive unions mainly when the economy is 
not prosperous and employment relations are not good; and moreover, that it is 
critical to mobilise service sector workers in order to amplify union power in 
Taiwan (Chang and Chang, 2010). 
On 24 June 2016, the newly established Taoyuan Flight Attendants Union 
(TFAU, 桃園市空服員職業工會)12 called a strike from 12 midnight; however, it 
finally came to a settlement with China Airlines (中華航空股份有限公司)13 and 
cancelled the picket line at 11pm the same day. It was a remarkable milestone 
for the labour movements, in that it was the first time that a strike had been led 
                                            
12 The Taoyuan Flight Attendants Union (TFAU, 桃園市空服員職業工會) was set up in November 2015 
as a craft union for all flight attendants but most of the members belonged to China Airlines. More 
discussion can be found in Chapter 2.3. Trade Unions in Taiwan from May 2011 onward. 
13 China Airlines (中華航空股份有限公司) was set up in 1959 as a national airline company and is 
currently receiving indirect investment from the government. Its official website can be found at 
http://www.china-airlines.com/. 
43 of 303 
by a trade union outside the enterprise. People had been anticipating changes 
in industrial relations in Taiwan. 
As noted above, trade unions in Taiwan were first introduced by the state as a 
means of serving political and economic purposes. Workers did not organise a 
union to convey their demands and some may even not have known what a 
union should do for them. In this situation, whether the trade unions set up by 
the government could develop independently and represent the collective voice 
becomes a question to investigate. 
 
1.5. Focus of the Thesis and Research Questions 
Most social movements in Taiwan are split into multiple organisations and 
routes as the labour movement is. Various organisations and groups may 
cooperate, compete or confront on different issues. Unfortunately, as a result of 
long-term authoritarian governance, living standards raised by economic growth 
and sustained discipline from education and the media, Taiwanese people are 
not easily mobilised (Chiu, 1992b). Chiu (2010) further argues that the format of 
individual workplace unions is not healthy since it is difficult to establish a labour 
class and Taiwan’s trade unionism cannot withstand the impact of economic 
globalisation. 
It is obvious, however, that industrial relations in Taiwan were transformed after 
several decades of silent unionism. Following the de-regulation of collective 
labour rights in 2011, trade unions are facing new challenges whilst newly 
established unions have to take root in employment relations, at the same time 
as mature existing unions must look for their niche to regain strength amidst the 
44 of 303 
current changes. Instead of ambitiously examining the whole system of trade 
unions in Taiwan, this research focuses only on the strategy and development 
of the unions that were set up on the traditional basis of supporting the state 
and management, such as exist mainly in large state-owned or privatised 
enterprises. 
For example, slack union organisation undoubtedly opens up more chances for 
workers to be organised and protected and provides new possibilities of 
collective activities, but today’s unpractised trade unions have to be equipped to 
cope with the shifting demands of organising, bargaining and disputing if they 
do not want to become still weaker. In fact, the trend of legal reformation 
provides such unions with great opportunities to re-examine and re-develop 
their methods of organisation to withstand dialogues with the state, employers 
and most importantly their members. 
Trade unions in Taiwan may be catalogued into various types, defined 
differently in different periods. The focal point of the present research is the 
workplace-based unions, which used to be called the ‘industrial unions’ and are 
now renamed ‘corporate unions’ under the lately amended Labour Union Act. 
These labour unions are normally organised within a specific factory or 
workplace, where all the eligible employees must become corporate union 
members. They are found in most state-owned and privatised enterprises and in 
general they practise the tradition of collective bargaining. It is a question 
whether and how those corporate unions can increase their influence in today’s 
workplaces. 
Trade unions used to be supplementary to the state and to capital, so it has 
long been concluded that Taiwanese unions did not function properly and did 
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not represent the voice of labour. Following the democratisation and 
liberalisation of the political economy in the 1990s, privatisation forced many 
unions in the state-owned enterprises to examine their roles and to stand up for 
their collective rights. Since 1 May 2011, it is likely that new trade unions, for 
example, the Taoyuan Flight Attendants Union, may be set up to compete with 
the old ones for resources and members. 
Hence, the research focuses on the old trade unions which now may have to 
struggle to revive as autonomous entities in the new era. To investigate this 
specific type of trade union, it should be asked whether and how far paternalism 
has influenced trade unionism in Taiwan. Apparently, paternalistic employment 
relations are the outcome of political and economic controls by the government. 
It seems that the harmonious relationships between employer and employees 
which are common in Taiwan are quite influential in the workplace. Therefore, 
paternalism is reviewed and analysed in this thesis. 
Trade unions are the main players in this research and the concern is what the 
transition of trade unionism in Taiwan may bring about. Because trade unions 
were viewed as not representative of labour in the past, it is a question whether 
Taiwanese trade unions can ever operate and function as agents of labour 
rights. Therefore, this research reviews trade unions and examines selected 
cases in order to set up scenarios for analysis. 
Non-union representation is another issue in this research. As the counterpart 
of trade unions in workplace systems of representation, its competing 
relationship with trade unions has been researched by many scholars. However, 
the relationship of the two mechanisms in Taiwan is another question. This 
research asks whether non-union representation is harmful to trade unions. 
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The last focus of this research is on collective identity at work. Identity is 
important to trade union mobilisation. However, Taiwanese people do not have 
the sense of class identity that Western countries often have. Overall, since 
identity is personal, this research concentrates on individuals in the workplace. 
This research asks what kind of collective identity may be found in workplaces 
and whether there is any chance of building up the class identity of workers. 
Perhaps different approaches and changes are applicable in Taiwan. 
To sum up, this research is constructed of the following questions: first, whether 
and how the existing (old) corporate unions can wield any influence in today’s 
workplaces; second, whether and how far paternalism has influenced trade 
unionism in Taiwan; third, whether Taiwanese trade unions may operate and 
function as agents of labour rights; fourth, what the relationship is between 
Taiwan’s trade unions and non-union representation; and last, what kind of 
collective identity may be found in workplace and whether there is a chance of 
building up the class identity of workers. Overall, the old trade unions are the 
main concern of this research, which discusses some in workplace factors, 
including paternalism, non-union representation and collective labour identity. 
Following these questions, this research provides a very different perspective 
from existing labour studies in Taiwan, which emphasise the underdevelopment 
of trade unions and the lack of labour class consciousness in the context of 
state coercion (Chiu, 2010, Chiu, 2011, Ho, 2003a, Ho, 2003b, Ho, 2008). 
Instead, this research further points out the possibility of trade union 
development within such political and economic contexts. Trade unions have 
been equipped with resources to accumulate power provided that they are 
aware of manipulating those resources, which is investigated in detail in the 
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following chapters. Besides, this research emphasises the importance of labour 
cooperation that is rarely discussed in Taiwanese labour literature. Cooperation 
with management is an important key for trade unions in Taiwan to develop 
their organisations and recognition in workplaces, but has been underestimated 
in previous studies. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis, including the literature review, research methodology, 
findings and discussion, analysis and conclusion, is set out as follows. Chapter 
2 reviews the literature of representation in workplaces, including trade unions 
and non-union representation. This chapter starts with the Western literature of 
trade unions, and then reviews changes in trade unions in Taiwan before and 
after 1 May 2011. The literature of Western non-union representation is also 
reviewed, following non-union representation in Taiwan including examples of 
labour-management meetings and worker directors. The last section of the 
chapter makes some concluding remarks on both trade union and non-union 
representation in Taiwan. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on two themes, paternalism and collective 
identity at work. From the campaign of ‘factory as one family’, paternalism is an 
important characteristic of Taiwanese industrial relations. This chapter first 
reviews paternalism and paternalistic management, which is an important 
concept to examine later in the chosen case study. Three main characteristics 
of paternalism in Taiwan, namely authority, benevolence, and morality, have 
been addressed. Further the concept of collective identity at work is discussed, 
since identity is essential to labour mobilisation. This chapter concludes that 
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paternalistic employment relations were influential over the organisation of trade 
unions in past decades as well as affecting collective identity at work. 
Chapter 4 concerns research methodology, the qualitative research of two 
cases. One primary case, SteelCo, and one supplementary case, SugarCo, 
were selected for analysis and discussion. SteelCo is a large privatised and 
unionised enterprise and the research methods included participant observation 
in its union, Steel-U, in-depth interviews with union representatives and officers, 
two surveys of union members and documentary analysis of official documents 
and meeting minutes. SugarCo is a large state-owned and unionised enterprise 
where in-depth interviews with union representatives took place and limited 
access to some official documents was gained. 
Chapters 5 to 7 contain research findings and discussions about the main 
themes of this research. Paternalism is still influential in Taiwanese workplaces, 
and trade unions are usually features of it. However, trade unions and non-
union representation do not compete with each other. The collective identity of 
workers is influenced by the paternalistic tradition and labour cooperation is one 
approach for trade unions to take within the paternalistic context. Trade unions 
need different ways of gaining members’ identity before mobilisation. 
Chapter 5 discusses paternalism in workplaces, its influence on trade unions 
and how trade unions react to it. From the implementation requested by the 
government, paternalistic employment relations have shaped the face of the 
existing trade unions. Workers have been influenced by such paternalistic 
elements as benevolence, authority and morality, and so have trade unions. 
Nevertheless, trade unions received quite a few resources from management 
and gained employer recognition in the workplace. To develop under the 
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paternalistic ideology, trade unions have to compromise and cooperate with 
management to some degree to reinforce employer recognition and extend their 
influence. 
Chapter 6 discusses the implementation and influences of non-union 
representation in the workplace. The practice of labour-management meetings, 
worker directors on the board, employee welfare committee and labour safety 
and health committees in the research cases are addressed. Furthermore, this 
research investigates how general workers and squad leaders who help trade 
union deliver information to members perceive non-union representation and 
their labour representatives. In general, only labour representatives engage in 
the implementation of non-union representation, and workers may not be 
familiar with the system, so trade unions play a key role in promoting non-union 
representation. Provided that non-union representation is a practice of 
paternalistic ideology, it actually provides trade union legitimacy, efficacy and 
autonomy and facilitates the union’s functions of self-fulfilment, economic 
regulation and job regulation. Implicitly, trade unions generate power by 
indirectly participating in non-union representation as support for labour 
representatives. Manipulating non-union representation in the workplace 
actually helps trade unions obtain additional power and resources to develop its 
organisation in a fundamental way. 
Chapter 7 discusses collective identity at work in terms of three groups of actors: 
labour representatives of non-union representation, squad leaders and general 
workers. Following the discussion in Chapter 6, the collective identity of labour 
representatives is investigated first. Support from trade unions makes labour 
representatives sense the difference between labour and management. Trade 
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unions may sustain and support non-union representatives to not only reinforce 
the implementation of non-union representing mechanisms, but also to 
strengthen their union recognition in the workplace. Labour representatives may 
lack collective identity at first, but it follows with experience. Besides, squad 
leaders are chosen to facilitate the communications between the union and 
general members so they learn more about trade union operation. In fact, it 
depends on whether the members are interested in union affairs, even though 
the trade union has some incentive to encourage their participation. Squad 
leaders think they are member of the big company family, and trade unions are 
part of the family as well. Last, trade unions have to actively reach members 
since they were never organised spontaneously by workers. Providing services 
and benefits is a good starting point before educating members to know the 
hard parts of trade unionism, such as collective bargaining. Owing to their 
history, Taiwanese trade unions have to build up their members’ collective 
identity with them. However, the paternalistic tradition conceals but does not 
remove labour conflicts in the workplace. Building up members’ collective 
identity is necessary once the trade union has to mobilise members to fight 
against management in the workplace. The case Steel-U has demonstrated a 
very successful protest as evidence of trade union’s use of paternalism as a tool 
to further members’ interests. 
Chapter 8, in conclusion, reviews the research questions proposed in the 
introduction on the basis of discussion and analysis from the previous chapters, 
and concludes the arguments of this research. Overall, the transition of 
Taiwanese trade unions is embedded in paternalistic employment relations. To 
be autonomous in the workplace, trade unions have to learn to take advantage 
of things to which they were already entitled, on the one hand, and to mobilise 
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members’ identity as a whole, on the other. The limitations of the research and 
its future application to practice and policy are also addressed. 
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Chapter 2. Trade Unions and Non-Union Representative 
Mechanisms in the Workplace 
The issue of representation at work has been a vital debate in industrial 
relations since the emergence of this discipline. Because of their asymmetrical 
relationships with management, individual workers need some sort of 
mechanism to represent them and bargain for their collective rights and 
interests; it was to fight for fellow-workers that trade unions were formalised. 
However, in recent decades, the decline of unions has become a worldwide 
issue in employment relations, and union revitalisation is a concern of the 
labour movement. Other mechanisms of non-union representation have been 
proposed to fill the representation gap in workplaces, but questions about the 
relationships between union and non-union forms of representation continue to 
emerge. 
Representation at work is principally either direct or indirect. Direct 
representation is seen when employees, either individuals or in group, directly 
participate in workplace decision-making processes, such as in the quality 
circles or departmental meetings; but indirect representation implies that 
workers elect their own representatives to speak out for them, for example, 
collective bargaining, worker directors on the board, and more important issues 
being dealt with in this form of representation (Gospel and Willman, 2003: 144). 
In general, direct representation deals with issues at a lower level of business, 
such as decisions about daily, routine tasks, whilst indirect representation 
mainly concerns broader interests. 
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This research focuses on indirect representation at work, especially by trade 
unions. Before discussing the trade unions in Taiwan, this chapter first reviews 
union representation in Western literature, including organisations, types of 
trade unionism, collective bargaining; and the decline and future of trade unions. 
The review continues by looking at the similarities and differences of trade 
unions in Taiwan, and then describes the changes made to Taiwanese trade 
unions after 1 May 2011, when the latest amended Labour Union Act came into 
force. 
The thesis includes a literature review of non-union representation in Western 
countries as well, since there has been a debate whether other non-union 
representative mechanisms might be able to replace trade unions. This review 
then compares the system of non-union representation in Taiwan. The last 
section of this chapter comments on some current issues and concerns of trade 
unions and other non-union representative mechanisms in Taiwan. 
 
2.1. Trade Unions in the Workplace 
Representation by a trade union means becoming a member of a trade union 
which represents the shared interests of its members. Trade unions were 
organised as a result of the different interests and the unbalanced power 
existing between employees and employers, so long as employers controlled 
most of the resources in workplaces. Therefore, as a collective body, trade 
unions are legitimated to enhance the power of the rank and file and seek their 
joint interests (Noon and Blyton, 2002: 289-292). Western literature offers a 
variety of concepts to analyse organisation and power of trade unions. 
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Salamon (1998) defines an organisation’s function as ‘the role or task it is 
required to perform and the means employed to carry it out’ (Salamon, 1998: 
103); he analyses the functions of a trade union along six dimensions, namely 
power, economic regulation, job regulation, social change, member services, 
and self-fulfilment. The functions of a trade union are related to its role and 
tasks and practised by the decisions and actions of the people in it. Only when 
the staff and members of a trade union have the same expectations will its 
function be fully worked out, so a common perspective on the trade union 
formalises the union’s functions and influences its mechanisms. 
In general, a trade union’s power is revealed by its other functions, and it 
protects and sustains its members by its collective force and acts as a party 
confronting the management and also as a pressure group in society. A union’s 
economic justification is to improve its members’ employment conditions and 
wages through the collective bargaining of the employment contract, whilst its 
function of job regulation is to maintain a mutual decision-making system to 
protect members from the dictatorial authority of management and to help them 
take part in decision-making in the workplace. Social changes mean that a trade 
union stands for the workers’ social cohesion; hence, its ambition or political 
demands, and it may have a ‘political role’ in its relationships with political 
parties as well as the government. Providing member services means offering 
services or benefits to individuals; in addition the union is a channel of self-
fulfilment by which members may develop their careers beyond their jobs in the 
workplace and involve themselves in union decision-making processes such as 
its ‘internal system of government’ and ‘collective bargaining system’ (Salamon, 
1998: 103-117). 
55 of 303 
According to Flanders (1968: 23-40), the organisation of British trade unions 
falls into these types: first, craft unions, which provide members with the 
privileges of bargaining power and benefits, as a result of their loyalty and 
collaboration; second, general unions, which have become used by various 
types of employment and are able to accommodate different work patterns; third, 
industrial unions, which arise from the incorporation of smaller unions, none of 
which can represent the whole of the industry concerned; fourth, non-manual 
unions, representing the needs of white-collar workers who do not always agree 
with blue-collar workers and have different interests from theirs; and fifth, the 
development of industrial federations which has met the demand for a national 
level of representation in negotiations with employers. 
According to UK statistics (Barratt, 2009), the union density in the UK in 2008 is 
27.4%, a decreasing 0.6% since 2007, whilst the union membership of female 
workers (29.2%) is higher than for male (25.6%) and union density in the public 
sector (57.1%) is much higher than the private sector (15.5%). However, the 
decline of trade unions has for several decades been a significant issue in 
Britain, where it is even more severe than in other countries (Machin, 2000, 
2003). By analysing the dataset of the Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations 
Surveys (WIRS/WERS) and measuring union density, union coverage and 
union recognition, Machin (2000, 2003) argues that, although a range of factors 
has generated the decline of unions in Britain, age in the workplace is more 
influential than all other variables. 
The ‘fracturing of collectivism’ has become a challenge to trade unions. 
Management implements strategies to focus on individual employees in order to 
weaken the workplace collectivity of trade unions, and at the same time 
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practises employee representative mechanisms to build loyalty to management. 
Trade unions have to develop approaches to support individuals and at the 
same time to maintain collective representation (Bacon and Storey, 1996). 
In the UK, management partnership and organising members used to be the 
two agenda items of the Labour Party’s proposal for union revitalisation but on 
examination they have been found to contradict one another. Maintaining 
partnership with employers has resulted in senior union stewards no longer 
being able to pay much attention to members of their organisation and 
mobilising them (Danford et al., 2002). 
Gospel and Willman (2003) also analyse industrial relations via WIRS/WERS 
and propose that a multi-channel way of indirectly representing workers, 
together with information and consultation, has been followed in Britain and will 
still be practised in the future, but that the worker representation system in the 
UK is distinct. Direct representation has been increasing and indirect 
representation through joint consultation has been impeded whilst 
representation by trade unions has seriously declined. 
Commentators have indicated that trade union decline is a universal issue. 
Challenges to trade unions from a global perspective include decreasing 
membership, loss of representation, weakening member mobilisation, external 
changes to organisation, and a shortage of power resources (Frege and Kelly, 
2003). Farber and Krueger (1993) point out the decline of union density in the 
US by analysing a demand-supply framework of unions, since trade unions 
cannot fulfil workers’ demands, but Farber and Kruger do not conclude that 
there is any demand for alternative representation. In addition, research by 
Kuruvilla et al. (2002) on the growth and decline of trade unions in Asian 
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countries, including China, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and the 
Philippines addresses the fact that these countries have all suffered the fall of 
union membership in the 1990s without effective strategies for revitalising the 
union movement. 
In the communist period, Soviet trade unions were sustained by the state and 
did not act as the agent representing collective labour interests. Instead, trade 
unions mainly performed the function in charge of social services to all people 
and continued this role even after the economic transition. Following the reform 
of economy whilst more industrial conflicts occurred in workplaces, however, 
trade unions were still not in favour of collective representation and it remained 
line management dealing with the workplace conflict (Ashwin, 1997). 
In post-socialist countries such as Russia and China, trade unions have a 
dilemma of maintaining the past relations with the state and management or 
transforming to represent member rights and interests. Existed trade unions 
have to make sure they successfully survive from socio-economic changes 
whilst sustainably developing their organisations. Paradoxically, a trend of 
labour protest led by outsiders instead of those trade unions results from the 
dilemma (Clarke, 2005). 
To discuss the future of trade unions, Hyman (1997) argues that worker 
representation is the representation of interests with three essential 
components: autonomy, legitimacy and efficacy. Autonomy refers not only to 
the degree of sovereignty of a representative committee from the management 
standpoint, but also the distance of the union from the workers; legitimacy is the 
way in which representatives are officially permitted to represent the rank and 
file; and efficacy means the capacity to obtain sufficient information and execute, 
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as well as originate, proper suggestions. Hence, in order to respond to the 
changing nature of employment relations, Hyman (1999) suggests that trade 
unions should adapt to the flexibility of work and the labour market without 
sacrificing workers’ choices, to enhance the security of employment by 
improving the programmes and policies of employability, to grasp the 
opportunity to attract new individuals rather than stressing conventional 
collectivism, to exhibit internal and external democracy, and finally to join the 
local community linking work with life. 
Hyman (2001) argues that different unions have varied identities to structure 
their activities and he shapes a triangle model of market, class and society to 
analyse trade unionism in examining the cases of Britain, Germany and Italy. 
Traditionally, trade unions have to effectively impact the labour market in order 
to maintain members’ interests; the nature of class relations makes trade unions 
advocate and at the same time trigger class struggle; and the emergence of civil 
society forces trade unions to participate in social movements. 
Therefore, Britain’s tradition of ‘free collective bargaining’ has been challenged 
by the concept of ‘social dialogue’ in which trade unions have to re-define their 
role between employers and workers. The German model of the social market 
in fact diminishes the union mobilisation of class and slashes unions from the 
three directions of society, market and class. The ‘historic compromise’ of Italian 
industrial relations obscures the solidarity of trade unions that exclude them 
from social and economic transition. Obviously, different trade unionism 
experiences various kinds of confrontation and has to rethink its identity, since 
unionism cannot be defined by any particular dimension but has to evaluate and 
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put together different needs and challenges from the market, class and society 
(Hyman, 2001). 
The growth of trade union membership often encounters problems such as free-
riders, restricted member services and management retribution against member 
workers; for this reason, trade unions have to gain recognition from bringing 
members into a condition where they are ready to take part in collective action, 
persuading employers to get involved in negotiation, and eternally bringing 
together themselves members and employers to make themselves viable 
bargaining units (Willman, 2001). Legislative regulation, although not helpful for 
mobilisation, supports trade unions against ‘employer recalcitrance and 
employee indifference’ (Willman, 2001: 114), and supportive statutory 
stipulations have a positive impact on increasing new collective agreements 
(Gall, 2004). Moreover, it seems that trade unions encounter a trend of structure 
shifting from being service oriented to being mobilisation driven, as a reflection 
of trade union revitalisation (Fiorito and Jarley, 2008). 
Boxall and Haynes (1997) analyse four typical formats of trade unionism, 
namely classic unionism, paper tiger unionism, consultancy unionism, and 
partnership unionism. Classic unionism focuses on traditional workplace 
solidarity and wage-work bargaining, strongly against employers. Paper tiger 
unionism acts as a formal and dependent agent of arbitration without physically 
powerful relations with the workers. Consultancy unionism practises collective 
bargaining with the partial cooperation of the management and has inadequate 
workforce support. Partnership unionism organises labour solidarity and seeks 
to cooperate with employers in the practice of strategic partnership. 
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Trade union strategy does not mean that trade unions have to officially sketch 
out strategies and does not imply that trade unions have to successfully target 
their problems, because trade unions contain their own structures and methods 
to reflect and adapt their surroundings (Boxall, 2008). Frege and Kelly (2003) 
propose four autonomous factors influencing trade union strategies, namely 
social and economic change, the institutional context, state and employer 
strategies, and union structures themselves. To act strategically, unions have to 
subjectively and actively represent the interests of the majority, not only 
representing those who are already protected by union representation, but also 
those who are employment disadvantaged and ought to be sheltered by trade 
unions as well (Hyman, 2007). 
To sum up, the literature analysing trade unions in Western countries offers 
conceptual and theoretical insights which are of general relevance for analysing 
trade unions’ organisation and their development over time. Despite the radical 
differences in context, many of these themes provide a useful starting point for 
research into Taiwanese trade unionism, in particular by highlighting the 
conditions and factors which shape trade union power. Table 2-1 summarises 
the key insights which I use for my research into Taiwanese corporate unions. 
Table 2-1 Analysing the Characteristics of Trade Unions 
6  
Functions 
2 
Recognising 
Bodies  
3 
Components 
3  
Identities 
4  
Formats 
4 
Autonomous 
Factors 
Power 
Economic 
Members 
Employers 
Autonomy 
Legitimacy 
Market 
Class 
Classic 
unionism 
Social and 
economic 
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regulation 
Job 
regulation 
Social 
change 
Member 
services 
Self-
fulfilment 
(Salamon, 
1998) 
(Willman, 
2001) 
Efficacy 
(Hyman, 
1997) 
Society 
(Hyman, 
2001) 
Paper tiger 
unionism 
Consultancy 
unionism 
Partnership 
unionism 
(Boxall and 
Haynes, 
1997) 
change 
Institutional 
context 
State and 
employer 
strategies 
Union 
structures 
(Frege and 
Kelly, 2003) 
Summarised by author. 
 
2.2. Trade Unions in Taiwan before May 2011 
The state has played the important role of determining the systems of worker 
representation in Taiwan, including both union and non-union mechanisms. 
With regard to trade unions, their decline, with some exceptions, has been 
expected. The Nationalist government initially brought Taiwanese trade unions 
into existence to support its industrial strategies, so enterprises regarded trade 
unions as the basic units in organisations and agreed to develop unions to be 
auxiliary means for the state and enterprises (Chen et al., 2003, Lee, 1999, 
Shieh, 1997, Wu, 1999). Trade unions were supported and subsidised by the 
government and their initial interests were members’ welfare and benefits rather 
than collective labour rights (Deyo, 1989a). 
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In the early 1960s, however, the United States, as the world hegemony, 
interfered in labour-management legislation in Taiwan in two important periods 
of intervention (Shen, 2003): from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the United 
States provided financial aid and set up its embassy to implement the principle 
of free trade to Taiwan; conversely, from 1965, when Taiwan started to expand 
its exports, to the middle and late 1970s, the United States put pressure to 
promote labour welfare and the establishment of a labour department in the 
government. At the time, Taiwan was highly dependent on the United States in 
terms of economy and military affairs; thus the legislation on collective labour 
was revised on the basis of the relative strength of the United States 
government and that of Taiwan. 
The United States still played an important role in reforming labour laws in 
Taiwan during the 1980s due to the expansion of the American labour and 
human rights movements, besides the menace of enormous export totals from 
Taiwan (Cooney, 1996). In addition to focusing on collective regulations, the 
United States at this stage emphasised intellectual property rights, 
environmental protection and so on, partly in order to increase the production 
costs of Taiwanese goods (Cooney, 1996, Shen, 2003). 
According to the Labour Union Act, which was announced in October 1929 and 
amended in July 2000, trade unions in Taiwan could be divided into two types: 
industrial unions and craft unions. An industrial union could be organised by 
more than 30 employees within any industry, area or factory/ workshop; for 
example, the Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union (中華電信工會)14 and the 
                                            
14 http://www.ctwu.org.tw. 
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Taiwan Railway Labour Union (台灣鐵路工會)15. A craft union was composed of 
more than 30 workers who did not have a constant employer but share the 
same professional skills, such as the Taipei Translators and Interpreters Union 
(臺北市翻譯業職業工會)16. Compared to the types of British trade unions 
defined by Flanders (1968), only craft unions seem to have been parallel union 
organisations. In terms of their levels, trade unions in the same city or county 
could found a federation of trade unions, above which a general federation of 
unions could be established at the national level. Thus, a three-tier system of 
trade unions exists in Taiwan. 
According to government statistics (Ministry of Labor, 2014: 36-37), the 
aggregate union density at the end of 2010 had slightly decreased by 0.5% to 
37.3%, compared to the end of the previous year. There were 890 industrial 
unions with a total membership at 14.6% of union density and 3,818 craft 
unions with a membership of 53.4% of union density; and, regarding regional 
and national levels, there were 138 federations of trade unions and 78 general 
federations of unions. 
The decline of industrial unions has become perceptible in the past decade as 
the aggregate number of industrial union members has gone down; but the craft 
union density, though also slightly declining, has gradually increased since 2008 
as more people have joined craft unions (Ministry of Labor, 2014). The main 
purpose of joining a craft union is to be covered by the national labour and 
health insurance schemes (Chen et al., 2003, Kuruvilla et al., 2002, Wei, 2003). 
To be entitled to the benefits of labour and health insurance systems, people 
                                            
15 http://www.trlu.org.tw. 
16 http://www.ttiu.org.tw. 
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have to register as employees in a company or a member of a craft union, since 
enterprises and craft unions are legitimated as insuring units. Unlike the 
prediction of Kuruvilla et al. (2002) that both industrial and craft unions would 
suffer more decline due to the today’s economic changes, craft unions are 
attracting more people without a regular employer who need national insurance 
or who have suffered economic hardship in periods of unemployment 
Nevertheless, craft unions act as so-called ‘labour insurance unions’ (Wei, 2003: 
49) and their main function is not to represent members in bargaining with 
associations of employers. Craft unions are in any case a ‘residual category’ 
(Ho, 2006a: 112) for anyone who is not entitled to join an industrial union, so it 
is quite difficult for craft unions to call for any collective movement. 
In addition, before the latest amendment of the Labour Union Act, the 
membership of a trade union used to be compulsory if one existed and was 
registered to the local labour administrative bureau. When people started to 
work in a unionised workplace, they were involuntarily enrolled in its industrial 
union and typically their membership fees were automatically deducted from 
their salary. When a workplace was not unionised, workers had the right but not 
the obligation to establish a union. Moreover, trade unions in state-owned or 
privatised enterprises are always better organised with sufficient funds and 
numerous members because of the past state policy of supporting economic 
development. 
Chiu (2011) argues that workplace unions in Taiwan will continue decline since 
unions organised within a single workplace in fact limit the automatic 
development of trade unions; however, social movement groups in Taiwan have 
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enforced the development of trade unions, even though there is competition 
between trade unions and social movement groups. 
Taking the example of the Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union, which has been 
one of the leading unions in the Taiwanese labour movement, its collective 
power comes from the response of the union itself to issues and problems, and 
members participate in their union mainly out of self-interest, as a result of their 
own reasoning (Chang and Liu, 2009, Ku, 2008). In order to encourage member 
participation, a union ought to increase labour consciousness as well as 
improve members’ identity (Chang and Liu, 2009). In addition, union leadership 
plays an important role in the success of union survival (Ku, 2008). 
Government intervention in industrial relations is a fundamental influence on 
industrial conflict, whilst different industrial relations policies result in different 
attitudes among labour and management to industrial dispute (Lee, 1997). Ho 
(2003b) argues that the trade union movement in Taiwan is based on 
grassroots militarism rather than class identity, but Taiwanese workers did not 
have much influence on the process of Taiwan’s democratisation. 
For example, since the enactment of the Labour Standards Act several unions 
of mass communication have been set up as more employees of the industry 
have been covered by the law, such as the Kaohsiung Craft Union of Mass 
Communication (高雄市大眾傳播業職業工會)17 in 1987 and the United Daily 
                                            
17 The Kaohsiung Craft Union of Mass Communication (高雄市大眾傳播業職業工會) was set up in 1987 
as the first trade union of mass communication in Taiwan. However, it was dismissed in 2008 by the 
Kaohsiung City Government due to offences against the Trade Union Act and the Civil Associations Act. 
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News Worker’s Union (聯合報工會)18 in 1988. However, the trade unions of 
broadcasting and television corporations, such as the Broadcasting Corporation 
of China Trade Union (中國廣播公司工會), the Chinese Television System 
Incorporation Industrial Union (華視產業工會), the Taiwan Television Enterprise 
Industrial Union (臺視產業工會) and the China Television Company Labour 
Union (中視產業工會),19 were mainly set up by the management and did not 
function well as an independent labour voice (Chiu, 1993). 
Another example of craft unions is in Yunlin, an agricultural county with 
traditional industries in middle Taiwan, where less than one third of the 
respondents in the research of Hsu (2012) were aware of the organisation and 
functions of the craft unions they had joined. Over 40% of his research 
respondents would have liked their craft unions to be involved in their labour 
dispute if one had arisen. The most important aspect of joining a craft union was 
receiving welfare and benefits, such as annual souvenirs, labour education 
activities, members’ subsidised trips, and so on, as more than 70% of the 
respondents attested. 
Chang (2010a) points out that trade union system in Taiwan has five main 
characteristics: first, private sector unions were difficult to set up, very small in 
                                            
18 The United Daily News Worker’s Union (聯合報工會) is the first industrial union of the mass 
communication industry, http://www.udnwu.url.tw/. It signed its first collective agreement with the 
employer United Daily News in 1996. 
19 The Broadcasting Corporation of China (http://www.bcc.com.tw/, 中國廣播公司，中廣) was set up 
in 1928 by the KMT and is now one of the largest broadcasting companies in Taiwan. The Taiwan 
Television Enterprise (http://www.ttv.com.tw/, 臺灣電視事業股份有限公司，臺視) was set up in 
1962 as Taiwan’s first television company owned by the state, the China Television Company 
(http://www.ctv.com.tw/, 中國電視事業股份有限公司，中視) established in 1968 was the second one 
invested by the KMT, and the Chinese Television System Incorporation (http://www.cts.com.tw/, 中華
電視股份有限公司，華視) was set up in 1971 by the government. They used to be responsible for the 
three main television channels. 
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scope and with limited resources; second, public sector unions after 
liberalisation focused only on their own interests and were unable to stand with 
the private sector unions; third, craft unions were unions for labour and health 
insurance only, without any of the function of representing craft workers; fourth, 
industrial unions were in fact enterprise or factory unions which were 
fragmentary and difficult to integrate with each other; last, most federation 
unions were only reorganised or rebranded versions of existing unions and did 
not make any sense to their rank and file. 
Collective bargaining is regulated by the Collective Agreement Act, which was 
enacted in 1930 and then modified in 2008. Accordingly, the trade unions are 
the only legitimate bodies to negotiate issues to do with specifying employment 
relations and to conclude written contracts with an employer or an association 
of employers. However, the coverage of collective bargaining is very limited 
(Kuruvilla et al., 2002, Wei, 2003). Only 49 collective agreements had been 
signed by the end of September 2009, though there were 4,735 unions with a 
total number of 3,162,346 members and the employed labour force totalled 
10,278,000 persons (Ministry of Labor, 2014). Hence, collective bargaining in 
Taiwan may be described as ‘rare and underdeveloped’ (Wu, 1999). 
Wu and Yang (2010: 33-45) argue that under state control collective bargaining 
before 2000 was only the by-product of economic precedence, so Taiwanese 
collective bargaining was not a distribution of power and interests between 
labour and management or the justification of industrial conflicts, but only a 
managerial control of the sharing of responsibility and obligation. To some 
extent, the actual practice of collective bargaining in Taiwan became the 
employer’s mechanism of labour management as unions became their means 
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of urging workers to observe discipline and take responsibility in the workplace. 
The government retained the power to make decisions, since both management 
and labour were attached to the state. 
According to Pang et al. (2008: 35-36), there is no collective agreement in 
seven main sectors: accommodation and food service activities, real estate 
activities, professional, scientific and technical activities, education, human 
health and social work activities, public administration, and other service 
activities, because craft unions in most accommodation and food service 
activities and other service activities have not engaged in collective bargaining, 
professional workers in professional, scientific and technical activities, 
education, human health and social work activities, public administration, and 
real estate activities lack labour and collective conciseness and do not think of 
themselves as labour, and the government severely restricts collective 
bargaining in professional, scientific and technical activities, education, human 
health and social work activities, and public administration. 
Approximately 70% of collective agreements apply to the manufacturing sector 
which has the greatest number of manual workers, and most collective 
agreements are signed in industry-intensive cities, such as Taoyuan, Kaohsiung, 
Taipei and Taichung. Over 90% of collective agreements are fixed-term 
contracts and 60% of them are effective for three years. However, more than 
80% of contracts have gone out of date without any renewal, partly because 
many collective agreements are in fact not genuine agreements between labour 
and management but a perfunctory response to governmental policy (Pang et 
al., 2008: 36-41). 
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Additionally, no collective agreement has been concluded in the science-based 
industrial parks where high-technology industries are located (Ministry of Labor, 
2014). Whilst trade unions are the only legally representative body for workers 
in collective bargaining, there is at present no trade union in the science-based 
industrial parks. 
During the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party between 2000 and 
2008, the logic of collective bargaining had four determining factors: the politico-
economic context, political and/or industrial elites, the characteristics and status 
of actors in industrial relations, and the power relationships and interaction of 
workers and management (Wu, 2003). Wu discusses the development of a 
‘human rights oriented’ policy of collective bargaining to gain more votes and 
public support. In pursuit of this the government started in 2000 to modify the 
three pillars of collective labour rights in Taiwan: the Labour Union Act, the 
Collective Agreement Act and the Act for the Settlement of Labour-Management 
Disputes. 
Furthermore, the right of collective bargaining used to be statutory but voluntary. 
Workers and management had to negotiate whether to bring collective 
bargaining to their workplace before any formal bargaining began. If one side 
was not willing to negotiate, the other side could not do anything to insist on 
collective bargaining. In January 2008, the modification of the Collective 
Agreement Act, Article 6, changed the right of collective bargaining from 
voluntary to obligatory. If one party called for collective bargaining to take place, 
the other side could not refuse without reasonable excuse. This suggests that 
the government is aiming to get rid of unfair labour practices and to encourage 
bargaining in workplaces in good faith (Huang, 2008). 
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Like American and British legislations, Taiwan’s latest revision of the practice of 
collective bargaining, according to Wu (2010b), indicates that it will develop so 
long as the procedural regulation of the Collective Agreement Act works with 
the relevant disciplining mechanisms. Moreover, Chen (2010) argues that lack 
of collective bargaining in Taiwan results from the ineptness of labour legislation 
in the past rather than from the limited power of the trade unions. He suggests 
that the modification of the Collective Agreement Act will move collective 
bargaining shift to greater centralisation as bargaining at the business and local 
levels becomes the new trend and trade unions grow bigger and are centralised 
in enterprise and local industrial unions. 
However, collective labour legislation in Taiwan has been a means for political 
campaigns to win elections, no matter which ruling party the president belongs 
to. It is clear that the change of collective labour legislation is mainly driven by 
political demand rather than a response to labour needs and therefore the 
reform of collective labour regulations will ineluctably proceed (Wang, 2010).  
 
2.3. Trade Unions in Taiwan from May 2011 onward 
The new regulation of trade union organisations implemented from 1 May 2011 
defined three official categories of trade union, namely, corporate unions, 
industrial unions and craft unions. According to Article 6 of the Labour Union Act: 
Labour unions can be classified into the following three types; 
however, teachers can only organise and join the labour unions 
referred to in Subparagraphs 2 and 3: 
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1. Corporate union: a labour union organised by employees of the 
same factory or workplace, of the same business entity, of 
enterprises with a controlling and subordinate relationship between 
each other in accordance with the Company Act, or of a financial 
holding company and its subsidiaries in accordance with the 
Financial Holding Company Act. 
2. Industrial union: a labour union organised by workers in the 
industry. 
3. Craft union: a labour union organised by workers with the same 
professional skills. 
The organisational district of a craft union in accordance with 
Subparagraph 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be limited to the 
municipal city or county (city) where it is located. 
Craft unions retain the same scope of organising workers with the same skill or 
profession and within geographical limits. The previous so-called industrial 
unions were renamed corporate unions to reflect the fact that a corporate union 
is actually organised within a specific workplace or factory. Therefore, industrial 
unions, such as the National Senior High School Teachers’ Union (全國高級中
等學校教育產業工會)20, finally act according to the definition by Flanders (1968) 
to cover employees in the relevant industries and beyond the capacity of the 
workplace, in order to organise workers in non-unionised workplaces. This was 
the very first time in labour movement history that teachers had been allowed to 
                                            
20 http://www.nshstu.org.tw/. 
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organise or join trade unions, even though they cannot form a union within a 
particular school or institution. Moreover, the amended legislation relaxes the 
limits of compulsory union membership so that workers now had the freedom to 
join a corporate trade union or leave one. After 2011, only one corporate union 
was allowed in any workplace. 
According to the state report, at the end of 2012 there were in total 5,225 trade 
unions with a total of 3,387,524 members, including 233 federated unions, 892 
corporate unions (537,419 members), 84 industrial unions (51,603 members) 
and 4,016 craft unions (2,798,502 members). Compared to the end of 2011, 
there were now 183 new trade unions, including 8 federated unions, 3 corporate 
unions, 47 industrial unions and 125 craft unions. The union recruitment rate 
very slightly increased, by 0.1% to 34.9% at the end of 2012 (Council of Labor 
Affairs, 2012, Council of Labor Affairs, 2013a). 
Nevertheless, the latest statistics (Ministry of Labor, 2016a) reveals that the 
overall union organisation rate dropped from 37.3% at the end of 2010 to 34.8% 
at the end of 2011, and since then has been almost stagnating: 34.3% (end of 
2013), 33.7% (end of 2014) and later 33.4% (end of 2015). In numbers, 
industrial unions have increased from 37 in 2011 to 158 in 2015, whilst 
corporate unions have increased a little from 889 in 2011 to 909 in 2015, and 
craft unions from 3,891 in 2011 to 4,105 in 2015. The number of people covered 
by an industrial union has expanded from 34,785 in 2011 to 79,217 in 2015, and 
the members of corporate unions have risen from 529,685 in 2011 to 547,283 in 
2015, but craft union members have gone down from 2,757,499 in 2011 to 
2,724,020 in 2015. 
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Based on the official statistics, the decline of union membership in recent 
decades does not seem an obvious issue, as it has been in other countries. 
Apparently, it is still doubtful whether the new Labour Union Act would help the 
development of Taiwanese trade unions although it seems that the industrial 
unions are currently flourishing. 
In 2016, the new Taoyuan Flight Attendants Union (TFAU) called a strike in 
front of the headquarters of China Airlines in Taipei from midnight of the 24th 
June. The union eventually made agreements with the company on the evening 
of the 24th evening and the picket line withdrew at 11pm the same night. The 
TFAU was established as a craft union in November 2015 by members 
originally from the Third Branch of the China Airlines Employees Union (CAEU, 
中華航空公司企業工會)21. The CAEU Third Branch consists of the flight 
attendants of China Airlines, who had long been dissatisfied with the CAEU for 
not speaking out on their behalf but acting as a yellow union. In May 2016, 
China Airlines announced some changes to flight attendants’ working conditions 
                                            
21 The China Airlines Employees Union (CAEU, 中華航空公司企業工會, http://www.ciunion.net/) was 
set up in 1988 by the company at a time when the union officials were directly appointed by the 
management. It currently has six branches, the First Branch (第一分會) of the employees in the 
headquarters; the Second Branch (第二分會) of the employees, including pilots, in flight affairs and 
training centres; the Third Branch (第三分會) of the employees in flight services and in-flight supplies 
including flight attendants; the Fourth Branch (第四分會) of the employees in the engineering and 
maintenance workshops; the Fifth Branch (第五分會) of the employees in the China Airlines Taipei 
Branch, cargo and ground services including ground staff;, and the Sixth Branch (第六分會) of the 
employees in the China Airlines Kaohsiung Branch. Following the deregulation of the Labour Union Act 
in 2011 and given that it still operates as a pro-employer union, the pilots of the Second Branch set up 
the Taoyuan Union of Pilots (TUP, 桃園機師職業工會, http://pilotunion.org.tw/) in May 2014, the 
engineering and maintenance staff of the Fourth Branch established the China Airlines Maintenance and 
Engineering Labour Union (CAMELU, 中華航空股份有限公司修護工廠企業工會, 
http://www.camelu.org/) in September 2015, and the flight attendants of the Third and Sixth Branches 
organised the TFAU in November 2015. All three new unions have been registered to the Taoyuan City 
Government. The TUP and the TFAU are both craft unions open to all airlines, but the CAMELU registers 
as a new corporate union within China Airlines. Therefore, the CAEU along with the company have 
appealed to the Ministry of Labour to judge the CAMELU as illegal and the Ministry of Labour has 
approved the case. The CAMELU plans to go through administrative litigation to maintain its legality and 
justification. 
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to be made from June, which would result in longer working hours which would 
not be officially recorded in order to keep in line with regulations. After the TFAU 
members’ demonstration on 31 May in front of the Ministry of Labour, the 
company and the union were still unable to reach any agreement, so the union 
held a strike ballot for its 2,638 members on 10 June. In the end, over 90% of 
the crews agreed to strike. The union finally announced on the afternoon of 23 
June that they would come out on strike on 24 June. Not surprisingly, the CAEU 
blamed and suspected the TFAU during the strike process, and then tried to 
benefit as a free-rider after the TFAU’s success. However, this was the very first 
time that a craft union had legally gone ahead and won after a strike in Taiwan. 
The success of the TFAU has certainly inspired people, though it is still a 
question whether the company will keep its promises. Trade union movements 
in Taiwan seem to have been transformed. It is very likely that craft unions and 
industrial unions will progress in the near future to representing their members 
in negotiations with their employers and that corporate unions may face new 
challenges from these unions. Therefore, it is important to study these old 
unions in the new era. 
 
2.4. Non-Union Representation in the Workplace 
Non-union representation refers to the participation of employees in some kind 
of representative committee supported by the company to express their needs 
and get involved in some of the decision-making procedures in the organisation, 
such as joint consultation and works councils (Gollan, 2006). It is ‘an integral 
element in providing the diffusion of information provision and employee 
involvement through consultation as a means to enhance organisational 
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performance’ (Gollan, 2007: 6-7). There are three types of non-union 
mechanisms differentiated by their initial formalisation: some by the state, some 
by the management and others by non-profit organisations such as trade unions 
(Heery et al., 2004: 21-28). Some commentators argue that management are in 
favour of introducing some kinds of non-union mechanisms because worker 
involvement and participation would harmonise industrial relations and increase 
the productivity in the workplace (Baugher, 2003, Lansbury and Wailes, 2008). 
Arguing from evidence about enterprises in Minnesota, Han (2005) analyses 
work teams, quality circles, suggestion systems and joint labour-management 
committees to conclude that most employees involved in some kind of 
mechanism or committee in workplace are merely given a restricted degree of 
control of non-strategic aspects of workplace, such as production. 
A classic example of non-union representation in Europe is works councils, 
which are a promising form of worker representation compared to collective 
bargaining, and may be categorised by whether they are based on employee or 
trade union involvement, statutorily required or voluntarily developed, and by 
the divergences of privileges and responsibilities (Jenkins and Blyton, 2008). 
Nevertheless, non-union employee representation has been an emerging issue 
in Europe since the enactment of the European Works Council Directive of 1994, 
regardless of the opt-out strategy of the UK at the time. A considerable number 
of journal articles elaborates on the European Works Councils (EWCs) from 
various perspectives. In terms of the politics, Stirling and Tully (2004), for 
instance, argue that to achieve the success and effectiveness of EWCs, people 
have to realise the problems created by the various languages and cross-
cultural communication in Europe, since cultural and linguistic barriers reinforce 
76 of 303 
the power relationships between different interest groups. Stirling and Tully 
further state that EWCs are usually composed of interest groups with diverse 
and potentially conflicting interests. Moreover, Gilman and Marginson (2002) 
address the factors influencing the nature of the ‘constrained choices’ in 
concluding agreements for establishing EWCs. The ‘statutory model effect’ has 
strong evidence in its favour, but the ‘learning effect’, ‘country effect’ and ‘sector 
effect’ must all be considered seriously as well. Lucio and Weston (2000) 
stipulate that as miscellaneous interactions of supranational regulation and 
international labour constitutions, EWCs have been formalised by the social and 
political environment, and new forms of transnational employment and industrial 
regulation have to be acknowledged. 
In relation to works councils in France and Germany, Hege and Dufour (1995) 
stress the complementarity of union and non-union representative structures. 
Employee representatives provide a channel of information and communication 
for the union, whilst the union provides material resources and legitimacy for the 
representatives. 
Chen and Pang (2002) compare collective bargaining and non-union 
representation in Taiwan, the United States, Germany and Japan and conclude 
four differences. First, the premise of collective bargaining is the confrontation 
of labour and management. Although unions exert collective power to negotiate 
with employers, non-union representation focuses on the sustainability of 
business and maintaining of employment relations so the labour and 
management can get the same value from cooperation. Second, trade unions 
and employers or employer associations are the interested parties of collective 
bargaining, but the persons concerned in non-union representation are all 
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members, whether unionised or not, and multi-dimensioned, even though the 
unions may be involved in practice. Third, collective bargaining concerns the 
content of labour contracts such as wages, hours and so on, but non-union 
representation consists of aspects outside labour contracts, including business 
management. However, it is not easy to distinguish the two by considering the 
items that they discuss: trade unions may nowadays include more issues in 
negotiation with management, and non-union representation may discuss 
affairs relevant to collective bargaining. Fourth, concluding a collective 
agreement depends on all the representatives in both parties agreeing with 
each other, so the processes of negotiation or arbitration help to come to a 
conclusion; in terms of non-union representation, it is not possible to gain the 
mutual agreement of labour and management representatives on many kinds of 
issue, for example, economic and financial matters; hence some mechanisms 
may empower only the employee representatives’ rights of information and 
consultation. 
To sum up, non-union representation refers to the representative mechanisms 
mainly supported by the management, even if they are initiated by the 
government, the employer or the union. Obviously the issues discussed are not 
as a rule directly associated with core business operations in whatever country. 
The debate is always on the relationship of trade unions and non-union 
representation in the workplace. The present research mainly discusses in the 
following chapters the types of non-union representative mechanisms and how 
these mechanisms operate. 
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2.5. Non-Union Representation in Taiwan 
Non-union representation has been available in Taiwan for a long time. The first 
kind of non-union representation in Taiwan can be traced back to 1929, when 
the Nationalist government enacted the Factory Act as a practice of 
competiveness as well as cooperation (Hou, 2005), to create factory 
committees which were organised monthly by equal numbers of representatives 
of both workers and employers to discuss issues regarding employment 
relations, such as increasing work efficiency, improving the relationship 
between factory management and workers, assisting with the implementation of 
work contracts and factory rules, reforming the terms and conditions of the 
factory, and planning workers’ fringe benefits. Meanwhile, statutory committees 
are the main sort of non-union representation in businesses. They consist of 
four legal committees convened by labour and management representatives in 
all enterprises, as follows: labour-management meetings, employee welfare 
committees, labour safety and health committees (職業安全衛生委員會), and 
supervisory committees of worker’s retirement reserve funds (勞工退休準備金監
督委員會). The most important one is labour-management meetings because 
almost all issues in the workplace can be proposed and discussed at this forum. 
The other three meetings are specified for different areas in the workplace as 
their titles suggest. For example, labour safety and health committees are the 
most direct channel for reinforcing health and safety conditions in the workplace 
(You and Chen, 2007). 
Additionally, the implementation of worker directors on the board was first 
regulated for state-owned enterprises only, and then extended to the private 
sector. This concept originated from the German co-determination system as a 
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practice of industrial democracy, but the outcome is not the same because the 
economic structures and employment relations are different from Germany’s 
(Wei, 2002). However, Han (2004) compares the different experiences of labour 
representation in Germany and Taiwan; he concludes that social dialogue is an 
important factor of a successful representative system but industrial relations in 
Taiwan do not have the basis of social dialogue to facilitate good practice in 
workers’ representation. The case of the Aerospace Industrial Development 
Corporation (漢翔航空工業股份有限公司)22, which is a state-owned enterprise 
specialising in aircraft and engine manufacture and maintenance, demonstrates 
that partnership between labour and management has not yet been achieved in 
Taiwan (Hou, 2005). 
In addition, financial participation, such as employee stock ownership plans in 
high-tech industry, is quite popular and a key element in economic growth in 
Taiwan. It is a mixture of profit sharing and employee ownership and is closely 
related to enterprise productivity and profitability. High-tech companies take it 
as a means of attracting and keeping employees (Han, 2003). Non-union 
committees, alternatively, have shed light on industrial democracy. 
 
2.5.1. Labour-Management Meeting 
The organisation, structure and issues of meetings of labour and management 
are regulated according to the Regulations for Implementing Labour-
Management Meeting announced in 1985 and amended in 2001, 2007 and 
                                            
22 http://www.aidc.com.tw. 
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2014. However, these regulations have no teeth and employers who refuse to 
hold labour-management meetings are neither penalised nor fined (Wei, 2003). 
Based on the above regulation, the rights of reporting, discussing and 
suggesting form the boundaries of labour-management meetings. 
Representatives report on the implementation of the decisions made in the 
previous meeting, labour turnover, production plans and business conditions, 
and so on; discuss matters relating to the harmonization of industrial relations 
and labour-management cooperation, matters relating to working terms and 
conditions, the planning of labour welfare and the increase of labour productivity; 
and then make suggestions to do with these issues. Decisions taken at the 
committee should be forwarded by the business to the trade union or to the 
department concerned with implementation, and should be reported in writing to 
the local competent authority for reference. Should the decisions taken prove 
impracticable, they may be referred back to the next meeting for further 
consideration. 
The regulation seems intended as a channel of labour and management 
communication and as a counterpart of the works councils in Europe, but the 
paradox is that in practice the rights of representatives are not as ‘real’ as a 
system of ‘co-determination’. Issues dealt with in labour-management meetings 
are matters relating to the harmonisation of industrial relations and labour-
management cooperation, relating to working terms and conditions, the 
planning of labour welfare and the increase of labour productivity, but are not 
the critical issues of working terms and conditions or the enterprise’s basic 
operation. Committees do not have any essential impact on businesses (Chen 
and Pang, 2002, Cheng, 2000, Huang et al., 2003). 
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Furthermore, decisions made at the labour-management meeting are not 
mandatory, even though the meetings may takes place regularly and smoothly 
(Chen and Pang, 2002, Cheng, 2000, Huang et al., 2003, Wei, 2003). If the 
enterprise were not willing to implement a decision taken by the committee, 
workers would not be able to ask any unbiased outsiders for conciliation or 
arbitration, even if they supposed that the enterprise did not think highly of the 
labour-management meeting. This crucial problem of the institution provides 
employers with the means to avoid sharing control with workers. 
Moreover, Hou (2005) has some conclusions about issues arising from labour-
management meetings. First, the regulation of labour-management meetings is 
in fact a ‘public law’ which without redress heavily intervenes in the ‘private law’ 
area of labour contracts, relying mainly on legislation to override bargaining in 
good faith. Second, labour-management meetings help peaceful negotiation 
between workers and management, but both sides will damage the purpose 
unless they have mutual trust and cooperation. Third, the roles of labour and 
management representatives are not easy to distinguish in state-owned 
enterprises, because management representatives are agents of the state and 
labour-management relations are actually labour-government relations. Fourth, 
labour representatives may not be able to fulfil their role if they are not backed 
up by the union, because there is a risk that management will take revenge for 
their behaviours in meetings when they cease to be labour representatives. 
Fifth, labour-management meetings may function as the employer’s rubber 
stamp, because some management representatives take these meetings as an 
extension of regular company administrative meetings and seek approval from 
the labour representatives in partnership in labour-management meetings as 
the foundation of industrial democracy. However, voluntary, peaceful 
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negotiation cannot proceed when management and representatives do not have 
a basis of mutual trust and only their asymmetric relationship exists. 
Furthermore, Chen and Pang (2002) argue that the involvement of the union in 
labour-management meetings may result only in conflict instead of cooperation 
between labour and management. If the agenda of labour-management 
meetings covers matters of collective bargaining both mechanisms may 
become entangled. 
However, labour-management meetings are still a practice of workplace 
democracy, giving labour representatives the chance to participate with 
management in work-related affairs. Nevertheless, the practice needs enforcing 
mechanisms to guarantee its continuance and legislation plays an important 
role in determining whether industrial democracy may or may not be practised 
(Huang, 1996). Moreover, in a country such as Taiwan, where trade unions 
have not yet matured enough to negotiate labour conditions, labour-
management meetings are essential for helping mutual agreements to be made 
between labour and management (Chou, 2011). In spite of the argument that 
decisions at labour-management meetings are not mandatory, Chou (2011) 
analyses several court verdicts of courts to demonstrate that labour-
management meetings are in fact recognised as legitimate by courts of law. 
These meetings provide an important representative mechanism until collective 
bargaining becomes available to all workers. 
Chou (2011) further proposes some possible ways of enhancing labour-
management meetings, such as upgrading the regulations on implementation to 
the status of laws, assuring the independence of labour elected representatives, 
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adding regulations to protect labour representatives, clarifying the powers of 
labour-management meetings, and so on. 
 
2.5.2. Worker Directors 
The issue of having worker directors on the board in Taiwan was initially 
proposed to the public by the Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union in January 
1996. This union has been the most active in the country since 1996, when its 
president was for the first time elected from the rank and file. However, the 
government did not consider the issue at the time. In June 2000, however, the 
Legislative Yuan passed the amendment to the Administrative Law of State-
Owned Enterprises (國營事業管理法), which is the only statute to refer to 
worker directors in Taiwan; the amendment allowed worker directors 
recommended by the trade union and appointed by the enterprise to be the 
representatives of state capital on the board. According to Article 35, the boards 
of state-owned enterprises have to nominate worker directors to represent state 
capital, letting each one of these worker directors represent 20 percent of the 
state capital invested. 
Article 35 of the Administrative Law of State-Owned Enterprises (Legislative 
Yuan, 2011) says, 
A director, auditor, trustee or supervisor of one state-run enterprise 
shall not concurrently hold the same position in another state-run 
enterprise, except for the purpose of merger or the establishment of 
holding companies. Under such exceptional circumstances, the 
director and trustee of one state-run enterprise may concurrently hold 
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the same position in another state-run enterprise, as well as holding 
the positions of auditor and supervisor. The director, auditor, trustee 
and supervisor who hold the same position in another state-run 
enterprise may be elected as the chairperson or, vice chairperson of 
the board, or another equal position. 
At least one fifth of the directors and trustees of one state-run 
enterprise who represent state capital shall be recommended by the 
relevant labour union. 
The labour union may replace the recommended directors and 
trustees who are considered incompetent. 
Huang and Lin (2004: 13-17), from a legal perspective, argue that although the 
worker directors are nominated by the union, their rights, obligations, and 
qualifications are the same as the other (state-appointed) directors, which may 
make it difficult to select worker directors. Additionally, the role of worker 
director is ambiguous because of their relationship with the state-owned 
business and the state, as well as the union (Wei, 2002: 244-246). Therefore, 
trade unions in state-owned enterprises have adopted their own regulations on 
the election and recall of worker directors, mainly focusing on ways to select the 
appropriate candidates, but also emphasising the obligations on these people to 
the union and their fellow-workers and indicating the establishment of advisory 
committees to support worker directors; apparently unions are more cautious 
than employers about the practice of worker directors on the board (Huang and 
Lin, 2004: 158-164). 
Regardless of the flawed legislation, worker directors have been introduced by 
many state-owned and privatised ventures, such as the Aerospace Industrial 
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Development Corporation (state-owned), the Taiwan Sugar Corporation (state-
owned, 台灣糖業股份有限公司)23, the Chunghwa Telecom (privatised, 中華電信
股份有限公司)24, the China Steel Corporation (privatised, 中國鋼鐵股份有限公
司)25, the Land Bank of Taiwan (privatised, 臺灣土地銀行)26, and so on. 
Nevertheless, a few state-owned corporations do not set up worker directors, 
such as the Bank of Taiwan (臺灣銀行)27, which is the only national bank 
without a worker director. 
Nevertheless, worker directors on the board may play a crucial role in the 
process of privatisation. Ku (2007) analysed the case of the Chunghwa 
Telecom Company with its union, the Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union, and 
showed that the labour representatives of industrial democracy functioned to 
connect the company with the union, which in addition earns more support for 
the union in representing its members’ interests. 
 
2.6. Trade Union and Non-Union Representation in Taiwan 
The focus of representation at work began with the organisation of trade unions, 
but then extended to non-union mechanisms as well, since the decline in trade 
unions has become universal. Suggestions of union revitalisation have been 
made, but non-union representation is no substitute for unions. The research by 
Chiu and Han (2005) on the antecedents of supporting representative 
                                            
23 http://www.taisugar.com.tw. 
24 http://www.cht.com.tw. 
25 http://www.1st.com.tw. 
26 http://www.landbank.com.tw. 
27 http://www.bot.com.tw. 
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mechanisms in the workplace finds that the influence of the union is related to 
the level of workers’ support for systems of representation. Thus, the future of 
worker representation in Taiwan consists of three components: collective 
bargaining, labour-management meetings, and worker directors (Wei, 2002: 
249). Despite the statutory efforts, as Wei suggests, trade unions will play a key 
role in reinforcing these mechanisms provided that they have better and 
stronger structures and organisations. 
The Taiwanese non-union representation system has mainly been regulated by 
the government, though any individual entity may set up its own mechanisms. In 
unionised workplaces, trade unions usually have the privilege of being involved 
in non-union representing committees with which the unions may compete or 
cooperate. However, it seems that quite a few enterprises basically follow the 
state’s legal requirements for the sake of compliance, not in order to build good 
communication between labour and management. As a result, one question to 
address is whether and how these non-union representative mechanisms 
function in practice. 
As discussed previously, trade unions which used to be called industrial unions 
are now renamed corporate unions, whilst the state in fact has extended the 
coverage of the new corporate unions. It has been a long-term argument that 
Taiwanese trade unions are only ‘flower vase’ trade unions (花瓶工會), ‘capon’ 
labour unions (閹雞工會) or yellow unions, which are nothing more than servile 
followers of their employers in the workplace and are not organised to serve the 
workers. Following the enactment of the new Labour Union Act on 1 May 2011, 
all kinds of new trade unions are very likely to be established. Instead of 
investigating the new trends of trade unions, the present study looks back at the 
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corporate unions, formerly the industrial unions. The change in collective 
legislation also constitutes a challenge to revitalising these old trade unions 
today. One specific aspect to be discussed in the following chapters is the 
representation of trade unions compared with non-union representation. This 
research argues that non-union representative mechanisms provide corporate 
unions with a platform to interact with the management and fosters their 
legitimacy and power in the workplace. Trade unions also ensure and improve 
the regular and sound practice of non-union representation. 
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Chapter 3. Paternalism and Collective Identity at Work 
Paternalism is a predominant characteristic of the work culture in Taiwan, where 
employers tend to manipulate workers in an authoritarian, benevolent and moral 
way. It has been a top-down ideology to which workers have been imperceptibly 
familiarised by the government in order for it to maintain political control and 
economic development and is still influential nowadays. Under this ideology, 
employers take care of workers’ lives outside the workplace, for instance, their 
accommodation and education, in order to secure a docile and loyal workforce 
in return. As a result, it is more familial than dictatorial in nature. 
Identity at work emerges from one’s various experiences of individual life, work 
and so on. Each individual has views about him/herself as well as relationships 
with associated groups, such as identification with their place of work. As a 
result, identity at work remains a vital element in shaping and changing the 
nature of employment relations. Therefore, it is important to learn how workers 
may identify themselves in a unionised workplace, whether they have collective 
identity or not. Collective identity at work may help trade unionism in that in 
terms of member recognition it is a fundamental factor of union development. 
After reviewing the theme of identity at work in the Western literature on this 
topic, the focus shifts to the circumstances of identity at work in Taiwan. As 
briefly addressed in the first chapter, the lack of a collective identity has been a 
dominant phenomenon of Taiwanese employment relations, for individualism 
has always been emphasised. In its last section, this chapter reviews the 
relationship between paternalism, collective identity at work and trade unions in 
Taiwan. Briefly, paternalism has been an important factor influencing collective 
identity at work and the development of trade unions and so this research 
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required a clear view of the background to facilitate further findings and 
discussions in the chapters to come. 
 
3.1. Managerial Paternalism in the Workplace 
‘Paternalistic forms of leadership involve practices by which organizational 
loyalty is engendered by treating the workplace as an extended family, where 
workers are nurtured, protected and controlled’ (Rajan-Rankin, 2016: 231). In a 
paternalistic workplace, employment relations are viewed rather as family 
relationships which the employer manipulates employees by taking care of their 
needs in pursuit of a harmonic and sheltered environment. Kerfoot and Knights 
(1993: 665) argue that paternalistic management adopts a family-like face to 
look after workers whilst exercising its power and thus reduces strain in the 
workplace. 
Paternalism is predominant in industrial relations in Taiwan, since the 
government used to promote it as a nationwide policy. Paternalistic employment 
relations not only impact on trade union organisation and activity but also 
influence the way in which employees sense and identify themselves in the 
workplace. Farnham and Pimlott (1995) identity four managerial forms of 
industrial relations in terms of the various degrees of labour participation that 
they produce, namely, authoritarian, paternalistic, consultative and participative. 
Authoritarian management is the traditional management style which sets the 
employer as the one and only authority in the workplace without or with the 
least possible employee participation. Paternalistic management may have low 
employee involvement but holds a pluralistic view of the workplace. 
Consultative management warmly encourages workers to become involved in 
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managerial decisions, yet maintains management as the ultimate decision 
maker. Last of all, participative management is in general open to frequent 
instances of labour participation in a pluralistic workplace. 
Paternalism may be classified into three types: traditional paternalism, welfare 
paternalism and sophisticated paternalism. Traditional paternalism applies 
paternal authority to the workplace and is usually observed in small organisation, 
where the employer interacts directly as a parent with the employees. Welfare 
paternalism can be seen when a workplace takes on more workers, making the 
welfare and benefits on offer more formal and regular. Third, sophisticated 
paternalism uses official channels and institutions to deal with the sharing with 
employees of welfare and benefits, yet maintains its devotion to the paternalistic 
tradition of management (Wray, 1996: 702-704). 
Moreover, trade union recognition may be a feature of definitions of paternalism 
and, in Deaton (1985), paternalistic management offers consultation and 
information to workers without much recognition of trade unions or the interests 
of formal industrial relations. Nevertheless, paternalism in general pays 
attention to individualism; thus, labour’s interests are emphasised despite 
reducing production costs and increasing labour dedication; and, in addition, 
modern paternalism is concerned to cooperate, so unions have a chance to 
influence decision making in the workplace (Kessler and Purcell, 2003). 
Workers in a paternalistic place of work are usually pledged to their employer 
and as a result are guaranteed a better chance of remaining employed 
(Edwards and Wajcman, 2005: 124). Besides, Ashwin (1998) investigates that 
when experiencing difficulties in the workplace individual workers under the 
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system of the Soviet paternalism tend to seek for authoritarian leadership which 
guarantees stronger security for their necessity of lives. 
Paternalism means that management not only manipulates work conditions but 
also provides care for the employees’ welfare. Paternalistic leadership is a 
common characteristic in Chinese organisations, but may exist in other cultures 
provided that employers and their subordinates are in need of a paternalistic 
approach (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008). Deyo (1989a: 152-166) categorises 
East Asian labour systems into six types: (1) patriarchy in small family firms 
where patriarchal authority dominates both economic and non-economic 
activities and close relations reinforce male control, especially in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan; (2) communal paternalism in large domestic businesses in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, where workers receive more non-economic benefits such as 
training and job security; (3) bureaucratic paternalism, as in Singapore, for 
white-collar, high status workers in multinational companies, who enjoy job 
ladders, an internal labour market and so on; (4) patrimonialism in large Korean 
domestic enterprises, with a dependable and obedient labour force, owing to job 
uncertainty and enslavement; (5) hyper-proletarian paternalism towards low 
status female workers in multinational companies or export-processing zones, 
where workers must totally rely on their salaries; and (6) stable proletarian 
paternalism towards low status, white collar workers in heavy industries, who in 
general are entitled to better wages and greater job security than hyper-
proletarian workers are.  
Some early studies show that paternalistic values may be found in Taiwanese 
enterprises, including even foreign invested companies and management tends 
to practise paternalistic management as a way of helping its employees (Chang, 
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1985, Chang, 1987). Cheng, Farh and their colleagues (Cheng et al., 2000, 
Cheng et al., 2004, Farh and Cheng, 2000) analyse paternalistic leadership as 
father-like, dictatorial generous and consisting of three elements, namely, 
authoritarianism, benevolence and morality. Authoritarian leadership means that 
management is the single authority and workers have to obey and respect it 
without hesitation or objection. Benevolent leadership shows individual care for 
both the life and work needs of employees who are viewed as family members 
and are grateful to management (Lin and Cheng, 2012). Moral leadership 
emphasises and practises standards of morality in order to persuade followers 
to agree and perpetuate the same values. In consequence, paternalistic 
leadership involves both individual and collective levels in the workplace (Cheng 
et al., 2010). 
In Taiwan, employees under paternalistic leadership have more normative 
obligations than Western leadership imposes, but benevolent and moral 
features are much more influential than authoritarian (Cheng et al., 2004). 
Authoritarian management and benevolent management interact in influencing 
employee reactions, whilst authoritarian management improves workers’ 
effectiveness and benevolent management helps their strength of mind (Chou 
et al., 2010). In fact, the interpersonal relationships of managers and their 
employees in enterprises have an impact on organisational function (Lin, 2010). 
Taiwanese workers are likely to follow management directions if they 
understand and anticipate the advantage of these directions (Bu et al., 2001a). 
Faith and doubt in paternalistic management in fact affect the effectiveness of 
workers (Jiang et al., 2012). 
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Paternalism is a capital and labour relationship when management compels its 
subordinates to exchange their labour for wages and elements beyond this, 
such as welfare (Chou, 2002). In terms of exploitation, paternalistic 
management often pay employees more than their output, yet the organisation 
still earns sufficient revenues (Liu et al., 2010). However, Bae et al. (2011) 
observe that managerial style in Taiwan has shifted from being paternalistic to 
something that offers less job security and so on, as a result of responding to 
environmental changes such as globalisation. 
The definition of paternalism for use in this research is that the party in authority, 
which in the workplace is the employer, rather than having an antagonistic view 
of its subordinates, the workers in the workplace, may look after their needs and 
create a culture of harmony and universal values, allowing people in the same 
workplace to view each other as if in a family and follow the discipline set by the 
employer. Paternalistic management, as we have seen, has three important 
characteristics: authority, benevolence and morality. Employers act to exert 
their power and influence, offer a form of ‘parental care’, and pursue practices 
designed to show that the company constitutes a united group. The campaign 
to have the ‘factory as one family’ is a symbol of paternalistic management in 
practice, making employees tame, docile and grateful to their employer. 
 
3.2. Identity and Work 
Identity shapes the ways that we act, teaching us how to respond to the 
environment and differentiating us from others. It emerges from our close 
relations with specific circumstances which at the same time limit the available 
sources of definitions and conceptions as well as creating the process of 
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identity. Sociologically, identity includes concepts of the self as well as concepts 
of one’s roles and reference groups; this sense of identity helps people not only 
to defend themselves against challenges from external control but also to 
interact with other people who may help them in this defence. In addition, 
identity is the foundation on which we can oppose outside control and at the 
same time empower ourselves to pursue our own interests within the 
organisation. People struggle to exert control over their environment and in 
order to sustain their identity fight against pressures from outside agents to 
define their identity for them (Thompson and McHugh, 2002). 
Personal identity comprises the definitions and conceptions that we find in 
previous experiences and that exactly represent us, whereas social identity 
emerges somewhere between our personal identity and the definitions and 
conceptions demanded of us in our present social contexts (Thompson and 
McHugh, 2002, Watson, 2008). Self-identity and the identity that others attribute 
to individuals form another duality, where self-identity refers to the way that one 
builds up the concept of the self (Leidner, 2006, Watson, 1995, Watson, 2007). 
Alternatively, identity embraces individuality concerning personal lifelong 
participation and the individual composition of social connections, together with 
collectivity, which focuses on recognitions, such as class, held in common with 
others (Leidner, 2006: 426). In general, identity can be defined as having two 
distinguishing aspects: one aspect is from individuals themselves or from 
internal, so-called personal identity, self-identity, individual identity; the other, 
which may be collective in origin, is from the external social contexts outside 
individuals and from the interaction with others, namely, social identity. 
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Both sociologists and social psychologists are much interested in social identity; 
however, sociological analysis, emerging from symbolic interactionism, focuses 
mainly on its structure, whereas socio-psychological analyses pay more 
attention to the process of identification (Capozza and Brown, 2000). Watson 
(2008: 131) in addition distinguishes five categories of social identity: social-
category social identities (nationality, class, etc.); formal-role social-identities 
(including citizenship, occupation) local-organisational social identities (such as 
is held by all members of staff at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science); local-personal social-identities (for example, a nice professor at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science) and cultural-stereotype 
social-identities (for instance, a diligent student). However, these models are 
not always clearly separate from each other. 
To go beyond the distinction of personal self-identity and social identity, Watson 
(2007, 2008) suggests that we have to consider both kinds of identity at the 
same time, because ‘“self identities” are indeed “social” phenomena’ (Watson, 
2008: 130). He defines social identity as the combined external cultural 
occurrences of individuals and as contributions to their personal identity. People 
normally accept their own identities as true without proof and only when they 
experience the marginality of their position, such as in encounters with different 
cultures, will they examine the notion of identity and act as they should (Watson, 
2007). 
With identity in organisations, two main concerns arise, individual identity and 
organisational identity. Individual identity is the way that members locate 
themselves in the organisation, where they behave and interact with others; 
organisational identity defines the way the way that the organisation identifies 
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itself (Brown, 2001). However, to better understand identity in organisations, 
Kreiner et al. (2006) argue that boundary dynamics have to be applied within 
and between individual and organisational identities. Self-identities in 
organisations fall into seven types: self-doubters, strugglers, surfers, storytellers, 
strategists, stencils and soldiers, according to an impressive study by Alvesson 
(2010) which analyses how individuals research their sense of self. The process 
of shaping identity can become part of management’s control over work in 
organisations. It may practise different discourse and activity at various levels of 
intensity to make employees identify with the company and regulate themselves 
according to organisational requirements (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). 
Work is an important foundation of identity since human beings learn to 
transform themselves from their own working experiences. Organisations are 
endless processes of identification and division at work (Koot and Ybema, 
2000). Reviewing the interconnection between the sociology of work and 
identity, Leidner (2006: 431) addresses four theoretical aspects of analysing 
identity at work. First, different sorts of work in the market involve specific skills 
and individuality and the individual is usually shown from his/her personal 
training and development to be an advantageous good on the labour market 
with reference to these skills. Then, career ambitions become the principle 
around which people arrange their ways of living and construct their identity, 
with the result that everyone constantly acquires knowledge of ways to be 
successful through individual actions. Third, many kinds of culture, compliance 
and preference build identity through the different people at work, which is a 
main reason for constructing distinctiveness of others. Finally, one person’s 
roles as both worker and customer should be both close and vague, because 
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his/her understanding of being a customer may relate to or have an impact on 
his/her working experience. 
From the standpoint of poststructuralism, the foci of the organisational 
manipulation of labour subjectivity include the following features. First, 
consideration shifts in some measure from collective identity to the trickier area 
of individual identity. Second, the resources to maintain a protected and 
sovereign work identity are generated in settings beyond the workplace, 
although the latter remains a vital arena of power relationships and of identity. 
Third, the discussion of workers’ subjectivity has been expanded to encompass 
actions towards management, not resistance to management alone. Fourth, an 
individual’s concern to build an absolute identity is a result of being captured in 
a power relationship (Leidner, 2006: 446). 
Drawing on her conceptual framework from a critique of the sociological and 
socio-psychological literature, Westenholz (2006) suggests that discussion of 
work and identity ought to go beyond differentiating between actor and structure, 
or between micro and macro. Identities are ‘socially constructed stories about 
individuals and their surroundings as they engage in social work practices’ 
(Westenholz, 2006: 1018).The differentiation of actors and structures as well as 
micro and macro levels is not creative, and the explanations of both pairs rely 
upon each other. Among IT workers, for example, emerging identities at work 
arise from meaning arenas which are unstable structures. Each person may at 
the same time have multiple identities at work derived from the surroundings 
and contexts and individuals can switch between various identities since they 
have their own genuine channels from one to another (Westenholz, 2006). 
98 of 303 
One trend of recent research suggests that work is no longer an important basis 
of identity but being a consumer is (Bauman, 2005, Beck, 2000). In arguing that 
work remains a dominant force in identity, regardless of the changing nature of 
employment relations, Doherty (2009) observed different organisations in 
Ireland, including a bus company, governmental division, bank and supermarket, 
which all exhibited contradictory characteristics of work; for example permanent 
as opposed to temporary workers, full-time versus part-time, blue-collar versus 
white-collar, and so on. The research evidence showed that workplaces are still 
the arena where employees gain and fulfil their personal and social identity 
despite the new forms of employment, but their voice at work is actually a new 
challenge. Workers may be detached from the organisation and collective 
representation, especially trade unionism, has to be adapted to the irregular 
features of work (Doherty, 2009). 
One concern of identity at work is whether the identity of knowledge workers is 
different from that of manual workers due to diverse labour processes. The IT 
workers of five software organisations in Scotland, for example, mostly clarify 
their self-identity according to their societal and cultural background, such as 
the class of their parents, but they may identify their occupation according to 
their economic circumstances (Marks and Baldry, 2009). Therefore, Marks and 
Baldry (2009) maintain that the class identity of knowledge workers is not the 
same as that of traditional workers, since their greater economic prosperity 
conflicts with their sense of cultural identity. Class identity, it seems, is not to be 
defined by wealth alone but by a combination of various values. 
However, Alvesson (2001) argues that knowledge is a fairly vague concept 
which makes it complex to protect the identity of knowledge workers. To join a 
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knowledge-intensive organisation, such as a high-tech company or law firm, a 
person has to adopt a certain corporate identity to fit its expectations. 
Identification with the company is some kind of intellectual control over as well 
as normalisation of the labour process. Knowledge workers learn to be a 
member of a company following particular regulations, values and ideologies, 
especially in reputable and well-salaried work. Eventually, the identity of 
knowledge workers is managed by their knowledge, which at the same time 
builds up, manipulates and maintains both their organisational and work 
identities. 
Another attractive theme of identity and work is the identity of workers who 
participate in some kind of involvement mechanism in the workplace; this is 
further discussed with the empirical data of the present thesis. Baugher (2003) 
examined worker identity among those who joined an employee management 
participation scheme in a General Motors plant in the United States. He 
considered some classic theories: a Marxist view of participation as a form of 
political manipulation; another Marxist view of them as workers identifying with 
management through their quasi-supervisory roles; a Weberian analysis of 
class established by background and also struggling for collective identification; 
and a Durkheimian view entailing the construction of a mutual perception 
between labour and management. According to Baugher’s analysis, each 
employee who participated in management became a ‘man in the middle’ in the 
workplace, feeling the tension between upper management and the rank and 
file. However, more than three-fourths of his interviewees believed that their 
main responsibility was to represent their team members when they were 
positioned between operators and management. Eventually, it was found that 
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the Durkheimian perspective on workplace norms is the most important factor in 
constructing workers’ loyalties (Baugher, 2003). 
To sum up, every single person has a variety of identities to differentiate 
themselves from or recognise themselves with others and to format how they 
behave or interact with others. Their identities may be self-identity, personal 
identity or individual identity, generated from their internal view of themselves, 
on the one hand, or social identity, organisational identity or collective identity, 
which comes from their external environment and the way that they see 
themselves socially, on the other. As a result, identity at work remains an 
important domain of social identity. The way people view themselves at work is 
influenced by their workplace and at the same time it influences how they do 
their work as they identify themselves in order to act. Overall, this research 
defines identity as the way in which individuals view themselves in a group, 
especially in a working environment. With their identity at work, people behave 
or react to support and agree with the group they belong to in the workplace, for 
example, a trade union. 
 
3.3. Collective Identity and Trade Unions 
Trade unions are agents of class struggle, since employment relations consist 
of making the best use of labour and the lack of protection for labour and 
workers’ identity is a component of class consciousness. However, each person 
has numerous identities and different identities play different roles in different 
circumstances. Individuals have identities in work and non-work at the same 
time, but non-work identities such as community identities may weaken class 
identity. It is difficult to know whether workers will act collaboratively or against 
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one another. Besides, who to oppose is always not easy to discern (Hyman, 
2001). 
However, social identification is an important factor in mobilising collective 
actions. According to John Kelly’s framework of mobilisation theory (1998), 
social identity helps individuals to identify themselves as members of a 
particular group and a sense of belonging consists of collective interests and 
values. The behaviour of the group members will be influenced by some 
stereotypes of the group, since a group is characterised by its own ideologies 
and values. Social stereotyping results in social attributions, which help 
members to reassure themselves about their identification with the group so 
that they can perform collectively. However, whilst collective action relies on 
social identification, other factors, such as cost-benefit calculations, leadership 
and so on, determine the eventual occurrence of a collective action (Kelly, 
1998). 
Collective action by union members is based on individual participation. Kelly 
and Kelly (1994) surveyed a group of union members in London to examine 
some of the socio-psychological factors related to collective action, such as 
group identification, collectivist orientation, outgroup stereotyping, perceived 
intergroup conflict, egoistic and collective relative deprivation and political 
efficacy. The sense of ‘we’ as a particular group, in contrast to ‘they’ who have 
different and conflicting interests, is very important to union participation. Hence, 
Kelly and Kelly conclude that personal identification with the union and 
individual awareness of industrial relations between labour and management go 
far to determine the individual’s involvement in union activities. Collective action 
emerges from individual recognition with the union. 
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Following Kelly’s work on the mobilisation of union members (1998), Cregan et 
al. (2009) conducted a survey of members of an Australian union in order to 
examine how social identity and transformational leadership, two elements of 
Kelly’s theory, influenced union organising. The social identification of workers 
facilitates union members’ participation in different union activities. 
Transformational leadership by the local union representatives influences 
members’ participation and trustworthiness. In addition, Cregan et al. 
demonstrated that social identity is an important factor of mobilising union 
members, especially in mediating the influence of the transformational 
leadership of the union. Social identity and transformational leadership therefore 
between them generate the mobilisation of trade union members. 
Moreover, Blader (2007) discusses the impact of two socio-psychological 
factors, social identification and procedural justice judgements, on whether 
workers support the formation of unions, in two empirical studies in the United 
States. He concludes that identification with the union is an important factor of 
unionisation in spite of various economic concerns, though identification with 
broader employment relations has less influence on union certification. Social 
identity remains a mediating factor of procedural justice judgements in the 
process of certificating a union, when economic factors have fewer impacts than 
these two factors. 
The union is a platform for collective identity beyond gender, race and so on 
(Moore, 2011). Based on the experiences of 30 union representatives and 
activists in the UK, Moore (2011) argues that the diverse backgrounds of union 
members have helped a new trade union activism to embrace all kinds of 
minorities; unions are empowered and willing to challenge every kind of issue 
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related to ethnicity, sexuality and much more rooted in the common identity in 
the workplace. Trade unions therefore have a mission to enrich and 
revolutionise society. 
To sum up, identity is an important factor of trade union movements. Only if 
members identify themselves with and support the union will the union be 
empowered to negotiate and fight for its members. A trade union has to find 
ways to enhance members’ collective identity, too. Therefore, this research 
pays attention to labour’s collective identity with unions and discusses how this 
kind of identity may be observed in trade union mobilisation. 
 
3.4. Identity at Work in Taiwan 
Since the 1990s, grass-roots social movements in Taiwan have reflected the 
pursuit of a system of universal social welfare from collective action; however, 
politics of identity of Taiwan within social movements have influenced class 
issues (Chuang, 2002). 
Sun and Hwang (1997) argue that the lack of working class identification in 
Taiwan is due to the fact that most workers come from a background of farming 
families, so they do not share in the collective experience of an urban work 
background and the career of a worker may easily take a turn into self-
employment (Shieh, 1989), whether in the industrial or service sector. Therefore, 
Taiwanese workers are quite different from British ones, whose family, friends 
and colleagues usually come from the same working class and who generally 
have fewer opportunities to change their work careers, according to Goldthorpe 
et al. (1987) (Sun and Hwang, 1997). Besides, during the rapid industrialisation 
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of Taiwan, most people left their families and their rural homes and moved to 
urban areas to work in industry. With the newer generations the farming class 
swiftly disappeared but a non-farm or non-manual class sprang up (Tsay, 1997). 
Kuan and Hwang (1997) further point out that Taiwanese people in general 
believe in inborn attributes, such as intelligence and exertion, as the main 
explanation for personal success and fail to fully understand the structural 
influences including job markets, industrial structures and so forth. Therefore, 
many people may dream of becoming a boss but do not realise the difficulties of 
crossing the boundary of class, as a result of some mechanisms of socialisation, 
for example ‘black-hands becoming their bosses’ (Shieh, 1989)’. This kind of 
stratifying belief in Taiwan prevents the existence of structural factors from 
invoking class consciousness so as to encourage collective movements. Even 
though the society is not fair and not open, people still believe it to be a fair and 
open society for the sake of self-fulfilment rather than going down the path of 
collectivity (Kuan and Hwang, 1997). 
In Taiwan, class consciousness may be viewed as people identifying 
themselves as having, to some extent, a different economic and social status 
from others, but the new middle class or the professional-managerial class 
people find it ambiguous and contradictory to identify themselves as working 
class or middle class, according to a project comparing evidence from Taiwan, 
Sweden and the United States (Hsiao, 1994). Hsiao (1994) indicates that the 
formation of a new middle-class in Taiwan is still incomplete, so people are 
inconsistent and conflicted in their class identity and class consciousness. Still, 
this implies that Taiwan’s new middle-class have some possibility of changing 
and shaping their ideas. 
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To understand workers’ identity in Taiwan, Wu (1994, 1996) analysed the data 
collected in 1992 in conjunction with an international project. He studied the 
sources of class identity and further treated class identification as independent 
to check its relationship with other features of class consciousness, including 
class opposition, class totality and the conception of an alternative society. The 
results indicated a relatively strong identification with the working class, but his 
respondents identified class mainly on the basis of objective economic terms. 
Apparently, workers’ failure to have a voice was due not to the absence of class 
identity, but to the absence of a consistent attitude to other aspects of class 
consciousness. 
Wu (1996) argues that worker identity in Taiwan is in reality ‘hollow’. People 
may have a high awareness of class stratification but they do not have class 
consciousness, mainly because the term ‘labour’ in Chinese is widely used by 
the state to regulate workers’ welfare. Furthermore, workers generally believe 
with little opposition in the unfairness of capitalism in society. Most workers are 
employed in small workplaces where they relate closely with management and 
are not much aware of industrial conflict. The sense of being working class is 
raised by social and public policies and not by conflicts between labour and 
management. The relatively high sense of class identity does not imply class 
struggle in Taiwan. 
In addition, the second cycle of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (Chiu, 1992a) 
investigated Taiwanese social structures, including occupational careers, class 
identity, class relations, social justice and so on. Two sets of questionnaires 
were shared among the respondents (one each) and all were asked to indicate 
which social class out of the six named ones they belonged to: was it upper, 
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upper middle, middle, lower middle, working or lower class? In Questionnaire I, 
with 2377 respondents, the results were upper class 0.6%, upper middle class 
7.9%, middle class 39.7%, lower middle class 13.6%, working class 27.9% and 
lower class 8.2% (Chiu, 1992a: 218). The results of Questionnaire II, which had 
1408 responses, were upper class 0.6%, upper middle class 5.7%, middle class 
38.6%, lower middle class 10.1%, working class 33.6% and lower class 8.5% 
(Chiu, 1992a: 242). 
Based on the data from Questionnaire I of the survey, Marsh (2002) studied 
social class identity and class interest in Taiwan. He argued that social class 
identity is quite unimportant there because people’s attitudes to class are not 
influenced by their class identity and in fact people might not have chosen any 
of the above classes if they had had the option ‘None of the above’. Taiwanese 
subjective class identification is related to objective factors, such as gender, 
education, age, occupation, income and so on. In fact, class identification in 
Taiwan does not relate to attitudes to class issues. For example, those 
Taiwanese who identify themselves as working class usually approve of 
cooperation between labour and management instead of conflict (Marsh, 2003). 
Hence, Marsh (2002, 2003) would expect the development of class 
identification in Taiwan as changes in one’s personal stratum emerge. 
Interestingly, Hsiao (1996) reviews the formation of a working class in Taiwan 
since the 1970s from a series of writings by five authors: Yang Qingchu (楊青
矗), Chen Yingzhen (陳映真), Zeng Xinyi (曾心儀), Mo Shangchen (陌上塵) and 
Zheng Junqing (鄭俊清). They have written many stories about workers, though 
the tragedy and hesitation of the era are the main concern of the stories rather 
than the workers themselves. The stories mirror the transition to industrialisation 
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and liberalisation in Taiwan, in such figures as temporary workers struggling to 
get a permanent post, rural girls making a life in the city, factory workers’ 
awareness of and failure of unionising, and so on. Hsiao (1996) argues that 
their writings, albeit not academic in character, still imaginatively reflect features 
of the Taiwanese working class, for instance, a sense of the disadvantages of 
being a temporary worker and a female, an unfortunate operator in a factory 
and the subordination to capitalism as well as a true belief in it. 
To conclude, from the evidence of these folk novels, Taiwanese workers have 
gradually been transformed over decades from individuals to a collective social 
class. Trade unions have slowly become actors in defence of the working class 
since the mid-1980s through their awareness and acknowledgement of workers. 
In addition, the objective societal separations were universally recognised by 
people without any question or doubt. In the cases of conflict with management, 
workers sought only to improve their situation within the social constitution but 
did not refuse or deny it. For this reason, the working class agrees with 
capitalism and accepts social inequality (Hsiao, 1996). 
Comparing his study with that of Burawoy (1979), Shieh (1997) researched 
subcontracted networks of workers and workers doing piecework in Taiwan and 
indicated that shaping the subjectivity of labour is a dynamic process of 
development. Piece-work implies the complete commercialisation of labour. 
Workers and employers have a common view of labour and the labour force of 
piece-workers as real commodities. Employers simultaneously doing piecework 
alongside piece-workers regard them as co-workers or partners and consider 
that there is a pure bargaining relationship of prices between them. Piece-work 
labourers believe that the work-wage relationship is only something to 
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exchange on the commodity market rather than the labour market and agree 
not to be paid additionally for weekends or holidays. As a result, workers are not 
aware that an employment relationship exists until a labour dispute occurs 
(Shieh, 1997). 
Shieh (1997) introduced the notion of the piece-working consciousness 
resulting from piece-work, which has four aspects. First, workers view 
themselves as ‘small bosses’ taking charge of their own risks. Second, the 
‘labour only’ consciousness makes workers regard their labour as a pure 
commodity. Third, workers come to the factory when there is work but go home 
whenever there is no work, moving freely in theory but in fact standing by at 
times without pay. A virtually free consciousness is constructed. Fourth, the 
blurring of the employment relationship results in a specific class consciousness 
in which piece workers believe that all the contributors to the workplace are 
themselves partners in the business, rather than the managers and employers. 
Industrial relations in Taiwan were extraordinarily peaceful without the input of 
labour voices before the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, when the state 
manipulated trade unions as creatures of its political propaganda (Chen et al., 
2003, Lee, 1999). Companies managed employees using various contrivances 
and limited only by national regulations. Workers were subordinated to 
capitalism as well as to the state. In contrast, after the lifting of Martial Law, 
plant closures and labour disputes emerged rapidly, whilst the state passively 
intervened and some cases failed to intervene at all in an attempt to escape 
from the disputes. However, the absence of government involvement resulted in 
more despotic employers and more exploited labourers (Shieh, 1997). 
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From an anthropological standpoint, Simon (2000, 2005) observed the changing 
labour process of the tanning industry in Taiwan with two concepts: technical 
divisions and gender divisions. The tanneries used to be family-owned, small 
and manually-oriented, in which the men did the more sophisticated work such 
as splitting leathers and wet tanning, whilst the work of the women and children 
was less skilled, for instance, drying hides. Apprenticeship was part of the 
system of production, but masters always hesitated to give apprentices high-
skilled tasks, to avoid mistakes and waste of materials. At the time, the class 
identity of tanners was implicit, because the division of masters and trainees 
came from the ownership of skills. 
Later, due to the development of technology and machinery, the tanning 
industry became capital dominated. People could simply buy machines and 
employ skilled workers to set up a factory; even the owner had little knowledge 
of tanning and few skills. Former masters were hired to work with common 
workers and a management class above theirs was created. The masters 
viewed themselves as professionals, unlike either management or the common 
workers, but they experienced a process of proletarianisation. However, a 
collective identity could not emerge among the skilled and common workers, 
simply because they did not view themselves as a unitary class (Simon, 2000, 
Simon, 2005). 
In terms of gender division after factorisation, the women who used to help their 
husbands had either stopped working because the use of machines was more 
dangerous, or had started to take over soft management functions, such as the 
finance of the factory if their husbands were owners; or they had become 
temporary workers to help their families. Similarly, women did not see 
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themselves as the same class as men in the factory since they were not 
professional or permanent workers. Male and female workers did not have a 
mutual sense of each other at work, so once more class identity could not 
develop. Eventually, worker identity was ‘hollowed out’ although the relationship 
of capital and labour existed (Simon, 2000, Simon, 2005). 
Ho (2003a) argues that solidarity within factories is generated from the workers’ 
labour process which has been transformed so as to look like distribution and 
moral economy. Workers shift from a workplace culture to working class 
solidarity and bring in an unofficial class culture to transfer their confrontation 
with management, which eventually emerges in their participation in collective 
actions. 
Therefore, there is no class identity rooted in the autonomous labour union 
movement in Taiwan, which in fact ‘originated in the “rank-and-file” workers’ 
brotherhood’ (Ho, 2008). In Ho’s (2008) observation, brotherhood is a 
subculture in the workplace that enables manual workers to set up an image of 
themselves and their fellow workers as a group of mutual helpers in their daily 
interaction, hidden normal values and need for mobilisation. It excludes some 
union members including females, clerks and high-level union officials and 
supports all issues related to brotherhood such as areas of their private life, 
resulting in a movement beyond the limits of class identity. However, 
brotherhood without a solid border of collective identity in the end causes the 
confrontation of different subgroups of ‘brothers’. Hence, a workers’ movement 
based on brotherhood may not go far, failing due to the lack of internal unity. 
In Ho’s later analysis (2006b, 2011), the trade union movement in Taiwan is a 
representation of masculinity that results from the lack of collective radicalism 
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as well as from the class division in state-owned enterprises where male 
workers are stifled at work. Taiwanese workers rely on this concept of manhood 
to build up their class solidarity; participating in a trade union becomes the 
privilege of male workers and also a means to maintain male dignity. Eventually, 
an independent Taiwanese trade union movement emerges from male 
domination. However, it may exclude female participation in the union and union 
officials are often opposed by their spouses because union activities often 
express male-oriented sociability. 
Obviously, the literature has represented the fact that Taiwanese worker identity 
does not originate in class struggle or industrial conflict. Therefore, workers do 
not have a strong sense of labour-management conflict which may be 
undermined in the workplace. A fundamental problem is that people take the 
relationship of employees and management for granted, so that employment 
relations are obedient and lack the labour voice. 
 
3.5. Paternalism, Collective Identity at Work and Trade Unions 
in Taiwan 
From the above, it may be said that paternalism has been an important 
characteristic, practised top-down in society by the KMT government, which 
propagandised harmony in employment relations in order to manipulate the 
disciplined and obedient labour force in the interests of government and 
management. People were coerced into contributing to economic growth 
without much collective consciousness and consequently did not take trade 
unions as protectors of their working rights during the period of Martial Law. 
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However, historical factors including the Japanese invasion and the White 
Terror in the 1940s also contributed to people’s patience and loss of hope under 
the KMT regime until the 1980s (Peng, 2006). 
Consequently, the tradition of paternalism was strengthened by the government 
during the process of developing the economy. The policy of ‘the factory as one 
family, factory as one school’ used to be a governmental requirement for 
practising paternalism in the workplace. It has been clear that paternalistic 
practice is not simply a product of the cultural background, but even more an 
artificial product of the political and economic context. These political and 
economic demands enforced the silence of the labour movement, because 
workers passively acted in the system of industrial relations without a so-called 
‘class identity’ as investigated and discussed in Western society and its 
academic literature. 
Discourses of paternalistic employment relations eliminate or obscure the 
opposing positions of capital and labour in practice, but they never vanish, and 
therefore employees have very little or no sense of labour conflict, but instead 
follow the logics of paternalism to act as members of their virtual family in the 
workplace. Workers may identify themselves as members and employees of 
their work institutions, as working at certain jobs or tasks and with different 
kinds of objective definition, but they rarely, possibly never sense themselves as 
subjects of the labour and capital relations in Taiwan. 
Fortunately, a system of trade unions has been established by the state, even 
though the initial purpose in doing so had nothing at all to do with collective 
representation in the workplace. Rather, the implementation of trade unions has 
fitted into the paternalistic ideology of the workplace to serve the interests of the 
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state and capital, so the system of labour unions has been in general 
acknowledged by the state, employers and employees, even though its function 
may have been in doubt. 
From the formation of a trade union to the mobilisation of union members, 
identity is a fundamental element throughout all union activities. Before we 
consider mobilising collective action, it is important to discuss collective identity 
with a trade union. Compared to research on other social movements plus 
questions of identity, research on the combination of collective identity and 
trade unions in Taiwan is relatively scarce (Chiu, 1996). From the literature 
reviewed in the previous sections, it is clear that paternalistic employment 
relations shape and influence trade unions as well as collective identity at work. 
Following all kinds of legislative reform to revitalise and reinforce labour 
regulations in Taiwan, the question now arises of how far the reform has 
collided with paternalistic employment relations, identity at work, trade unions 
and non-union representation in the workplace. 
Nowadays, it seems that paternalistic trade unionism based on the paternalistic 
tradition informs the employment relations in unionised workplaces. Trade 
unions seeking for autonomy and independence may not undervalue the 
importance of recognition by members and employers which eventually 
contributes to trade union power. Therefore, because trade unions cannot 
escape from the contexts of paternalism and lack collective identity, it becomes 
more important for them to develop and organise from the paternalistic tradition. 
Overall, this research goes on to examine how previously set-up trade unions 
within the paternalistic contexts seek to make the transition by generating and 
gathering together the collective identity of their members.  
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology 
To investigate corporate trade unions in Taiwan, this research qualitatively 
approached two cases; the primary case SteelCo is discussed throughout the 
whole thesis, and the supplementary case, SugarCo, is addressed as 
necessary. Both cases are unionised, the first with the union Steel-U and the 
second with Sugar-U. SteelCo was first approached with participant observation 
in summer 2003 whilst Steel-U offered summer internship for students. Later in-
depth interviews, surveys and documentary analysis were followed up for 
further data collection until the winter of 2015. SugarCo was investigated in 
2007 using in-depth interviews with union officials. 
 
4.1. Qualitative Research and Case Study 
Qualitative research, or field research, involves researchers working to 
understand and interpret the world and social realities from daily life and 
activities; they may participate in, observe, or interact with the research objects 
to discover inner knowledge rather than to express the quantity of things 
(Babbie, 2007, Bauer et al., 2000, DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011, Singleton and 
Straits, 1999). Case study is a particular kind of field research focusing on the 
description and explanation of some social occurrence or specific instance such 
as a group, a community, an organisation, and so on (Babbie, 2007, Singleton 
and Straits, 1999). A case study may be generalised to its representing group, 
or simply an extraordinary case to look at in itself (Gomm, 2009: 40). 
Case studies in social research are important for understanding a precise 
occurrence, situation or experience, and researchers have to keep as open and 
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curious as possible in a case study because there may be much deeper 
meanings and understandings than the appearance of the case would suggest 
(Mabry, 2008). 
Many scholars have examined the macro level of the labour movement in 
Taiwan (such as Chiu, 2010, Chiu, 2011, Ho, 2005, Ho, 2008, Lee, 1996, Lee, 
1997, Shieh, 1997, Son, 2012, Wang, 2010, Wei, 2001, Wu, 1999 and so on). 
Most of them pay attention to the national policies, legislation and industries, but 
relatively fewer focus on micro cases. Therefore, to take a different approach in 
order to understand more deeply the basis of the labour movement, I examine 
specific cases to analyse some extraordinary findings. 
 
4.2. Selection of Cases 
Social researchers may select cases on the basis of their own interest in a 
special phenomenon, or from the cases available in order to contribute to a 
theory, a problem, and so on (Mabry, 2008). This research selected two cases 
for analysis and a discussion of the research themes. The criteria of selection 
are based on the fact that each of them has regular and continued occasions of 
employee representation, and also that these cases represent different kinds of 
enterprise ownership in Taiwan, namely, privatised and state-owned. Both of 
them are large enterprises. With different levels of access to the fields, the 
cases were SteelCo, the primary case that involves all the research themes and 
questions, and SugarCo, the secondary case, which is brought into this 
research for the sake of comparison. Each case is introduced below. 
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4.2.1. SteelCo 
SteelCo is a steel corporation based in southern Taiwan, which was established 
in December 1971 as a privately-owned corporation, but it came under state 
ownership in July 1977. SteelCo was again privatised in April 1995 following the 
international trend of privatisation (Shieh, 2006), by a sale of stock shares, but 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the government agency responsible for 
industrial affairs, has been its main shareholder so far. SteelCo had established 
a strong reputation as a model state-owned enterprise. After its privatisation, as 
a well-managed corporation it kept up its reputation and its managing strategies 
have been widely researched by many Taiwanese scholars, such as Chi and 
Uen (2012), Lee and Chang (2002), and Cho et al. (2012). 
In April 2016, SteelCo had a market capitalisation of approximately 3,572 
hundred million NT$. Its main products include steel plate, steel bar and wire 
rods, hot-rolled steel, cold-rolled steel, and coated steel products; 67% of its 
production supplies the domestic market and 33% is exported to other countries, 
such as China and Japan. It is the largest steel company in Taiwan with a share 
of over 50% of the domestic market and employs more than 10,000 people, 
mostly male production workers. Less than 2% of the employees are female 
and over 50% are operatives. Workers have two types of working time: one is 
regular time, from 7:30 to 16:30 Monday to Friday, with one hour’s break 
between 11:30 and 12:30; the other is shift working, since steel production 
operates 24 hours a day. There are three shifts, from 07:00 to 15:10, from 15:00 
to 23:10, and from 23:00 to 07:10; between every two shifts there is a 10-minute 
period for work handover. SteelCo has long experienced a very stable labour 
force, with an annual labour turnover rate of less than 1%. 
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SteelCo has a mix of characteristics from the public sector and heavy industry, 
which are the same as Deyo (1990) analyses; for instance it is male-intensive, 
with a strong occupational commitment, bureaucratic paternalism ‘iron rice bowl’, 
job security, stable labour solidarity, political control, and so on. 
Steel-U, the labour union of SteelCo, was founded in December 1980 and its 
10,000 members make it the country’s largest single-plant trade union. Steel-U 
is located within the workplace in the Welfare Building of SteelCo, where 
cafeterias, a grocery shop, a book store and exhibition area, a laundry, a post 
office and a bank are also located. Steel-U uses the office free of charge under 
an agreement between the union and the corporation, and it may hire five full-
time officers seconded from their original departments, namely, the union 
president, chief secretary, and the three executive secretaries. These full-time 
staff members are still on the SteelCo payroll and SteelCo may recall the chief 
secretary and the three executive secretaries if necessary. In addition to these 
secondments, Steel-U independently employs four full-time secretaries of its 
own for daily operation. The chief secretary, three executive secretaries plus 
four secretaries organise the Steel-U secretariat. 
All SteelCo employees, except top management – the chief of the Appointing 
Section of the Human Resources Department, the chief of the Corporate 
Relations Section of the General Affairs Department – and contractors, are 
qualified to be Steel-U members entitled to all rights and obligations. Steel-U 
held its first direct presidential election in November 2001, the earliest of its kind 
in Taiwan. It is regarded by members as a union that looks after its members 
and their families, offering various welfare and fringe benefits, from pension 
schemes to children’s scholarships. 
118 of 303 
Table 4-1 Basic Information about the Case Steel-U 
Set up date December 1980 Office Kaohsiung City 
Members 10,000 Full-time staff 8 
Members of 
Board of 
Directors 
27 Members of 
Board of 
Supervisors 
9 Officials’ 
location in 
union office 
President: full time 
Standing members of board 
of directors: half time 
Official leave Boards of directors and supervisors entitled to 50 hours per 
month 
Union representatives and other officials entitled to official leave 
for union meetings or activities 
Sources of 
expenditure 
Initiation fees: 582NT$ (approximately £15) 
Regular membership dues: 194NT$ (approximately £5) per month 
per person 
Subsidies for labour education and training: 3/5 paid by SteelCo 
according to the collective agreement 
Government subsidies: competent authority for labour day 
activities 
Interests: Steel-U buying SteelCo stock share with 20% annual 
interest 
Salary of worker directors: Steel-U’s secondary source of 
expenditure 
Other: external donations 
Modified from Wu and Yang (2010: 77). 
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Initially, Steel-U was founded as a model union to assist the government in 
implementing labour legislation in the workplace and a means of supporting the 
nation and industrial development. In May 1993, Steel-U for the first time joined 
the national demonstration of state-owned enterprises. It has transformed itself 
into an effective union, which plays a prominent leadership role in Taiwan’s 
labour movement. Although trade unions have played the weakest part in the 
industrial relations system in Taiwan, Steel-U has been an outstanding model 
for shedding light on the autonomous development of trade unions. Analysis of 
the Steel-U shows how a stronger Taiwanese union may act to gain recognition 
in the workplace.  
I initially started working with the Steel-U in 2003 when I was conducting 
research for a master’s degree as an intern student and have kept a close 
connection with it. Steel-U provides me with full access to its resources so I can 
collect as much data as I need. So far I have observed Steel-U under three 
different presidencies. I discuss this case throughout the thesis. 
 
4.2.2. SugarCo 
During its occupation of Taiwan (1895-1945), the Japanese set up many sugar 
corporations to export to Japan. After WWII the National Government merged 
four former Japanese-managed sugar factories to form SugarCo as a state-
owned enterprise in 1946. Sugar was the major export product in Taiwan in 
1952-64, at a time when SugarCo was the largest state-owned business. 
Producing sugar not only helped agriculture to prosper but also led to the 
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development of industries at the time. SugarCo started an organisational 
restructuring in 2003-04 in order to expand its business in several markets and 
also to increase its income. It created eight business divisions reflecting the 
range of its products: Sugar, Hypermarkets, Biotechnology, Agriculture, Animals, 
Petroleum, Leisure and Marketing. Moreover, it set up its Land Development 
Centre and Property Management Centre in 2004 to increase income by leasing 
real estate to the public, since it is the biggest property owner in Taiwan. 
In 2006, the Executive Yuan approved the segregation of SugarCo’s divisions 
and land during privatisation, so that both could be transferred, whereas non-
division land, the headquarters and the Sugar Division would remain state-
owned. The state has been keen to privatise many state-owned businesses in 
this decade and a policy of privatisation was also proposed at the end of 2007 
to privatise parts of SugarCo, including the Hypermarkets, Agriculture, 
Petroleum and Biotechnology Business Divisions. This would affect a quarter of 
its workers and SugarCo’s revenues would be diminished by one third. In 2007 
it had 4,370 employees whose average age was 47 years. The employees were 
either members of the civil service in status or pure workers. However, 
proposals to privatise each division still await the Executive Yuan’s approval, so 
SugarCo remains state-owned without a clear timetable for its privatisation. 
According to Deyo (1990), SugarCo remains a good example of the ‘iron rice 
bowl’ for its employees, exhibiting bureaucratic paternalism, job security, 
workforce stability, union acceptance, and so on. 
Sugar-U, the federation of sugar workers’ unions was set up on 26 June 1955 
following the establishment of 27 sugar workers’ unions in 1954. The first union 
of sugar workers in Taiwan was founded in a sugar factory of SugarCo in 1952. 
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However, following the organisational readjustment of SugarCo in 2003-04, the 
structure of this federation was also reorganised in 2005. The member unions 
were remodelled from workplace unions to regional unions. The number of 
member unions went down to 12, with each member union covering all 
branches of the different business divisions within a region. 
Table 4-2 Basic Information about the Case Sugar-U 
Set up date June 1955 Office Tainan City 
Members 4,189 Full-time staff 9 
Members of Board 
of Directors 
21 Members of Board 
of Supervisors 
7 Officials residence 
in union office 
No 
Member 
unions 
12, namely Taipei, Taichung, Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan 
City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County, Hualien, 
Taitung and Pingtung sugar unions. 
Official leave Boards of directors and supervisors entitled of 50 hours per 
month 
Union representatives and other officials entitled of official leave 
for union meetings or activities 
Modified from Wu and Yang (2010: 179). 
 
SugarCo is a supplementary research case that I investigated in 2007 when I 
conducted some interviews with Sugar-U officials. I mention this case in 
discussions of non-union representation vis-à-vis the trade union, when its 
experience is compared with that of the primary case. 
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4.3. Participant Observation 
Participant observation involves researchers actively participating in the 
activities and daily lives of the research objects; they are accepted as a member 
by the group or community and can have informal conversations with people 
who share their experiences (Babbie, 2007, DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011, 
Singleton and Straits, 1999). 
I started participant observation in SteelCo in July and August 2003. I gained 
access through the union, which offers summer internships to university 
students majoring in industrial relations or human resources management. In 
July and August 2003, I worked as an intern in the union with two other students 
to learn about and help with Steel-U’s routine operations, to interact with visiting 
members and to get involved in some events, such as a protest in the factory on 
the first day of my internship, and the off-site training camp for elected officers. 
In this period I worked with the union president CPW, who is introduced in the 
next section. I visited the manufacturing areas in the company of union officers, 
to learn about production process and working conditions. At the same time, I 
lived in the employees’ residential hall and participated in the social life of the 
workplace. SteelCo provides all kind of on-site entertainment and leisure 
facilities, including a cinema, a gym, a swimming pool, tennis courts, and so on. 
Later I continued to visit the union for further data collection and carried on 
participant observation again in spring and summer 2007 and winter 2010. I met 
the second president STW who used to be a member of the board of directors 
in CPW’s presidency. During each visit I spent a few weeks living in the 
company accommodation and working as a volunteer in the union office, as I 
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had done when I first joined. As I was well-known to the union officers, I was 
always made welcome, like someone ‘coming home’; and I used to be updated 
with details of things that had gone on whilst I was away. 
In autumn and winter 2015, I repeatedly visited the union to collect data, 
observe and interview. There was the third president CCW to meet and there 
were also some changes to the secretariat. 
 
4.4. In-Depth Interviews 
The narrative interview is used here to encourage and stimulate interviewees to 
tell stories about their experiences and the significant events for worker 
representation systems (Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000). In-depth interviews 
are usually the main technique accompanying participant observation, but either 
participant observers or other researchers may use the tool (Babbie, 2007). 
Following my participant observation in Steel-U, I held several interviews 
between October 2003 and August 2007 in the Steel-U office with the union 
president, the union chief secretary, three labour representatives and the 
administrator from the SteelCo Human Resources Department. I also had some 
interviews in February 2014 and December 2015 in the SteelCo Human 
Resources Department office with a former union chief secretary and the 
corporation’s assistant general manager. The interview questions were 
generated from my participant observation and focused on the operation, 
problems and difficulties of the trade union, the implementation of non-union 
representative committees, the roles and responsibilities of labour 
representatives, and so on. All the interviews were recorded and conducted in 
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Chinese or Taiwanese. I briefly explained my purposes at the beginning of the 
interview but I did not provide interview questions in advance, and I let the 
interviewees tell their stories in their own way. The eight interviewees in 
SteelCo are introduced below and their details summarised in Table 4-3. 
The first interviewee CPW was the key person and gatekeeper for my access to 
Steel-U. He was the Steel-U president and represented the union as the worker 
director of SteelCo when I was observing it and holding interviews. Later after 
his two terms of presidential office in Steel-U, he was elected president of the 
Kaohsiung City Confederation of Trade Unions28, defeating the strong candidate 
from the Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union. SteelCo agreed to his 
secondment to the confederation and therefore he did not need to come in to 
work at SteelCo. However, during his term of office in the confederation, after 
his day’s work finished, he still visited SteelCo every afternoon. He was re-
elected president of the Kaohsiung City Confederation of Trade Unions and 
after these two terms as president, he was chosen to act as the director-general 
of the Labour Affairs Bureau of Kaohsiung City Government. CPW eventually 
retired from SteelCo when he left his job with the Kaohsiung City Government, 
and became Steel-U’s unpaid voluntary consultant. 
The second interviewee, HCC, had just begun as Steel-U’s chief secretary in 
November 2003, when he gave his first interview. Therefore, I did not meet him 
before the period of participant observation. He used to work in the Human 
Resources and General Affairs Departments and has worked in SteelCo for 
over 20 years. As a degree major in labour relations, he was an expert in 
                                            
28 http://www.kcctu.org.tw. The Kaohsiung City Confederation of Trade Union was founded on 21 March 
1997, and has 75 trade union members, adding up to 47,000 individual members in 2016. 
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employment relations in SteelCo. He played the key role of communication 
channel between the union and the company because his position was created 
for the benefit of both sides. He later completed a master’s degree in business 
management before my second interview in August 2007. When I revisited the 
factory in 2015, he had been promoted to chief of the Training Section of the 
Human Resources Department. 
Third, HHC became an engineer in the Steel and Aluminium Research and 
Development Department when he joined SteelCo some years ago as a 
graduate in mechanical engineering; he participated in quite a few Steel-U 
activities. He was appointed as the convenor of nine labour representatives in 
the SteelCo labour-management meeting at the time of his interview in April 
2007 and had been the meeting’s labour representative over several terms of 
office. In order to improve his professional knowledge of employment relations, 
he completed a bachelor’s degree in law with the Open University after work. As 
an experienced labour representative, he provided his insider’s view of the 
implementation of meetings and gave examples from his participation in the 
meetings as well as the union. 
CCL was a mechanical engineer in the Equipment Design Section of the Plant 
Engineering and Maintenance Department for ten years. He did not take an 
active part in the union until he was elected as a labour representative for the 
SteelCo labour-management meetings. He admitted in his interview in August 
2007 that he was not clear about all Steel-U activities due to his lack of 
participation in the past. However, he started to learn about labour-management 
relations in SteelCo and became more familiar with labour-related issues.  
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CHH was acting as the convenor of labour representatives to the employee 
welfare committee at the time of his interview in August 2007. He was quite 
active in Steel-U and was previously a labour representative on the safety and 
health committee and a member of the board of directors of Steel-U. He had 
been working in SteelCo for 30 years and was a technician responsible for 
controlling the engineering process in the Rolling Mill Department III (Cold 
Rolled Products). In December 2015 he was about to retire. 
HMW was responsible for minute-taking and administration at SteelCo’s labour-
management meetings for over 5 years at the time of his interview in August 
2007. He had worked in the Human Resources Department for over 20 years 
going through several job rotations within three Human Resources divisions. He 
had a close relationship with Steel-U as a result of his work. He was quite 
supportive of Steel-U, but at the same time he provided a more balanced view 
from his role as one of its human resources administrators. During my visit in 
December 2015, he was chief of the Employment Relations Section of the 
Human Resources Department. 
KFC used to be the union chief secretary during CPW’s presidency and then 
was recalled to the Human Resources Department when HCC took up the post 
of union chief secretary. After years of job rotation within the SteelCo Human 
Resources Department, he was first sent abroad to SteelCo’s Vietnamese 
branch and then promoted to assistant general manager of the Human 
Resources Department of a SteelCo group member corporation in Taichung. 
With his working experience in both SteelCo and Steel-U, he provided views on 
the relationship between the two. 
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The last interviewee, HJT, was the assistant general manager in the Human 
Resources Department. KFC introduced me to her because she used to be his 
line manager. HJT had been in SteelCo for over 20 years, mainly in the Human 
Resources Department with job rotations. She worked in KFC’s post in 
Taichung before taking up her post as SteelCo’s Human Resources assistant 
general manager. She provided her overall view on the human resources affairs 
in SteelCo and also commented on Steel-U’s development. 
 
Table 4-3 Interviewees in the Case Study of SteelCo 
ID Position at the time of 
interview 
Foci of interview Date Length of 
interview 
(minutes) 
CPW Union president Union operation 
Problems and 
difficulties in the 
workplace 
October 
2003 
90 
HCC Union chief secretary 
Used to work in the Human 
Resources Department and 
the General Affairs 
Department 
His change of role as 
union secretary and 
HR specialist 
Union operation 
Relations between 
union and company 
November 
2003 
August 
2007 
120 
 
75 
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HHC Labour-management 
meeting convenor of nine 
labour representatives 
Engineer in the Steel and 
Aluminium Research and 
Development Department 
Implementation of 
labour-management 
meetings  
His role and 
responsibilities 
April 2007 150 
CCL Labour representative at 
the labour-management 
meetings  
Mechanical engineer in the 
Equipment Design Section 
of the Plant Engineering 
and Maintenance 
Department for 10 years 
Implementation of 
the labour-
management 
meetings  
His role and 
responsibilities 
August 
2007 
150 
CHH Convenor of the labour 
representatives at the 
employee welfare 
committee 
Previous labour 
representative on the safety 
and health committee and a 
member of the board of 
directors of Steel-U. 
Worked in SteelCo for 30 
Implementation of 
the employee welfare 
committee  
Implementation of 
the safety and health 
committee meetings 
His roles and 
responsibilities 
Comparison of the 
employee welfare 
August 
2007 
90 
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years and was responsible 
for controlling the 
engineering process in the 
Rolling Mill Department III 
(Cold Rolled Products) 
committee and the 
safety and health 
committee. 
HMW Minute-taking at and 
administration of the 
labour-management 
meeting for over 5 years 
Worked in the Human 
Resources Department for 
over 20 years with job 
rotation in three Human 
Resources divisions 
Implementation of 
the labour-
management 
meetings  
His role and 
responsibilities 
August 
2007 
80 
KFC Assistant general manager 
in the Human Resources 
Department of a SteelCo 
group member corporation 
His view of the 
relationship between 
SteelCo and Steel-U 
February 
2014 
120 
HJT Assistant general manager 
of the Human Resources 
Department 
Her view of SteelCo’s 
human resources 
and Steel-U 
December 
2015 
120 
 
In addition, I conducted a few interviews in SugarCo in April and August 2007. 
Here, the interview questions were given to some interviewees in advance 
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because they wanted to prepare. In order to get insights into SugarCo 
employment relations and their practice of representative mechanisms, I asked 
interviewees about their history of employment in SugarCo; why they 
participated in the union and/or some kind of worker representation; how they 
experienced being labour representatives; whether they had any suggestions 
for non-union representative mechanisms; and if they had any experience in 
SugarCo and Sugar-U that they wished to share with me. Most interviews were 
conducted and recorded in the union office located in the company 
headquarters site, but one interviewee invited me to spend the day at his home 
and told me the whole story of his life in SugarCo. The language used in the 
interviews was Chinese or Taiwanese. Details of the four interviewees in Sugar 
Co are summarised below and listed in Table 4-4. 
CWC helped me to gain access to SugarCo and Sugar-U. He had been an 
administrator of the Industrial Relations Section of the Human Resources 
Department at the SugarCo headquarters for over 10 years. At the same time 
he had been elected one of Sugar-U’s 20 directors and was appointed by 
Sugar-U as one of the consultants for Sugar-U’s worker directors as well. 
Before joining the Human Resources Department, he had been a technician in 
the Animal Division for several years. He provided practical details of SugarCo’s 
representative mechanisms and talked about relations between SugarCo and 
Sugar-U. 
CTW was the Sugar-U executive secretary at the time of his interview in April 
2007. He provided details of Sugar-U’s organisation and its interaction with 
SugarCo. However, when I visited Sugar-U again in August 2007, he had left 
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the office on his promotion to the post of deputy manager of SugarCo’s Yunlin 
branch. 
HML was a member of Sugar-U’s board of directors and the chief of Sugar-U’s 
Welfare Division when he was interviewed in August 2007. He started his 
career in SugarCo in a sugar factory in Taichung and then moved to the 
Secretary’s Department at headquarters. He acted as a worker director from 
July 2001 to September 2003. 
CCH invited me to visit his home in a village so I spent one day listening to his 
story. He was an administrator of the Civil Service Ethics Department at the 
time of his interview in August 2007, had been a SugarCo worker director since 
2003 and was quite experienced in the implementation of worker directorships 
in SugarCo. 
Table 4-4 Interviewees in the Case Study of SugarCo 
ID Position at the time of 
interview 
Foci of interview Date Length of 
interview 
(minutes) 
CWC Administrator of the 
Industrial Relations Section 
of the Human Resources 
Department 
Consultant for worker 
directors of Sugar-U 
Technician of the Animals 
Representative 
mechanisms 
Relations between 
union and company 
April 
2007 
August 
2007 
120 
 
90 
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Division before working in 
the Human Resources 
Department 
one of the 20 directors of 
Sugar-U 
CTW Sugar-U executive secretary 
Later promoted to deputy 
manager of Yunlin Branch 
Union operation 
Relations between 
union and company 
April 
2007 
180 
HML Chief of Sugar-U Welfare 
Division 
Experiences in a sugar plant 
in Taichung and then the 
Secretary’s Department at 
headquarters 
Worker director from July 
2001 to September 2003 
Experience as 
worker director 
Union operation 
August 
2007 
180 
CCH Worker director since 2003  
Administrator of the Civil 
Service Ethics Department 
Experience as 
worker director 
Professional life in 
SugarCo 
August 
2007 
420 
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4.5. Surveys 
The purpose of a survey may be descriptive: to reveal some characteristics, 
behaviours or understanding of a population using uncomplicated analysis. It 
may be explanatory: to elucidate relationships between different variables in 
terms of causality; it may be an integration of the two (Singleton and Straits, 
1999: 243). To conduct a survey, a self-administered questionnaire is 
convenient for respondents since it allows them enough time to think and 
answer with privacy and anonymity (Singleton and Straits, 1999: 258-260). 
To design a survey, open-ended questions and closed-ended questions have to 
be considered. Open-ended questions (with free responses) allow respondents 
to express their opinions and thoughts without restraint, but make it more 
difficult to code and analyse the data; contrariwise, closed-ended questions 
(with limited choice) restrict possible answers but ones which are easier to 
analyse. However, respondents may not be able to express their views 
accurately if the choices provided are not wide enough (Singleton and Straits, 
1999: 281-284). 
I conducted two surveys in SteelCo, the main research case, in order to collect 
more data relating to individual union members’ understanding of and 
experience with Steel-U. 
 
4.5.1. Survey I 
The first survey took place in December 2007 when I visited Steel-U and stayed 
at the company accommodation for one week. A questionnaire was designed 
with a view to understanding the identity of ordinary workers and their 
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relationships with the representative system as well as their interaction with the 
union. 21 questions were asked, 12 fixed-choice questions and 9 free response 
questions. The questionnaire was reviewed by the union secretary before 
distribution to make sure that the terms used were clear and understandable to 
the workers. 200 copies were randomly given out to members visiting the union 
office and most of them answered during their visit but a few brought them back 
to their office. Finally 126 questionnaires were completed and returned. 
The respondents comprised 124 male workers and 2 female workers. Their 
average age was 48.24 years, whilst the eldest of them was 60 and the 
youngest 28. The length of experience in SteelCo (which included the state-
owned period) was on average 22 years and 7.5 months, and the most senior 
worker had been in the company for 34 years, whereas the most junior had 
joined only 5 months before. In terms of education, 11 people had a post 
graduate degree, 12 had a first degree, 20 graduated from junior college, 78 
finished senior high or vocational school, which is the main level of education in 
the company, 4 had gone through junior high school, and 1 did not answer. 
63 people worked normal hours, but 51 worked on shifts, and 12 did not answer. 
101 workers had such basic positions as foremen, technicians or operators, 13 
held professional positions, including engineers, specialists or researchers, 11 
were at managerial level, and 1 did not answer. In terms of working 
departments, 107 employees were in the Production Division, 7 in the 
Commercial Division, 6 in the Technology Division, 4 in the Corporate Planning 
Division, 1 in the Engineering Division, and 1 did not answer. 
The findings of Survey I are investigated in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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4.5.2. Survey II 
The second survey was distributed in December 2010 when I visited the union 
for one week and I collected the data until February 2011. This survey targeted 
a specific group of union members, 801 squad leaders. The questionnaire 
consisted of 47 questions: 36 closed-ended questions and 11 open-ended, and 
was reviewed beforehand by the union president, the union chief secretary and 
the union executive secretary. The reason for this was that the union had just 
held a presidential election so they felt that the timing was a little sensitive. 
However, the union distributed the questionnaire on my behalf which was 
appended with a union president’s memorandum to all squad leaders at the 
time; it explained the purpose and encouraged them to respond. The response 
rate was 28.83%; in all, 231 questionnaires were returned. Of these, 16 were 
invalid because one respondent was not a squad leader and 15 had half their 
questions unanswered. The background of the respondents is summarised 
below. 
The majority were male and only 4 were female squad leaders. The average 
age of the respondents was 48 years, the eldest being 64 years old and the 
youngest 28. The average length of experience with SteelCo was 21 years and 
9 months; the most senior person had been in the company for 39 years, 
whereas the most junior squad leader had joined the company only 30 months 
before. Over half (55.8%, 120 people) of the squad leaders had finished some 
kind of higher education. 23 people held a post-graduate degree, 52 had a first 
degree, 45 had graduated from junior college, 90 had finished senior high or 
vocational school, which is the main level of education in the company and 3 
had gone through secondary school. 
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In terms of their positions in the company, 75.81% (163 people) held a basic 
position as a foreman, technician or operator, 19.06% (41 people) were 
professional workers such as engineers, specialists or researchers, and only 
3.72% (8 people) were at the managerial level. Regarding their working shifts, 
128 people worked normal hours, but 74 worked on shifts. Most people came 
from the manufacturing departments, 170 of them in the Production Division, 17 
in the Technology Division, 9 in the Engineering Division, 4 in the Commercial 
Division, 4 in the Finance Division, 3 in the Corporate Planning Division, and 1 
in the Administration Division. 
The findings of Survey II are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
4.6. Documentary Analysis 
Documents are defined as “[u]sually written or printed texts and their 
illustrations, but sometimes extended to cover film, TV and radio productions” 
(Gomm, 2009: 99). 
I continuously collected meeting minutes, official letters and internal documents 
from SteelCo for documentary analysis between July 2003 and December 2010 
in my regular visits to the trade union and gained full access to all Steel-U’s 
documents. 
I also had limited access to some official documents from the SugarCo Human 
Resources department but I was not allowed to acquire any minutes of 
meetings. 
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4.7. Research Rationale 
In theory, trade union revitalisation has been a worldwide phenomenon for the 
future of trade unions. In Taiwan, however, the new labour legislation enacted in 
2011 actually seems to offer trade unions a broader space to develop because 
several restrictions have been relaxed. The change of collective statutes has 
impacted on the existing trade unions which were brought into the industrial 
relations system following the logic of authoritarian, paternalistic and 
manipulative governance. At present, they may be facing the challenge of 
becoming revitalised in the process of legal transformation. 
This research pays no attention to the new trade unions being constructed in 
Taiwan, but rather follows with interest the trade unions which may (or may not) 
have to revitalise themselves as a response to the shifting environment of 
industrial relations it seeks to understand and investigate further if they have to 
do this in their own interests and how they will do it. 
As a result of weak trade unionism, it is necessary to examine those labour 
unions which have already been predominant in the labour movement so that 
their lessons may be addressed and applied to other developing unions in 
Taiwan. This research chooses the route of a case study rather than an 
overview of general trade union organisation and development, because such 
major unions have always played the role of pioneers in Taiwanese labour 
history and hence may have striven to ensure the representation of their 
members in the workplace. Steel-U, the labour union of the case SteelCo, is 
one of these significant trade unions and so may shed light on the renewal of 
the old Taiwanese unions. 
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Nevertheless, the supplementary case of SugarCo represents a characteristic 
type of state-owned enterprise, paternalistic and unionised, and thus a slight 
contrast with SteelCo. Its labour union, Sugar-U, although structured differently 
from Steel-U, reveals a kind of paternalistic unionism consisting of its similarity 
and differences from Steel-U, worthy of some comparison between the two. 
To start discussion and analysis, the influence of paternalism in the workplace 
sets the beginning of the research. Non-union representative mechanisms are 
chosen as variables to compare between the cases. The focal points then shift 
mainly to SteelCo and Steel-U, in order to provide in-depth materials and 
findings of change in trade union organisation, interaction between the trade 
union and members, and so on. A specific group of Steel-U members, so-called 
squad leaders, is discussed to help solve the dilemma of work identity under 
paternalism. 
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Chapter 5. Paternalistic Employment Relations 
In Taiwan paternalistic employment relations have for decades been of the 
essence. Managerial paternalism seems quite influential even now, whatever 
the impression is given. This chapter investigates some characteristics of 
paternalistic employment relations, mainly benevolence, authority and morality; 
and discusses how trade unions have developed and responded in this situation. 
In unionised workplaces, it has perhaps become an advantage to have 
developed trade unions. Employers had less hesitation in accepting trade 
unions, as a result of governmental policy. Old trade unions used to be under 
the umbrella of the state and capital in fact gained plentiful resources thereby, 
such as financial support and employer recognition. The research cases reveal 
that trade unions may be able to redevelop provided that they have the capacity 
to take advantage of what they have already secured. 
 
5.1. Managerial Benevolence in the Workplace 
Benevolence is a key characteristic of paternalism; the employer contributes 
concern for the employees and supports their needs as far as possible. It is 
quite common for all kinds of facilities and services to be set up in a workplace 
for workers following the policy of ‘factory as one family and factory as one 
school’. Moreover, it is also interesting to know that the employer may offer 
quite a few benefits and support for trade unions as well as practising the same 
ideology. 
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5.1.1. SugarCo 
SugarCo, as a state-owned enterprise, has in general followed all the orders 
and directives from the government and has been a model of practising the 
‘factory as one family, factory as one school’ policy up to the present. An 
important element of the ‘factory as one family’ campaign is employee housing, 
which is located within each sugar factory. Within the housing area there are 
also such facilities as a convenience store, a barber’s, playground, and so on, 
so workers and their families can live together close to the company with all 
their immediate needs supplied. 
Historically, SugarCo used to practise ‘the factory as one school’ ideology by 
offering educational opportunities to the children of their employees. SugarCo 
ran its own primary and secondary schools for several decades until the 2000s, 
providing the basic education and vocational training that its business required. 
In the end, those graduates were not only educated but also had more 
opportunity to be selected for jobs in SugarCo and eventually it became a 
tradition that the majority of SugarCo workers was a gang of SugarCo 
secondary school alumni. 
As a result, SugarCo employees were quite familiar with the setting; the second 
generation came from the same background and worked together under the 
same employee welfare system. However, some people still joined the 
company after passing the open recruitment test. The interviewee CWC, for 
example, did not graduate from SugarCo’s secondary school and found it quite 
common for colleagues to wonder whether someone was from the same school. 
Indeed, people felt it was a privilege to be a graduate of the school who had 
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gone on to work in SugarCo. People even spontaneously took care of the new 
employees who were the children of their colleagues. 
When the interviewee CCH talked about his campaign of running for election as 
a worker director, he said, 
“People from the gang of the SugarCo secondary school could 
always easily win a union election simply because most colleagues 
were fellow alumni. They had a feeling that “we should help ‘our’ 
people”. However, I did not go to the SugarCo secondary school but 
took the recruitment exam to join the company and I found it was 
more difficult to gain support from those people so that I had to 
spend more time mingling with them in order to get them familiar with 
me and finally consider supporting me. It seems your campaign 
manifesto is not the most important but your background is.” 
Obviously the ‘factory as one family and factory as one school’ policy has 
helped to shape some kind of labour identity in the company, which might be 
attributed to loyalty to the workplace. Most people identify themselves with their 
workplace based on the privileges received by their parents. 
In terms of the benevolent strategy to the trade union, SugarCo’s approach to 
Sugar-U is overall very open and pleasant on the whole, since establishing 
labour unions in workplaces used to be the state policy. As a result, SugarCo 
has been providing quite a few resources to Sugar-U without charge. Sugar-U 
has its head office based in the SugarCo headquarters and each of the Sugar-U 
member branches also has its office in each SugarCo branch. The union is 
allowed to use most of SugarCo’s facilities without charge and is subsidised by 
the company to hire a few staff for its routine business. 
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There is an interesting aspect of SugarCo and Sugar-U’s relations, in terms of 
Sugar-U’s official website. It is easy to see on SugarCo’s official website that, in 
its exposition of SugarCo’s structure, Sugar-U is listed as a peripheral 
organisation of the company. Moreover, Sugar-U’s official website is hosted and 
maintained within SugarCo’s company website. Information published by Sugar-
U includes its organisation, structure, activities and some basic details. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees CTW and HML in Sugar-U did not think it was a 
problem. 
CTW thought that the union is not specialised in any information technology and 
does not have any staff responsible for maintaining the website, so it is quite 
convenient for the union to have the website running in this way. HML stated 
that, 
“The union website hosted by the company is not a problem for us, 
because we do not have to manage the server on our own and it 
saves us a lot of money. In addition, we are not as professional as 
the SugarCo Information Technology Department, so it is nice that 
the company wants to support it. We are very happy that the 
company wants to offer it.” 
Put simply, the union treated the company’s provision of free resources to them 
as a way of keeping their costs down and helping their development. However, 
the company’s gesture implies the risk that, for example, the website contents 
might be filtered and controlled by SugarCo under cover of maintaining their 
corporate image to the public and in the end the union might find itself acting in 
support of the company regardless of its inclinations, since the union seems 
quite dependent on the company’s resources. 
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5.1.2. SteelCo 
The national model enterprise SteelCo, whether state-owned or privatised, also 
had a workplace setting which implemented the ‘factory as one family’ policy. 
As one goes in by SteelCo’s main entrance, the administrative building is on the 
left and the welfare building on the right, with a number of parking spaces 
around both buildings for employees and visitors. There are also some 
accommodation halls to the right, so the employees who live there can access 
the restaurants, convenience store, laundry, bank, post office, book shop, travel 
agent and so on in the welfare building quite easily. Going straight ahead to the 
workplace, there is the second accommodation area which contains a medical 
centre, a gym and swimming pool, additional restaurants, etc., only a five-
minute walk from the welfare building. Before reaching this second area, one 
passes SteelCo’s auditorium with a plaza on the left-hand side, where cinemas 
and company-wide activities can be found. Most SteelCo members use the 
main entrance every day and may stop by the welfare building for different 
reasons. Most of them visit the welfare building more than once a day. 
Steel-U is located on the first floor of the welfare building, which means that 
workers and visitors can easily access the Steel-U office. At the same time, 
Steel-U officials and officers can approach their members without difficulty. 
During opening hours every day, the same times as the company’s normal 
working day, union members come into the office all the time. Union officers are 
always ready to greet people, no matter what time they call. In addition, quite a 
few workers may be dropping by for different purposes at the same time. 
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Steel-U was set up at a time when the government was encouraging all state-
owned enterprises to help establish workplace labour unions, so it has had an 
office free of charge since then. In the meantime, it has been officially written in 
the collective agreement that the company should provide the office and other 
necessary facilities free of charge. As a result, the infrastructure of Steel-U 
office is provided and managed by SteelCo, since it is part of the welfare 
building. SteelCo mentions Steel-U on its official website as part of its corporate 
social responsibility and views it as a subsection of the ‘employee and 
contractor management’ section to demonstrate its harmonious employment 
relations. SteelCo set up its website of corporate social responsibility in 2012, 
as a result of its announcement of its own corporate social responsibility, 
following the sustainability reporting guidelines of the Global Reporting 
Initiative29 in 2011. SteelCo laid emphasis on cordial relations with Steel-U on 
its website by giving examples of collective agreement, worker directors on the 
board and so on. Clearly, SteelCo’s position vis-à-vis Steel-U is welcoming and 
positive in most cases. 
Unlike Sugar-U, Steel-U set up its own website which is hosted outside the 
SteelCo servers, though SteelCo’s website currently provides a link to it. In 
addition to the use of free company telephone lines and broadband, Steel-U 
also rents its private telephone line and broadband from a third party to maintain 
the independence of its site because the SteelCo information technology 
department monitors all company lines and may be a latent threat to union 
organisation and activity. As the union president CPW said, 
                                            
29 https://www.globalreporting.org. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a non-profit organisation to 
promote reports of sustainability in order to help organisations to develop sustainably. 
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“In general SteelCo seems supportive of the union’s routine business 
and we feel thankful, but it never does any harm to be more cautious 
as we understand the company may not always agree with the union. 
Essentially there are still conflicts between labour and management, 
so we have it written down since our first collective agreement what 
resources the company offers free to us to avoid further arguments 
about using them. In terms of our website, we know we must have 
our own independent site as we do not wish to be completely 
monitored by SteelCo. We still have our independence to keep as far 
as possible.” 
It is always pleasant to hear that trade unions get complimentary resources to 
develop, since trade unions are usually short of resources. However, it is worth 
a second thought before accepting anything from an employer without charge. 
Undoubtedly, no matter how friendly and kindly management is, there may still 
be some hidden threats as the corporation still holds an authority which is 
neither avoidable nor negligible. 
 
5.1.3. Summary and Comparison 
Paternalistic benevolence offers workers a good deal of care for their lives win 
the workplace and convenient living conditions. Moreover, in the past it 
supported the growth of trade unions in the workplace by offering recognition, 
financial support and resources. As a result of Taiwan’s state policy, it is likely 
that the management in state-owned and privatised enterprises does not hold 
an antagonistic view of trade unions and providing the necessary resources has 
become a means for workplace trade unions to develop. 
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Comparing the cases of Steel-U and Sugar-U, Steel-U has more consciousness 
of the value of autonomy in the workplace, whilst Sugar-U simply enjoys the 
resources offered by SugarCo. This results from the differences between state-
owned and privatised workplaces. 
It has been argued that trade unions never used in the past to be autonomous, 
but in fact they have been gradually expanding their territory as officially 
encouraged by the state. As a result, the old labour unions became less 
dependent after the experience of privatisation and continued to grow towards 
their present level of autonomy. In general, the reinforcement of paternalism by 
the government gradually helped the trade union organisation and its 
development in state-owned and privatised workplaces alike. 
 
5.2. Managerial Authority in the Workplace 
Authoritarian management is a feature of paternalism whilst the employer 
wields his/her power to manipulate the workplace. The example of the selection 
of Steel-U’s chief secretary may be enlightening. 
In terms of staffing, Steel-U’s union president, chief secretary, executive 
secretary and two daily secretaries are on secondment from SteelCo but with 
different conditions. All seconded staff members working in the union receive 
their salary from SteelCo based on their salary before they joined the union. In 
terms of their annual performance review, the process is a little different for 
each role. The performance of the executive secretary and two secretaries is 
reviewed by the chief secretary whose performance is then reviewed by the 
union president, but that of the union president is reviewed by his original line 
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manager in SteelCo. However, as the president does not actually work with this 
line manager, the performance review becomes a kind of formality. 
In general, all the seconded staff will return to their original departments if 
required. Depending on the election result, the union president has a fixed term 
in office of four years and no president may serve for more than two terms. The 
decision of who is to be the chief secretary is based on the consensus of Steel-
U and SteelCo’s Human Resources Department, so the person may be recalled 
by SteelCo after a few years. The executive secretary and two of the ordinary 
secretaries are selected by Steel-U and approved by SteelCo’s Human 
Resources Department, which rarely opposes Steel-U’s decision; these 
secretaries may go on working in Steel-U for a considerable time provided no-
one objects to their secondment. 
However, the agreement between SteelCo and Steel-U on who holds the 
position of union chief secretary is in fact the result of paternalistic authority in 
the workplace. Following paternalistic ideology, the company still would rather 
have a certain degree of control over the union’s affairs than giving it complete 
freedom to organise, especially when it is offering so many resources to the 
union. The union chief secretary, HCC, explained, 
“The company asks for the privilege of deciding who should be the 
union chief secretary, the one in charge of most of the union’s routine 
affairs and reporting directly to the union president. The candidate 
normally comes from the Employee Relations Division and is 
proposed by the company and the secondment usually has a fixed 
term of three years, possibly extended to a second term. Generally, 
the company seeks agreement from the union, whilst the union rarely 
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objects the company’s suggestion. It sounds ridiculous that the 
company should be allowed to interfere like this in union affairs, but 
the union accepts it as a survival strategy.” 
Another interviewee, KFC, the previous union chief secretary added, 
“Being the union chief secretary is quite challenging. You actually 
work for the union and the company at the same time. From the 
union’s viewpoint, you are expected to seek more welfare and 
benefits for members. From the company’s viewpoint, you are still 
part of the Employee Relations Division so your work is about 
employee relations. The mutual expectation is that you are the man 
in the middle who has to strike the balance between. Overall, the 
union chief secretary should consider the union more, whilst bearing 
in mind the company’s baseline and try his best to make both sides 
happy, or at least not unhappy, with each other.” 
The union president, CPW, added, 
“Of course we would be able to hire an independent chief secretary 
from outside to reduce SteelCo’s control over the union and we 
would be happy to do so, but we decide not to do it. Instead, we 
agree with the approach the company takes. We know that the chief 
secretary holds the key position between the company and the union. 
We may be able to hire an excellent outsider, but if the person has 
never worked in SteelCo, he will not truly understand the workplace 
culture here. There are occasions when the union president should 
not talk directly to the company, for example, when the union is at the 
stage of initiating an issue. The chief secretary, who is familiar with 
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the Human Resources Department, plays the role of informally 
communicating from one to the other so that both sides need never 
simply confront each other directly. Therefore, this agreement helps 
us to maintain a certain degree of good communication with the 
company.” 
Overall, it is inevitable under the paternalistic aegis for managerial authority to 
be wielded in the workplace and even for management to make an effort to 
intervene in trade union affairs. As far as the union is concerned, it treats the 
action as a survival strategy and an opportunity to understand the company 
better. Steel-U understands that confrontation between labour and management 
is not always preventable, but what they like is to try to reduce the possibility of 
conflicts, since their resources are limited and they have to win whenever 
conflict occurs. 
It seems, then, that SteelCo retains a certain degree of control over Steel-U’s 
affairs and it may be doubted whether Steel-U is altogether independent from 
SteelCo. Nevertheless, the paternalistic style of employment relations in 
SteelCo provides Steel-U with a helpful foundation on which to develop its own 
organisation and strategy. 
 
5.3. Managerial Morality in the Workplace 
Paternalistic morality can refer to the desire of management to act in a moral 
way to gain respect from the workers. Morality implies universal values in the 
workplace so management behaves in a good way that can be judged by 
workers and even by the society. Moral behaviours, which are normally not 
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required by law or the government, in fact play an important role when workers 
judge management as good or not. Therefore, the example of management 
wearing the same uniforms at work represents themselves acting in the same 
way as workers in SteelCo, dissolving the gap between labour and 
management in a symbolic way. 
It is quite common in state-owned and privatised enterprises in Taiwan for 
people to wear uniforms at work. When they start work, employees normally 
receive one summer uniform and one winter uniform. Some corporations may 
offer new uniform routinely, whilst others replace old items when requested. 
Rucker et al. (1999) note from the literature that manual workers mainly care 
about how hard-wearing their uniforms are and whether they help productivity. 
Uniform is useful to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, to help people 
identity their role in an organisation and to overlap of roles among group 
members. It is an important symbol of collectivity and regulation, which may 
point to external judgements of a firm and its employees (Joseph and Alex, 
1972). 
The former chairman of SteelCo was very proud of the uniform in the firm’s 
culture: everyone in the workplace, including the executive board and himself 
wears the same grey-blue uniform, no matter what job title people have (Wang, 
2002, Wang, 2006). He believed that SteelCo would like to create a corporate 
culture, the SteelCo spirit, which would lead every person there to be treated 
the same, without distortion by hierarchy or clique, although each has a different 
task or responsibility (Wang, 2002). Wearing the same uniforms brings in the 
image of ‘us’ as a group and implies the sense of fairness, which is a moral 
value demanded by many people. 
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In 2003, however, the chairman of SteelCo proposed a change to SteelCo’s 
uniform in order to give a better social impression of the firm. The management 
came up with a new design and colour for the clothes, but they did not know 
whether the employees, the main people wearing it every day, would agree with 
the initiative. Therefore, the company approached Steel-U to seek their help in 
order to put the new uniform policy into practice gently. First of all, the 
representatives from the Human Resources Department met the members of 
the union’s boards of directors and supervisors to discuss the idea and 
demonstrate the sample uniform. They met and responded to the union’s 
comments whilst emphasising their request that the union should advocate the 
change as well as collecting employees’ opinions. 
The union agreed to help because it had more frequent and direct interaction 
with members than the company. In addition, they treated this initiative as 
positive workplace recognition by the company. The president, CPW, said, 
“When the company got in touch over helping with the introduction of 
the new uniform, we thought it was a good idea to have us involved. 
In fact, our members are much more familiar with us than with the 
Human Resources Department and it is easier to visit the welfare 
building than the administrative building. We discussed the process 
with the company and then rolled it out very well. In addition, we are 
always happy when the company asks for our help, because it 
means that the company thinks of the union as a helper rather than 
an enemy.” 
After meeting with the management, the union set up a display area in the union 
office for a couple of weeks to advertise the new uniform and to provide some 
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explanations to the union members. Steel-U also publicised the news in its 
periodicals to encourage members to have a look at the display and give as 
much feedback as possible, emphasising that the style of uniform would not be 
changed on a regular basis, but that everyone would have to wear the new one 
when on duty. 
Eventually, after Steel-U’s efforts to introduce it to the workers, SteelCo 
introduced its uniform without much opposition. The company was happy to 
consult with the union this time, since a change in the uniform was not a major 
issue or one influencing managerial authority and it was aware that employees 
regularly interacted with Steel-U. In addition, it should be noted that, because 
the workers trusted the union, securing the union’s approval helped the policy to 
be accepted more easily. In the end, all the stakeholders were satisfied with the 
new uniform without much difference of opinion and each party got its needs 
and concerns satisfied. This is also an example of the union’s collaborating with 
the company in the workplace. 
 
5.4. Paternalistic Trade Unions and Employer Recognition 
In labour force general, the ideology of paternalism has helped the state and 
capital to tame the labour force into stable docility by providing personal welfare 
and benefits, with the wider purpose of sustaining economic growth and political 
peace. In addition to authoritarian management, paternalism values morality 
because it presents an authoritarian party as a good and feasible employer 
respected by the workers. It has even further supported the growth of trade 
unions, though initially not for the sake of their autonomy but for the same 
purpose of national economic and political development. 
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Paternalistic benevolence is quite important since it provides, with few 
obstructions, a foundation for corporate trade unionism in the workplace. It may 
also create the phenomenon of trade unions being affiliated to the employer 
because of the variety of resources that they receive from it, as in the case of 
Sugar-U and SugarCo. However, leaving aside the question of union autonomy, 
paternalism offers an opportunity to develop the organisation of trade unions in 
the workplace, which allows the development of corporate trade unions to begin 
without frequent resistance from the management. 
Nonetheless, paternalistic authority is never avoidable since the management 
always holds a certain degree of authority in the workplace. Employers want 
their workers to be obedient and silent and expect trade unions to act 
accordingly. As a result, trade unions may have to take on the requirements of 
the management, even though some of these requirements may ask a great 
deal of the unions. Trade unions evaluate the circumstances to decide whether 
to follow everything the management asks or negotiate with them and do the 
best to maintain such autonomy as they have. 
Paternalistic morality tolerates, even welcomes, cooperation with trade unions 
as it is presumed that management is doing what people see as the right things. 
It helps the employer to gain a good reputation which shapes the desired 
impression of being good parents. Given this presumption, the employer may 
see trade unions not merely as obstacles in workplace, but rather to be treated 
as his affiliates. Therefore, seeking the help of trade unions is not a bad move 
and an employer may gain some advantage from their help. 
According to the participant observation in December 2015 when Steel-U held 
its two-day annual meeting of union representatives, SteelCo offered the venue 
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and necessary facilities without charge. When the representative meeting 
opened, some of the senior management in SteelCo were presented, including 
the chairman of the board; the vice president of the Administration Division, who 
is in charge of human resources, general affairs and public affairs; the general 
manager of the Human Resources Department; and the assistant general 
manager of the Human Resources Department, HJT. The Administration vice 
president, the Human Resources general manager and the assistant general 
manager are the highest-ranking managers of SteelCo’s human resources 
management. 
The chairman of the board gave a short opening address to wish the meeting 
success and then had to leave early to travel to other businesses. Each of the 
three human resources management representatives also spoke a few words 
and all stayed until the end of the opening session to show their respect for 
union affairs. They also took the opportunity to answer questions from the trade 
union representatives. For the rest of the two-day meeting, one representative 
of the Human Resources Department was always present, mainly from the 
Employment Relations Division that is mainly responsible for union affairs in 
SteelCo. This representative usually sat in the meeting as a guest, not 
intervening in any discussion unless Steel-U asked him to comment. He sat 
beside the trade union officers and usually chatted with them. 
From the standpoint of SteelCo, sending a representative from the Human 
Resources Department is a habitual way of understanding what Steel-U does 
and how it acts. Its purpose is also to monitor whether Steel-U carries out its 
function when asking for company resources. For example, the company gives 
each union representative two days’ paid leave for union affairs and would like 
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to make sure that the union does not abuse these rights. Besides, attending 
some union meetings gives the company the chance to discover whether Steel-
U has any complaints or views that may be discussed by SteelCo and resolved 
at an early stage. Thus the intention is not only to show how much the company 
values union affairs but also to make sure that the communication between 
itself and the employees is clear. 
The interviewee HJT who has been working in SteelCo for over twenty years, 
mainly with responsibility for human resources affairs, made the following 
observation on Steel-U: 
“The relationship of labour and management is like dancing the tango. 
When one side steps forward, the other side steps backward. The 
two sides have to watch each other’s steps and act in concert with 
each other so they can keep dancing without stepping on each 
other’s feet. SteelCo is responsible for the way that Steel-U acts 
nowadays. In fact, we allow them to be what they are and offer them 
the chance to declare themselves, so we cannot complain too much 
if they are too demanding. We have to remember that the union was 
originally created by us. Frankly I quite admire Steel-U. They do not 
insatiably ask us to give them everything without good reason. 
Instead they have made lots of effort to communicate with SteelCo 
and they work very hard to make themselves better at fully 
representing the workers.” 
Clearly HJT felt that the company was responsible for the inception of Steel-U 
but the current status of Steel-U mainly comes from its own efforts. This is an 
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expression of paternalism in management, which gives her a less hostile view 
of trade union development. 
For trade unions, paternalism in fact offers them employer recognition, which is 
fairly important in the workplace. Management gives respect and talks to trade 
unions only once it has recognised them. However, this recognition implies 
some mutual compromise and makes trade unions moderate their aggression in 
the paternalistic context. Nonetheless, it is more important for corporate trade 
unions to be recognised by employers so they may be empowered to negotiate 
with the company. Trade unions nowadays may have fewer barriers to the 
development of their functions and organisation. To what extent a corporate 
trade union acts as the agent of its members and successfully mobilises 
workers will be addressed in the following chapters. 
More sophisticated paternalism institutionalises more in order to formalise the 
workplace further. It helps management to manipulate the workplace 
ceremoniously. A good example of this comes from the various kinds of non-
union representation mechanism. As required by the government, SugarCo 
implements labour-management meetings, the employee welfare committee, 
the labour safety and health committee, the committee supervising the labour 
retirement reserve funds and worker directors on the board. SugarCo also 
offers branch meetings to give all branch employees the chance to discuss and 
give feedback to management. Moreover, Sugar-U is another communication 
channel for SugarCo to express its paternal care as a listener welcoming the 
workers who talk to him. 
At the same time, SteelCo puts the required statutory committees into action as 
well, including the labour-management meeting, employee welfare committee, 
157 of 303 
labour safety and health committee and supervisory committee of the labour 
retirement reserve funds. A place on the directorial board for worker directors 
was initially requested by Steel-U. Moreover, SteelCo has initiated other 
channels of communication to mark their caution on behalf of employees, 
namely, the awards and punishments committee, employees’ stock ownership 
trust committee, sexual harassment prevention committee and departmental 
meetings. With all kinds of non-union representation and the existence of Steel-
U, SteelCo, under the ideology of paternalism, still acts as a parent trying every 
means of listening to and understanding its workers. Further discussion of non-
union representation can be found in the following chapters. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Paternalism begins by looking after the relationship of management with 
individual workers and provides them with welfare and necessary care, acting 
as a parent with authority, benevolence and morality. Apart from having workers 
simply obedient, it seeks in advance ways to make workers feel wholeheartedly 
loyal, so management puts thought into moral behaviour on its part to win more 
respect. Paternalistic management offers the illusion that the employer spares 
no effort to look after his employees. What it wants in return is for all workers to 
sincerely work hard and follow management’s bidding. 
However, following the governmental policy, paternalism covers not only 
individual workers but must also embrace trade unions. Trade unions were 
introduced by the state to help the growth of capital and itself, so their duty was 
not help labour voices to be heard or workers’ rights to be upheld. This premise 
resulted in a very quiet labour movement lacking aggression and militancy. At 
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the same time, nevertheless, management did not view trade unions reluctantly, 
but more or less welcomed them. Trade unions could take a soft approach, 
therefore, and gained space and resources to develop in the workplace. 
The three characteristics of paternalism, namely, authority, benevolence and 
morality, differentiate paternalistic management from absolutely authoritarian or 
dictatorial management. The paternalistic employer is authoritarian, benevolent 
and moral, because he would like to make people feel all in the same boat and 
win over his subordinates by his virtue. Benevolence and morality make 
paternalistic management stand out from autocratic management. These 
factors provide trade unions with a space to take root in the workplace, 
especially in state-owned and privatised enterprises. 
Unfortunately paternalism inescapably generates a docile labour force and 
silent trade unions since management has the initiative of offering welfare and 
benefits to meet labour needs and goes on to terminate labour conflicts before 
they can materialise. It is not surprising to learn from history why the state 
chooses to enforce paternalism in order to sustain politics, the economy and 
society. In spite of taming workers and trade unions, however, it must be 
remembered that trade unions serve some vested interests by paternalism, 
namely, employer recognition. With this, corporate trade unions have easier 
access and fewer obstacles to interacting with employers and surviving in the 
workplace. 
To conclude, this research argues that paternalism has made a setting in which 
trade unions have been calm and still for the past few decades, but at the same 
time paternalism has provided trade unions with fairly fertile ground in which to 
organise and develop. The employer offers various resources to trade unions, 
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such as physical offices, staff, funds and employer recognition. All these help 
trade unions to set themselves up at first. The rest depends on whether trade 
unions are conscious of union autonomy and further develop a strategy to 
survive. These topics are further discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6. Non-Union Representation in Workplaces 
Non-union representation in Taiwan’s workplaces was originally required by the 
government. It is in fact a practice of paternalism as evidence that employers 
listen to and care for employees. Besides, non-union representation promoted 
by the state is a fertile basis for reviving trade unions in the workplace. 
Selecting labour representatives of non-union representation provides trade 
unions with further legitimacy and reveals the union function of self-fulfilment for 
workers. Indirectly engaging in non-union representation helps trade union 
functions of economic regulation and job regulation, and demonstrates trade 
union efficacy. Non-union representation may enhance trade union power, 
provided that the union takes advantage of indirectly participating in non-union 
representation by supporting labour’s representatives. Trade unions are 
authorised by the government to intervene in non-union representation and 
further gain additional power and resources following their manipulation of non-
union representative mechanisms. The following chapter discusses and 
compares the implementing of labour-management meetings, worker directors 
on the board, employee welfare committees, and labour safety and health 
committees in the research cases of SteelCo and SugarCo. It is noted that trade 
union involvement in non-union representation not only facilitates a good 
practice of non-union representation mechanisms but also reinforces the 
influence of trade union in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the focus shifts to investigate how general workers and their 
squad leaders view non-union representation. Squad leaders, who are 
described more fully in the next chapter, are people who help the union to 
communicate with members. Apparently legislation, current issues and trade 
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unions influence people whether they are aware of non-union representation or 
not. Although non-union representation seems important in the workplace, most 
people may not have much understanding of it. Trade unions, however, play a 
key role in promoting non-union representation. 
 
6.1. Labour Representatives of Non-Union Representation: 
Legitimacy and Self-Fulfilment of Trade Unions 
Non-union representation is an important area of employment relations because 
the state governs a few mechanisms which must be implemented in all 
workplaces. Worker representatives participate in various meetings with 
management representatives and represent their fellow workers in discussing 
relevant issues. This represents the paternalistic ideology under which 
employers want to communicate positively with their employees. 
As mentioned in previous sections, four statutory committees, namely, labour-
management meetings, the labour safety and health committee, the employee 
welfare committee and the supervisory committee of workers’ retirement 
reserve fund, must be convened in each workplace, whether unionised or not. 
Employee representatives on these statutory committees are usually elected by 
the direct election of all workers when a union does not exist, or, when one has 
been legally set up, are elected by all union members or all union 
representatives. The legal rules are as quoted below. 
Article 5 of the Regulations for Implementing Labour-Management Meeting 
(Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014): 
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In a business entity with a labour union, representatives from the 
labour side in the labour-management meeting shall be elected by 
union member or member representative meeting; in the business 
entity without a labour union, they shall be directly elected by all 
employees. 
Article 11 Paragraph 4 of the Regulations for Occupational Safety and Health 
(職業安全衛生管理辦法) (Ministry of Labor, 2016b): 
The number of labour representatives of the provisions of Paragraph 
1 shall be more than one third of the committee members. Labour 
representative refers to the representative designated by the labour 
union in the enterprise; if the enterprise is not unionised but has a 
labour-management meeting, the labour representative may be 
appointed by labour representatives of the meeting; if the enterprise 
is not unionised and has no labour-management meeting, labour 
representative may be appointed by all labour through direct election. 
Article 4 of the Organisational Regulations on Employee Welfare Committee (職
工福利委員會組織準則) (Council of Labor Affairs, 2013b):  
The Committee may appoint one of the committee members as the 
ex officio member. All other members are determined as described 
below: 
1. The method used to elect committee members shall be 
determined by the business entity and the union separately. The 
elected committee members of the union should elect at least two-
thirds of the committee members.  
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2. For business entities without a union, the committee members are 
determined by the business entity and the welfare committee. In this 
case, the method used to select members is determined by the 
business entity. Labour representatives are elected by all employees. 
Substitute members should be also elected at the same time. The 
number of substitute members shall not exceed one-third of all 
members. 
Article 4 of the Rules Governing the Organisation of the Supervisory Committee 
of the Business Entities' Labour Retirement Reserve (事業單位勞工退休準備金
監督委員會組織準則) (Ministry of Labor, 2015b): 
Workers' representatives of the supervisory committee shall be 
elected by the labour unions. Where a labour union does not exist, 
they may be elected by workers by direct election among themselves. 
Substitute members may also be elected. 
It is clear from all the legislation that a workplace union may engage in the 
practice of non-union representation since the union is empowered to 
legitimately elect worker representatives. In general, trade unions in businesses 
have the legal right to engage in the election of employee representatives, so 
these elections may become part of their usual business. For instance, Steel-U 
has passed its own rules to regulate each election, namely, the Election Rules 
of Steel-U Officials, in order to smooth the progress of employee representation 
in SteelCo. As a result, labour representatives of the SteelCo labour-
management meeting are elected by the union representatives, but the 
employee representatives of the employee welfare committee, the labour safety 
164 of 303 
and health committee and the supervisory committee of workers’ retirement 
reserve fund are all elected by the union directors. However, every worker in 
SteelCo can register to be a candidate of some representative committee. 
Before each representative election, Steel-U officers may actively approach 
some members who may or may not participate in union activities but are 
recommended by other members or union officials. The union encourages 
those members to stand for election as worker representatives. In fact, these 
members may never have thought of doing such a thing until they get the 
chance to join a committee. The labour-management meeting representative 
CCL explained how he became a labour representative, 
“I started to act as a worker representative of the labour-
management meeting because the union president CPW came to 
persuade me. I had been working as an engineer in our company for 
several years but I took no enthusiastic part in union activities before 
taking up this role. I simply thought I was too busy to take part, but 
CPW was thoroughly sincere and supportive, so I decided to try. In 
addition, being a representative does help me to understand the 
company, the union and our colleagues better.” 
In the participant observation, I noticed that people working in professional 
positions, such as engineers, specialists or researchers, could be less 
interested in participating in the union than those in basic positions, such as 
operators and foremen. However, Steel-U has both basic and professional 
employees, so it would like to learn a range of views on workplace issues to 
avoid bias and also to encourage as many members as possible to participate 
to exemplify the union function of self-fulfilment. 
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On their side, some worker representatives are volunteering to mount a 
campaign for a new post, because they want to show their ambition to improve 
the departmental structure or to advance their own careers. The union provides 
a platform for this kind of self-fulfilment. Another representative of the labour-
management meeting, HHC, said, 
“I joined the union after I started my job in SteelCo when I could 
sense a problem between workers and managers in my department. 
I was desperate to change it so I actively asked for support from the 
union and joined the candidates for election. So far I am pleased with 
what I have done and I truly believe that I am doing something right 
and good for all Steel-U members.” 
Moreover, the general survey for union members includes three questions 
especially for those who have been or are employee representatives. In total 22 
of 126 respondents had had the experience of representing their colleagues in 
labour-management meetings or those of the employee welfare committee, 
safety and health committee and supervisory committee of workers’ retirement 
reserve fund, awards and punishments committee, or employees’ stock 
ownership trust committee. To explain why they had become a worker 
representative, most people said that they wanted to serve fellow members, 
fight for labour rights and welfare in the workplace and supervise the company. 
A few people mentioned their interest in relevant affairs such as safety and 
health, and their specialism in such issues. Self-fulfilment via a trade union 
seems an important motive for workers to participate in non-union 
representation. 
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Second, the respondents were asked to define their roles in the company. Most 
of them saw themselves as striving for welfare, protecting rights and acting as 
the communicating bridge between labour and management. One respondent 
said, “employees first.” It seems people who have been or are worker 
representatives generally understand their duties well, but the survey did not 
ask how or why they had learnt these ideas. 
Asked about their satisfaction with their achievement in meetings, 10 of the 15 
respondents felt satisfied because they had worked hard and received quite 
positive feedback from their fellow members. Four people thought their 
achievement was about right but their professional abilities were not good 
enough and should be improved. One person was not originally satisfied 
because he felt that the mechanism of labour representation was not enough to 
protect workers in the workplace. Overall, no matter why a member decided to 
serve as a labour representative in a representing mechanism, it seems the 
trade union helped them to achieve self-fulfilment in the workplace. 
The following section starts by citing the practical experiences of some official 
workplace representatives from the cases under study, which is followed by 
comparison and discussion. 
 
6.2. Non-Union Representation in Practice 
Following the review of relevant regulations to give an overall understanding of 
the non-union representation system which formalises the legitimacy of trade 
unions, this section examines the actual practices in the non-union 
representation of the cases studied. Trade unions support their labour 
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representatives and gain efficacy in the workplace. Helping the implementation 
of non-union representation further aids the union functions of economic 
regulation and job regulation. 
 
6.2.1. Labour-Management Meetings 
Labour-management meetings are the main non-union representative 
committees in most businesses, but the operation and outcome may vary in 
different enterprises. This section describes the experiences of SteelCo and 
SugarCo workers and then briefly compares them. 
 
6.2.1.1. SteelCo 
SteelCo called its first labour-management meeting on 18 December 1985 after 
the statutory announcement of Regulations for Implementing Labour-
Management Meeting in May 1985. As the model state-owned enterprise at the 
time, SteelCo had the responsibility of implementing all new regulations. 
Nowadays this meeting brings together nine labour representatives and nine 
management representatives and takes place over a full day every month in a 
company conference room. The labour representatives are elected by the union 
representatives who are elected by all union members, but every employee can 
register as a labour representative candidate. Management representatives are 
usually senior directors and chiefs who take it in turn to attend. Unlike other 
representative committees which the company president attends ex officio, the 
highest management representative in this meeting is the vice president of the 
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Administration Division, who is unable to make a final decision during a meeting. 
The labour representative CCL said,  
“The company president does not like labour-management meetings 
at all and is unwilling to participate. He thinks the labour 
representatives in this meeting are always too aggressive and too 
demanding, so he would prefer to be a temporising outsider without 
direct involvement.” 
After the election of labour representatives, all labour representatives decide on 
a convenor among them to coordinate and represent the whole body. Before a 
formal meeting, the convenor calls a pre-meeting to integrate the labour 
opinions and at the same time to collect items to propose to the Employee 
Relations Division which is in charge of the administrative affairs of the labour-
management meeting, including minute taking. Labour representatives propose 
all kinds of issues concerning employment relations, but management never 
submit any item for the agenda. During the formal meeting, the representatives 
chair in turn, but the person taking minutes is always an administrator from the 
Employee Relations Division. Approximately one week after the formal meeting, 
whoever chaired it confirms and signs the minutes which are then distributed to 
all the meeting representatives, the union, all sections and units, and senior 
managers. 
In terms of agenda, at least three or four new issues or problems arise in each 
monthly meeting whilst at the same time a fairly long list of unsolved issues are 
carried over. One item usually involves departments or divisions which have no 
representatives on the committee, and therefore it cannot be concluded until the 
relevant managers or officers have been invited to attend and are willing to do 
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so. Most items focus on specific issues and may not be brought to a conclusion 
until several meetings have passed or may even be even be passed to the next 
meeting group. Taking the seventh labour-management meeting (from 
December 2003 to November 2006) as an example, the aggregate number of 
items proposed for the meeting agenda was 204. 49 items were adopted 
without change, 75 items were accepted in part, 34 items were rejected and 46 
items were left pending until the eighth meeting. 
One of the pending items, for instance 13-1 (December 2004), suggested that 
the company should provide a specific allowance to employees working in 
hazardous environments. This item could not be concluded with mutual 
agreement. However, only two labour representatives at the seventh meeting 
remained in post at the eighth meeting, and this may have been a problem for 
the labour side, since there were still many pending issues which could be 
dismissed by the management if no one followed them up. The labour 
representative CCL said,  
“Fortunately, the convenor of the two meetings was the same person 
who is very positive and willing to carry out the duties for the labour-
management meeting. Besides, a new labour representative is sitting 
in the union seat of the current board of directors. This helps to 
improve the company’s recognition of the labour-management 
meetings.” 
In order to improve the efficiency of the meeting, three or four representatives 
(including both labour and management representatives) may organise an ad 
hoc group within the meeting to take responsibility for a few specific items. 
Otherwise, it is not possible to discuss all the new and remaining items within 
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one-day session. Sometimes the company may try to ignore some issues, but 
the labour representatives will report to the union, which may make further 
efforts to force management to tackle the issues. However, the meeting 
administrator HMW felt that the labour representatives usually raise an issue 
without providing any solution and wait for the management response. He 
wanted them to approach the departments concerned before the meeting, 
especially if they were departments without representatives, to allow both sides 
to reach mutual understanding more easily and improve the efficiency of the 
meeting Besides, HMW mentioned, 
“Issues discussed should be more general instead of the specific 
cases which could be submitted to the departmental meeting instead. 
Although all kinds of issues can be submitted according to the statute, 
some issues such as safety and health should go to the relevant 
committees, which would also improve efficiency.” 
However, this reflects the essentials of the labour-management meeting that 
almost all kinds of workplace issues may be brought to the platform. 
Nevertheless, the interviewee HJT commented on the labour representatives at 
the meetings, 
“Steel-U works very hard to push the labour representatives. As you 
may be aware, they propose new items of agenda every month and 
there are already other items on the agenda, so the list keeps 
growing. It is very surprising that they can always find something to 
draw attention to and it is good to know that people care about the 
workplace.” 
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6.2.1.2. SugarCo 
Unlike SteelCo, SugarCo has several branches in different cities so each 
branch holds its own labour-management meeting. Altogether, 25 labour-
management meetings are set up within SugarCo and each meeting should 
take place every three months and send its minutes to the Industrial Relations 
Division of the Human Resources Department at headquarters. Every meeting 
involves 10 to 18 representatives with the same number of representatives of 
management and labour. The company directly appoints the management 
representatives and the representative with the highest position is the deputy 
chief of each branch. The union members or all the workers in a branch elect 
their worker representatives who are elected pro rata in each department. When 
a branch has a local union, its standing directors become ex officio 
representatives and the labour-management meeting has to report to the union 
as well. Some meetings have two fixed chairs with one management and one 
labour representative, but most meetings have all the representatives taking it in 
turn to chair the meeting. 
All the representatives have to send any issue they wish to discuss to the 
person administering the meeting in the Human Resources Sector of each 
branch some time before the formal meeting; the administrator is also 
responsible for taking minutes at the meeting. Nevertheless, both sides may 
propose items for the agenda. The management may take the labour-
management meeting as an opportunity to announce new policies, safety and 
health issues, or statutory changes. Moreover, should no item be proposed by 
the labour representatives, the administrator may propose a few issues on 
behalf of the management representatives to make sure each meeting has a 
proper agenda. The labour-management meeting is an important item for the 
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Human Resources Department at headquarters and the Human Resources 
Division of each branch aims to ensure that the meeting is held regularly, since 
the implementation of the labour-management meeting is always an important 
item in many external investigations or assessments by the government or non-
governmental organisations. 
Representatives generally aim to reach agreement before the meeting ends and 
normally keep away from taking a vote. Sometimes if the management feels an 
issue is quite controversial, the Human Resources Sector may hold informal 
discussions with the labour representatives before the formal meeting in order 
to avoid any overt conflict. When it is too difficult for the two sides to agree with 
each other, the branch will defer the issue to the next meeting or pass the item 
to headquarters for final judgement or a recommendation. In general, the 
responsible units or sectors will carry out the decisions of the meeting and 
moreover the Human Resources Department at headquarters pay most 
attention to health and safety issues which have to be resolved before long and 
reported back to the Human Resources Department. 
In the view of the administrator, CWC, 
“Statutory committees in a company are a purely representative 
system which results from different representatives’ views and 
knowledge. Labour-management meetings should be very important 
in a non-unionised workplace, but they may be weakened if a union 
is operating well and labour self-awareness rises. The agendas of 
labour-management meetings are always similar to the agendas of 
meetings of union boards of directors and supervisors. However, we 
have to implement labour-management meetings since they are 
173 of 303 
statutory. We in the Industrial Relations Division try our best to be 
neutral and pull both sides to a point of balance, so both sides are 
very likely to expect too much from us and feel unsatisfied.” 
Apparently, SugarCo has the view that non-union representation is unnecessary 
in a unionised workplace like itself and puts it into practice more or less out of 
obedience to the government’s requirement. 
 
6.2.1.3. Comparison 
Obviously, labour-management meetings appear to be important and to be very 
similar in SteelCo and SugarCo, such as having legal regulations for the 
structure and organisation of meetings. However, the major difference is made 
by the effect of involving the union in the meeting. The practice of labour-
management meetings in both cases is summarised in as Table 6-1. SteelCo 
experience shows that union assistance in fact helps forward the practice of 
holding meetings. 
Table 6-1 Labour-Management Meetings in SteelCo and SugarCo 
Company SteelCo SugarCo 
Frequency of meeting Monthly Every three months 
Number of representatives 18 10-18 
Most senior management 
representatives 
Vice administrative 
president 
Branch deputy chief 
Chairperson All representatives in 
turn 
Fixed to two or all in turn 
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Responsible department Employment Relations 
Division 
Human Resources 
Sector 
Proposals for agenda From labour only From both sides 
Labour pre-meeting Yes No 
 
In both cases, the most senior management does not engage in the practice of 
labour-management meetings in order to avoid formal confrontations between 
management and labour. Management always takes a passive part in meetings, 
such as not submitting agenda items or taking it as another opportunity to 
promote policies, rather than debating issues which are more relevant to 
employment relations as a whole. 
Majority decisions are always avoided because both sides believe it may make 
the situation worse or result in conflicts between representatives. Whether union 
supports a delegate or does not differentiate the participation and efforts of any 
labour representative from any other, the candidates who are backed by the 
union seem more dedicated to meetings and better organised. 
The practice of holding labour-management meetings is a paternalistic stage on 
the road to union maturity, which allows workers to express their needs and 
requests. The union is an important factor in ensuring the regular 
implementation of such meetings. The other factor is the great variety of 
external assessments to check the legal implementation of committees as 
significant evidence of a well-established enterprises. External assessments 
urge businesses that want to be certified as good companies to arrange for non-
union representation whether or not businesses are interested in such 
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committees. What those enterprises are interested in is their reputation in 
society, including credit for looking after their employees properly. 
 
6.2.2. Worker Directors on the Board 
The only statute referring to worker directors on the board is Article 35 of the 
Administrative Law of State-Run Enterprises (Legislative Yuan, 2011) which 
requests state-owned businesses to set up worker directors to represent at 
least one fifth of the state’s capital. SugarCo currently has three seats for 
worker directors on its board, who are elected by the assembly union 
representatives. In contrast, SteelCo worker directors are set up according to 
the stock shares of union members, though the state is still the biggest 
shareholder of SteelCo. 
 
6.2.2.1. SteelCo 
After the privatisation in 1995, the fifth Steel-U representatives suggested to 
SteelCo that a worker director should be a member of the board, but the 
company tended to appoint someone of its own choice. However, neither side 
had acquired enough stock to sustain a labour director, but labour and 
management did not reach a compromise, due to severe internal conflicts 
between the parties at the time. 
In December 1997, the sixth union board of directors and supervisors 
negotiated with the company again, since a seat for a worker director needed 
6% or more of shareholdings. The company collected 4% and the union 
collected only 2% of the shareholders’ letters of consignment. Eventually they 
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came to an agreement that one seat for an employee director would be set up 
as a legal person with the union’s choice occupying it in the second year of the 
three-year term of office and the company representative doing so in the first 
and third years. Following this agreement, the union started to collect 
shareholders’ letters of consignment from members and the employee 
representative was elected as a director at the shareholders’ meeting in 
December 1997, three years earlier than the passage of the statutory revision. 
Furthermore, Steel-U passed its Rules for the Election of Employee Directors 
and Labour Advisory Committee in February 1998, so the union elected four 
advisors of the committee in the assembly meeting of union representatives and 
one employee director was elected from these four. 
Later, the union negotiated again to fully represent the employee director rather 
than sharing the term of office with management. The company finally agreed 
and authorised the union to collect the stockholders’ letters of consignment on 
behalf of the company as well. The seventh union helped members to draw gifts 
at the general shareholders’ meeting and collected 3% of the shareholders’ 
letters of consignment in May 2001. It elected one worker director in the same 
month whilst the union president was elected as a legal person. The union at 
last obtained the sole right to appoint someone to occupy the seat of the 
employee director. 
In June 2003, the Legislative Yuan passed a law saying that privatised 
enterprises should have at least one labour director when the state capital 
remains at 20% or more. However, Steel-U did not ask for an extra seat on the 
basis of this bill. The union president, CPW, who was also the worker director, 
said,  
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“For the union, it does not make much differences if there are one or 
two worker directors. If we asked for another seat for a director 
simply based on the shareholding of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
how could we retain the seat if one day the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs held less than 20% stock? Besides, the company might think 
we were too greedy, so then the function of the labour director would 
not work well, which would be more a loss than a gain; at the same 
time, we have to consider whether we are powerful enough to 
support two directors’ seats. However, having one worker director is 
totally different from having none, because one employee director 
gives the union and workers an opportunity to supervise the 
operation of the company. Why the union struggled to have the union 
as the legal person of the labour director is to make sure that this 
seat would not become a way for a small number of people to gain 
fame and wealth or for a nominal director with no actual function to 
be a token member of the board. We act on the premise that we work 
together with the company for sustainable operation.” 
The union actively pushed forward the mechanism for having labour directors 
on the board and regulated its support to the representative in order to be sure 
of having the only seat based on the stock shares of members and of exercising 
its function as the voice of labour on the board of directors. It is vital that the 
union should define the mission of its labour directors and be knowledgeable 
and professional enough to support its representatives. 
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6.2.2.2. SugarCo 
SugarCo operates a board of 15 directors three of whom have been labour 
directors since 2001, according to the legislation. The normal term of office of 
directors is two years, but each worker director has a term of three years on the 
board. SugarCo and Sugar-U have agreed with this arrangement and do not 
regard it as a problem to operate. The meeting of the boards of directors and 
supervisors takes place every month. Three subgroups are set up within the 
board of directors responsible for different issues, including investment, 
property planning and regulation and budgeting. Each director has to participate 
in one subgroup and each subgroup has its own individual meetings before the 
formal monthly meeting. 
According to the Election Rules of Worker Directors passed by Sugar-U, labour 
directors are selected in such a way that every worker can register to be a 
candidate but only Sugar-U representatives have the right to vote. Therefore, “it 
is an indirect election so the candidates whom union members favour may not 
be elected,” commented the administrator CWC. Besides, individual 
background of candidates may be influential, since union representatives 
usually vote for people who graduated from the same high school which used to 
run a sponsored programme with SugarCo. CWC said that the labour director 
CCH always had a difficult campaign because he was not from the same high 
school so he had to work hard to secure a majority without a union cadre 
position. 
There is no limitation to the terms of office of a labour director, so it is possible 
that some people may hold a seat forever and this may be a blind spot of the 
regulation. At the time of my interviews, one worker director had survived three 
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terms of office and another had survived two terms. wo of the worker directors 
apart from CCH were also union directors, who might confuse their roles as 
labour director on the board and union director. CWC commented,  
“Worker directors should not become the union vice-director, but 
should pay attention to various labour issues indirectly affected by 
changes of management and investment. They have to create 
employment opportunities through management and investment and 
members take priority in these employment opportunities.” 
The employee directors define themselves as canvassers seeking to persuade 
other directors because they are in a minority on the board, who are unable to 
take the lead on any issues in meetings. The meeting rules of SugarCo board 
regulate that any issue could be postponed if two or more members agree, so 
worker directors have some chance to lobby other directors as long as 
someone supports them. 
Sugar-U passed its Rules of Labour Directors according to Article 35 of the 
Administrative Law of State-Run Enterprises to regulate the selection and 
obligation of worker directors as well as the second term for worker directors. 
The seats of the Consultative Committee of Worker Directors consists of the 
union president, standing directors and supervisors and external professional 
advisors. Labour directors usually meet committee members before any formal 
meeting or every time an issue arises which is related to company governance. 
When the labour directors want to propose an agenda item, they usually 
discuss it in advance with the Sugar-U board of directors rather than proposing 
it on their own. The former worker director HML explained,  
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“Most issues are related to business overall or employees’ rights as a 
whole, so worker directors and the union want to support each other. 
Items to so with union boards of directors and supervisors and the 
meeting of union representatives will pass to labour directors in 
writing, as they do when the union wants them to be addressed in the 
board of directors’ meeting.” 
The worker director CCH also said, 
“What is a worker director? It puts ‘worker’ always in front of ‘director’, 
so we have to think of workers before considering directors. A worker 
director is responsible for representing all workers on the board.” 
 
6.2.2.3. Comparison 
Worker directors so far have existed only in state-owned businesses or 
enterprises which are invested by the government according to the legislation. 
SteelCo is something of an exception since its labour director was set up taking 
a different approach. Table 6-2 summarises the practice of worker directors in 
both cases. 
Table 6-2 Worker Directors in SteelCo and SugarCo 
Company SteelCo SugarCo 
Number 1 3 
Origin Union members’ 
shareholding 
Legal requirement 
Term of office 3 years 3 years 
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Consultative committee Yes Yes 
 
In general, worker directors are in a minority on the board and may not be able 
to dominate many issues. The setting is union-related but is sometimes 
symbolic rather than essential if worker directors have less support from the 
union. However, for seats guaranteed by the state capital, a potential threat is 
the loss of seats if the state decided to privatise or reduce its investment. In 
terms of employees who hold the position, it is in question whether they might 
have conflicts of self-identity in workplace because their own jobs could be quite 
distinct from their work on the board of directors. As a result, trade unions have 
to support worker directors and plug the gaps in their knowledge by their own 
consultative committees. 
 
6.2.3. Employee Welfare Committee 
The Organisational Regulations of Employee Welfare Committee (Council of 
Labor Affairs, 2013b), announced on 23 October 1943 and modified on 17 
October 2013, regulate employee welfare committees in enterprises. This is a 
very clear practice of paternalism to demonstrate employers’ care for 
employees’ work and lives. 
 
6.2.3.1. SteelCo 
SteelCo employee welfare committee is in charge of the welfare of all the 
employees in the SteelCo business group; it has 27 members, 20 representing 
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labour and 7 management. The management representatives are non-union 
members appointed by the company and the company president is both an ex 
officio committee member and its chairperson. Employee representatives are 
elected by the union board of directors and every member can register as a 
candidate. Each representative remains on the committee for three years. 
According to the Organisation Rules in SteelCo, the committee appoints a chief 
executive to carry out the daily business without pay, a position held by the 
head of the General Affairs Department. The funds come from 40% of the sales 
of leftover materials, 0.15% of the company’s operating income 0.5% of 
employees’ salaries. A cooperative store is set up by the committee for the 
convenience of the workers. 
The missions of the committee include the discussion of welfare affairs, 
administration of welfare funds, business of the cooperative store and any 
issues related to welfare and benefits. Regular meetings take place every two 
months and any members of Steel-U Welfare Division may attend as observers. 
The convenor of labour representatives usually calls a pre-meeting to conclude 
common views of the agenda in advance. Agendas of formal meetings are 
generally concluded without much argument according to what the labour 
representatives have agreed in the pre-meetings. Therefore, representatives 
never vote but try to organise as peaceful and effective a meeting as possible. 
The convenor of labour representatives, CHH, said, 
“We never put things to a vote in a meeting, because voting results 
must be what we want since labour representatives are the majority 
of the committee. However, we also have discussions with the 
Welfare Division of the General Affairs Department and the chief 
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executive of the committee in pre-meetings to gain common 
consensus.” 
The Welfare Division of the General Affairs Department is responsible for 
administering the employee welfare committee, including taking minutes of 
meetings, inviting relevant businesses to tender, and so on. 
The union president has sometimes urged the convenor to be more aggressive 
as worker representatives at the labour-management meeting, but the convenor 
has disagreed, since the nature and mission of the two meetings were not the 
same and he looked only for an efficient committee from which workers could 
receive the welfare and benefits they indeed needed. The convenor, CHH, 
remarked, 
“It is said that the past labour representatives of the employee 
welfare committee were very antagonistic, but I wanted to be tactful 
and give members the maximum welfare and benefits, avoiding any 
strained situations, since everyone in the company, including 
management, would benefit. Now I am the convenor of the labour 
representatives, but it is very exhausting to reach a conclusion when 
there are 16 people, the union board of directors and then the 
company president.” 
CHH further commented on the selection of labour representatives, 
“I was approached before to be a representative on this committee 
but I refused at the time. I know it is very difficult to deal with welfare 
because everyone has different needs and it is not possible to satisfy 
everyone. This time only six representatives had had experience on 
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the previous committee, because welfare became the target of the 
last union election and most representatives were replaced. When 
you deal with welfare, you become the target; people see you with 
peculiar views. However, some people like this position as it gives 
them more or less a chance to make contact with the bidding 
companies.” 
 
6.2.3.2. SugarCo 
Owing to the structure of SugarCo, the employee welfare committee was set up 
as a foundation constituted as a legal person with 13 branches. It has 21 
representatives: 14 workers and 7 from management whose term of office is 
ways three years. The company president is the ex officio member and 6 
management representatives are elected from the employees who are not 
union members. The administrator, CWC, said,  
“We usually provide a reference list which is discussed by senior 
management and election is by secret ballot. The result is usually 
similar to the reference list though the votes for individuals are often 
different from what was predicted. All ballots are anonymous and 
members of the Ethics Department, chiefs of Human Resources and 
local units have to supervise the process,” 
Labour representatives used to be chosen by Sugar-U and then put forward for 
election by the Sugar-U representatives who suggested them, but now they are 
chosen again by each branch nominating one person and the rest of the quota 
being shared by the bigger branches. All employee representatives have to be 
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confirmed by the Sugar-U boards of directors and supervisors before their 
names are announced. The chief of Sugar-U’s Welfare Division, HML, said,  
“In general, members are more interested in participating in the 
employee welfare committee since welfare is the most important 
thing to them. Each member union usually nominates the member 
with the highest reputation. However, members pay less attention to 
other committees in the company.” 
Committee meetings take place every three months whilst a chairperson, who 
convenes the regular and provisional meetings, is elected from all the 
representatives. A chief executive is appointed to look after daily business 
without pay. The funds come from 20%-40% of sales of leftover materials, 
0.12% of the company’s operating income and 0.5% of employees’ salaries. 
Cooperative stores may be set up in all branches. Sugar-U’s welfare chief, HML, 
said,  
“The principal task of the committee is the way to use the welfare 
funds, since the source of funding is quite stable. For example, the 
committee has an income of approximately fifty million dollars per 
year, so every member is entitled to about ten thousand dollars. It is 
more appropriate for the committee to give vouchers or products to 
the value of eight thousand dollars or so to each employee, so 
people will feel more or less satisfied.” 
CWC commented on the relationships with outside providers:  
“Because of the pressure from our business divisions, it is difficult for 
outside providers to offer products to us; insurance companies may 
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be the only exception. We have had a large variety of products and 
even our employees may not be aware of everything … We used to 
have a cooperative store and common room and rented out corridors 
to outside providers when the headquarters were in Taipei, where we 
used to have a single building. Their products had to be different 
from ours and the employee welfare committee was able to receive 
the rents.” 
 
6.2.3.3. Comparison 
Employee welfare committees, then, are very popular among workers; welfare 
is related most directly to people, whether they have a union or not. Its issues 
are simpler than those discussed at labour-management meetings, so its 
representatives may act differently. The union may have a welfare division and 
so may management, but both of them may relate to the implementation of an 
employee welfare committee. Table 6-3 summarises the practice in the 
research cases of the employee welfare committees. 
Table 6-3 Employee Welfare Committees in SteelCo and SugarCo 
Company SteelCo SugarCo 
Frequency of meetings Every two months Every three months 
Number of labour 
representatives 
20 14 
Number of management 
representatives 
7 7 
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Most senior management Company president Company president 
Chairperson Company president Company president 
Responsible department Welfare Division of 
General Affairs 
Department 
Welfare Division of 
General Affairs 
Department 
Labour pre-meeting Yes No 
 
Welfare is a key concern of paternalism also, because it reflects how 
management looks after employees in the workplace and beyond. The setting 
of the employee welfare committee makes it a platform of less conflict in labour 
and management communication, partly because most of the committee 
represent labour. Besides, the Employee Welfare Fund Act (職工福利金條例) 
(Ministry of Labor, 2015a), which is the parent legislation of the Organisational 
Regulations on Employee Welfare Committee, has regulated the funding 
resources for the committee, so it makes the committee run smoothly without 
worries about money. 
 
6.2.4. Labour Safety and Health Committee 
Health and safety form a vital issue in heavy and manufacturing industries and 
both case enterprises have paid much attention to it, even though the state has 
stipulated a committee co-organised by labour and management 
representatives. 
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The labour safety and health committee in SteelCo is chaired by the company 
president and consists of 15 management representatives and 15 employee 
representatives. Management representatives are appointed by the enterprise 
and labour representatives are elected by the union board of directors. In 
general, most agenda items are proposed by the worker side. The labour 
representatives may call a one-day pre-meeting devoted to discussion in the 
morning and inspecting the field in the afternoon. 
It is seldom that labour and management representatives have conflicting 
opinions in a meeting, for health and safety cannot be ignored. Therefore, the 
employee representatives feel powerful since their views are taken seriously. 
The interviewee, CHH, who had previously participated in both the employee 
welfare committee and the labour safety and health committee said about the 
latter,  
“I found more fulfilment being a representative on the labour safety 
and health committee than the employee welfare committee or 
labour-management meeting, because health and safety is the target 
for both sides. If we said something was not safe enough, the 
company rarely rejected our view.” 
 
6.2.5. Efficacy, Economic Regulation and Job Regulation of Trade 
Unions 
Even without paternalistic ideology, non-union representation would give trade 
unions efficacy in that it gives them more chance to collect information and give 
opinions. Non-union representation does not take the place of trade union 
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membership but offers trade unions a platform from which to participate in 
workplace affairs in an indirect way. 
Trade unions may practise the functions of economic regulation and job 
regulation within non-union representation as well as for their members whilst 
relevant issues may be brought into discussions by non-union representatives. 
For example, the labour-management meeting may bring in issues relevant to 
economic regulation and job regulation and the employee welfare committee 
may contribute slightly to economic regulation. Overall, the autonomy and 
power of trade unions may be increased provided that trade unions actively 
engage in non-union representation. 
 
6.3. Workers and Non-Union Representation 
Labour representatives of non-union representation are only a small group of 
people elected to represent the whole, so it may be asked whether general 
workers feel they are represented or not. Survey I asked some open-ended 
questions to find out.  
To assess the ease of access to a worker representative, 75 survey 
respondents provided their experiences of reaching a labour representative. 48 
people said it was quite easy to find a representative whenever they needed to, 
mainly because most of them work in the same department as a representative 
or more than one. 9 workers felt it was possible to see a representative 
whenever they wanted, as they usually worked in the same division or 
department, or they had known each other well. 
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In contrast, 18 respondents thought it was very difficult to approach a 
representative because they had no representatives in the office or department 
and they did not visit the union frequently. Some found they did not have a 
chance to get in touch with their representatives. 
Even though 76% of the valid responses show the accessibility of 
representatives, only those who happen to have colleagues as representatives 
or who contact the union can easily speak to a representative. It is hard for 
workers to interact with representatives if they do not know any and at the same 
time rarely get in touch with the union. Overall, workers tend to be aware of who 
their representatives are, but they might not be able to contact their 
representatives. Employee representatives in meetings represent the rank and 
file as a whole, but they are only able to interact with a limited number of 
workers. The union therefore becomes an important mediator in encouraging 
relationships between members and labour representatives. 
 
6.3.1. Awareness of Non-Union Representative Mechanisms 
Non-union representative mechanisms have existed in SteelCo for a long time, 
but whether workers are aware of the whole system is a question. According to 
the labour legislation, all the statutory committees are formalised, namely, the 
labour-management meeting, the employee welfare committee, the labour 
safety and health committee and the supervisory committee of workers’ 
retirement reserve funds. One worker director’s seat on the board was set up 
under an agreement between the company and the union in 2001 and is now 
occupied by a union member. In addition the company itself institutes the 
following mechanisms: the awards and punishments committee, the employees’ 
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stock ownership trust committee, the sexual harassment prevention committee 
and departmental meetings. 
Therefore, the mechanisms of non-union representation in SteelCo comprise 
the Labour-Management Meeting, the Employee Welfare Committee, the 
Labour Safety and Health Committee, the Supervisory Committee of Workers’ 
Retirement Reserve Funds, the Worker Directors, the Awards and Punishments 
Committee, the Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust Committee, the Sexual 
Harassment Prevention Committee and the Departmental Meeting. 
To examine workers’ understanding of the SteelCo non-union representation, 
respondents were asked to indicate which mechanisms they had ever heard of. 
The result is shown in Table 6-4 in the order of people’s awareness. In spite of 
the variety of representative mechanisms, workers do not know all of them and 
may feel the some are not relevant to themselves. 
Table 6-4 Awareness of SteelCo’s Representative Mechanisms 
N=126 
Mechanism # % 
Employee Welfare Committee 105 83.3 
Labour-Management Meeting 92 73.0 
Labour Safety and Health Committee 87 69.1 
Supervisory Committee of Workers’ Retirement Reserve Fund 76 60.3 
Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust Committee 69 54.8 
Worker Directors on the Board 64 50.8 
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Departmental Meeting 60 47.6 
Awards and Punishments Committee 53 42.1 
Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee 20 15.9 
 
The survey result shows that workers are more aware of the four statutory 
committees than of the other mechanisms initiated by the company or the union. 
Over 60% of respondents know of these four meetings, but less than 50% is 
aware of some company-originated mechanisms such as the awards and 
punishments committee and the sexual harassment prevention committee. 
About half of the respondents are aware of worker directors on the board. It 
seems that legal requirements are more influential than others in the workplace, 
where legislation matters. 
However, it is interesting to find that departmental meetings, which are a direct 
channel offered by the company for speaking to management, do not work 
particularly well. Evidently, the employee welfare committee, the outcome of 
paternalistic industrial relations, remains the important factor in the workplace. 
The issues focused upon in each mechanism may account for the different 
degrees of workers’ awareness. The most renowned mechanism of non-union 
representation in the company is the employee welfare committee, which 
affects the quality of the workers’ everyday life at work. Its main function is to 
agree to and carry out all kinds of welfare and benefits provided by the 
company, such as the annual bonus of stock sharing, holiday gifts at the 
Chinese New Year, the Dragon Boat Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival, 
yearly subsidies for family trips, grocery shops, cafeterias, gyms, cinemas and 
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entertaining facilities, the provision of accommodation halls and so on. Workers 
always keep an eye on the things offered by the committee, since welfare is one 
of the incentives for working. 
The second popular institution is the labour-management meeting, which 
discusses issues of working conditions, production, personnel systems and 
most agenda items related to the workplace. The labour safety and health 
committee also seems important because most workers in the case company 
are operating workers in the field of production, whose safety and health are of 
great concern. 
However, the sexual harassment prevention committee is the least known 
mechanism, perhaps not surprisingly. Some of those who answered the 
questionnaire whilst visiting the trade union asked me, “Sexual harassment 
prevention committee? Are you sure? Do we have that?” Most of the 
respondents, who are manual workers with no female colleagues in the factory, 
only meet the few women who work in the welfare building where the trade 
union, cafeteria, grocery shop and the office of the employee welfare committee 
are located. Some of these females are subcontracted workers. 
Apparently, people pay attention to the issues which they feel are important, but 
they may not know much about issues that do not directly affect their work or 
their life. 
People receive information about non-union representation from different 
sources, such as the union, management, colleagues and so on. The 
responses (see Table 6-5) show that the union is the main channel of 
information about non-union committees: more than 85% of respondents have 
heard about them from union officials or periodicals. An example of this is the 
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monthly union periodical; it reports the working progress of each committee so 
as to help members keep up with the issues that are on-going or have been 
resolved, especially at the labour-management meeting. 
Table 6-5 SteelCo’s Channels for Understanding Non-Union 
Mechanisms 
N=126 
Channel # % 
Union officials or periodicals 108 85.7 
Fellow workers, word of mouth 51 40.5 
Employee manuals or internal documents 45 35.7 
Line managers 14 11.1 
 
Workers also understand representative systems from what their colleagues 
say or what they read in internal documents, but these mechanisms have far 
less than the union’s. Moreover, it is interesting to find very few people have 
received such information from their line managers. If the company gives more 
support to non-union representation which may in time replace the union, 
management seems not keen to encourage it. 
Therefore, it is up to the union to play the very important role of publicising non-
union representation; management does not put as much effort as the union 
does. Apart from the union’s efforts, legislation and particular issues affect 
whether workers may be aware of representative mechanisms. 
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6.3.2. Understanding of Labour Representatives’ Responsibilities 
Apart from understanding non-union representation mechanisms, it is 
interesting to know whether workers understand the responsibilities of the non-
union labour representatives. 67 respondents commented on whether they 
knew the duties of worker representatives; 48 of them believed that they knew 
and gave examples of the way in which representatives and supervising 
management on behalf of labour expressed their opinions, whilst 4 people said 
they might know some of their duties Most of these people said they received 
information about representative committees from the union. Overall, members 
had a sense of what labour representatives were supposed but could not easily 
describe their responsibilities in detail. 
In fact, 14 respondents were not clear about what representatives did, whilst at 
the same time quite a few of these were the ones who felt it was hard to 
approach a representative at work. Lacking interaction with labour 
representatives might result in lack of awareness of their representative duties. 
Briefly, people’s understanding of the representatives’ responsibilities reflects 
their relationships with the union and their representatives. The union is vital to 
helping members to understand what their representatives do when most 
members cannot take part in most mechanisms. 
 
6.3.3. Evaluation of Labour Representatives’ Efforts 
An indicator that workers feel that they are represented is their evaluation of 
how well their representatives reflect their needs. To answer the open-ended 
question, 73 members gave their evaluation of representatives’ efforts and most 
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of them agreed that non-union representation ensures that their needs and 
demands are addressed in the company. 
However, 6 respondents were sceptical and still did not agree that those 
representative mechanisms can make their voices sufficiently heard by 
management. 
The final question asked people to give any comments or suggestions they 
wished. Most respondents suggested that the system is good overall because 
employment relations can benefit from it, but it needs people to implement it 
properly and worker representatives should be professional and improve their 
skills and knowledge in negotiating with the company. Workers wanted to have 
more information about the system, which can be conveyed through regular 
staff briefings, intranet, or company magazines. In addition, the union should 
encourage members who are interested and knowledgeable to participate in 
non-union representation. 
 
6.3.4. Willingness to Serve as a Labour Representative 
Workers are the majority in the workplace but only very few of them may 
become labour representatives. 104 respondents said they had never worked 
as a labour representative, but only 17 of them wanted to become a 
representative in the future, in spite of the fact that representatives are not 
always approachable to everyone. 
It seems that workers who want to become representatives think it is very 
helpful for self-development as it will give them different experiences from their 
work. Besides, people may be interested in becoming a representative out of 
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dedication to their fellow workers. Clearly becoming a labour representative 
may provide people with a channel for self-fulfilment. 
Among those who would not consider becoming representatives themselves, 
the main reason is they do not have enough spare time. Some feel they lack 
relevant abilities and skills and a few are not interested at all. It implies that 
these people may not have a strong feeling of engagement in collective 
representation. 
In general, most workers are not willing to participate as representatives and 
think their colleagues can do it better. They also feel that they are too busy in 
the workplace to do this extra work. However, people who wish to be a 
representative in the future believe that it is a good chance to enhance their 
capabilities and to develop their careers, but they understand that being elected 
is quite competitive. 
Furthermore, members have a feeling that worker representation is somehow a 
‘professional’ position; understanding the relevant issues and affairs and 
meeting the management calls for professional skills, usually unlike their own 
professional requirements at work. Those both willing and unwilling to contribute 
have the same concern about their abilities, though different perspectives: 
either they are unenthusiastic and feel not capable enough of representing their 
group or they are enthusiastic members who hope to become more capable 
through participation. 
Apparently, being a labour representative of non-members of a union can 
enhance the union function of self-fulfilment, which seems to attract many 
people if they hold a basic position in a relatively large workplace. 
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6.4. Squad Leaders and Non-Union Representation 
The squad leaders form a group of union members who deliver union messages 
to fellow workers and feedback to the union at the same time. It is a method of 
widening members' participation in the union. Details of the situation of squad 
leaders are discussed below in section 7.3. Trade Union Squad Leaders. 
This research asked the SteelCo squad leaders to rate four perspectives on 
non-union employee representation, namely, their awareness of each 
mechanism, their views of the importance and of the effectiveness of each 
mechanism and their suggestions or comments. Comments on each set of 
replies is given below. 
 
6.4.1. Awareness of Each Non-Union Representative Mechanism 
In rating their awareness of non-union representation as shown in Table 6-6, 1 
indicates least, 3 partial and 5 greatest awareness. The scores for each 
mechanism and the average scores may be found in the table below. In general, 
squad leaders shared their degree of awareness of most mechanisms. The 
Employee Welfare Committee was the most familiar, whereas the Sexual 
Harassment Prevention Committee was the least known. 
Table 6-6 Steel-U Squad Leaders’ Awareness of Non-Union 
Representative Mechanisms 
Unit: N 
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 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Employee Welfare Committee 9 13 76 65 29 3.5 
Labour-Management Meeting 9 22 90 55 19 3.3 
Labour Safety and Health Committee 7 26 85 52 22 3.3 
Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust 
Committee 
8 37 81 49 17 3.2 
Departmental Meeting 16 22 77 57 22 3.2 
Supervisory Committee of Workers’ 
Retirement Reserve Fund 
11 46 79 37 17 3.0 
Worker Director 15 51 66 39 21 3.0 
Awards and Punishments Committee 18 50 85 22 16 2.8 
Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee 28 59 70 21 10 2.6 
 
Squad leaders are supposed to have a better understanding of non-union 
representation than other union members, being in between them and the trade 
union. Overall, they have a fairly good understanding of non-union 
representative mechanisms but their level of awareness is still similar to the 
general level of workers’ awareness. It is interesting that the Employee Welfare 
Committee as a good practice of paternalism has always attracted people. 
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6.4.2. View of the Importance of Each Non-Union Representative 
Mechanism 
The importance of each mechanism in Table 6-7 is rated as 1 for the least 
important, 3 for more or less important and 5 for most important. Numbers of 
counts and averages are listed in the table. All mechanisms are viewed as fairly 
important, but the Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee is the least 
important of all. The Labour-Management Meeting and the Employee Welfare 
Committee are both the most important of all for all respondents. 
Table 6-7 Steel-U Squad Leaders’ View of the Importance of Non-
Union Representative Mechanisms 
Unit: N 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Labour-Management Meeting 5 3 16 49 123 4.4 
Employee Welfare Committee 3 3 20 50 116 4.4 
Labour Safety and Health Committee 2 7 31 61 89 4.2 
Supervisory Committee of Workers’ 
Retirement Reserve Fund 
2 7 27 62 93 4.2 
Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust 
Committee 
4 4 31 69 85 4.2 
Worker Director 5 9 39 43 97 4.1 
Awards and Punishments Committee 3 7 50 60 69 4.0 
Departmental Meeting 6 8 41 67 72 4.0 
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Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee 7 26 45 57 57 3.7 
 
In general, the legally backed mechanisms are quite important to squad leaders 
and the remaining mechanisms also have some importance. 
 
6.4.3. View of the Effectiveness of Each Non-Union Representative 
Mechanism 
In evaluating the effectiveness as shown in Table 6-8, 1 is the least effective, 3 
reasonably effective, 5 the most effective. From the table, it appears that all the 
representative mechanisms are reasonably effective, but once again, the 
Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee emerges as least effective of all. 
The most effective committees are the Labour-Management Meeting, the 
Employee Welfare Committee and the Labour Safety and Health Committee. 
Table 6-8 Steel-U Squad Leaders’ View of the Effectiveness of Non-
Union Representative Mechanisms 
Unit: N 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Labour-Management Meeting 5 9 67 64 46 3.7 
Employee Welfare Committee 8 10 55 67 48 3.7 
Labour Safety and Health Committee 3 13 56 73 42 3.7 
Supervisory Committee of Workers’ 
Retirement Reserve Fund 
4 18 65 64 37 3.6 
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Worker Director 8 17 65 54 42 3.6 
Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust 
Committee 
5 19 58 68 40 3.6 
Departmental Meeting 7 10 66 71 35 3.6 
Awards and Punishments Committee 6 27 67 57 29 3.4 
Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee 8 27 76 51 23 3.3 
 
The effectiveness of non-union representation reveals that squad leaders find 
the official committees fairly effective, but not impressively effective in their view. 
 
6.4.4. Comments on Each of the Non-Union Representative 
Mechanisms 
Regarding the squad leaders’ comments on each mechanism, only a few of 
them provided any, but their comments still reflect some major issues in the 
workplace. The comments on each mechanism are summarised and listed 
below for discussion. 
 
6.4.4.1. Labour-Management Meeting 
The Labour-Management Meeting receives most comments – 28 people gave 
feedback on it. Basically, respondents wanted to know more about the 
committee and wanted to know what it implemented and with what results. 
Some people raised concern over new staff members who seemed not to pay 
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much attention to many issues. A few respondents were sceptical about the 
outcome of the mechanism because of the lack of transparency. 
The findings are that the labour-management meeting is the most famous 
mechanism among squad leaders, but it still shows that even squad leaders, 
who are supposed to have a closer relationship with Steel-U than other union 
members do, are still not very familiar with the outcome of labour-management 
meetings. Squad leaders wanted more information to be published. 
 
6.4.4.2. Employee Welfare Committee 
19 respondents expressed their thoughts about the committee. Overall, people 
were not happy with the welfare provision and wanted to see an open and 
transparent procedure of decision making. Current welfare did not suit their 
needs, especially new staff and employees working on shifts. 
Respondents raised their concern about improving the welfare provision and 
looked for better and more suitable welfare. Some people even believed that 
welfare provision was getting worse. Because welfare is always an important 
aspect of paternalistic employment relations, people always care about what 
benefits they can receive and want to be more informed in advance about 
welfare and benefits. 
 
6.4.4.3. Labour Safety and Health Committee 
11 squad leaders provided their perspectives. It seems this committee has not 
done very well, for various reasons. For example, the committee members did 
not regularly report to members about their progress, so transparency was an 
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issue. Besides, some respondents had a feeling that the committee did not 
function in an efficient and proactive way to prevent occupational accidents in 
the workplace. 
Safety and health are highly important in heavy industry and it is not exceptional 
in SteelCo. Respondents would like to demand more on safety and health to 
make SteelCo safer to work for. 
 
6.4.4.4. Supervisory Committee of Workers’ Retirement Reserve Fund 
12 people gave their comments. Some people mentioned that the new pension 
system implemented by the government recently may cause some problems for 
this committee. Most workers will retire in a couple of years but the new 
employees have to accept the new pension scheme, so the committee may 
become less and less important in the future. 
A new national pension system is gradually replacing the old one, presuming 
that SteelCo is hiring more new employees who may not be qualified for the old 
scheme. However, the old format of pension is still available for the majority of 
SteelCo employees who have been in the company for a long time. This 
committee will still be in place for a while until all old employees have retired. 
 
6.4.4.5. Worker Director 
18 respondents expressed their opinions of the worker directors but many of 
them are quite pessimistic. They feel the worker director is not strong enough to 
stand up for workers’ rights and interests so they might need more than one 
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seat for worker directors on the board. The representative person should bear in 
mind the essential role of speaking for labour. 
Worker directors in general may have more authority than other types of labour 
representatives, so people wanted to see the role become more powerful. 
However, it reflects the literature review that worker directors are a minority on 
an enterprise’s board of directors. 
 
6.4.4.6. Awards and Punishments Committee 
Only 10 people gave their suggestions to this committee, but the main issue is 
the transparency and fairness of awards and punishments. People are not 
convinced of the results. Awards and punishments are usually related to 
workers’ merit so transparency is far more significant for this committee. 
Workers would like to demand openness and fairness from this committee as 
awards and punishments are related to their salary, bonus, merit and welfare. 
SteelCo had to consider how to improve the channel to truly reflect workers’ 
performance at work. 
 
6.4.4.7. Employees’ Stock Ownership Trust Committee 
It should be noted that the process of SteelCo’s privatisation involved 
employees purchasing stock shares; this committee was set up to supervise the 
management of their stock ownership trust. 
19 squad leaders raised their apprehensions. The ratios of trust bonuses and 
purchasing quota are quite important to them and they wanted to see increases 
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in both. Being in a privatised corporation when the government remains the 
main shareholder, squad leaders are also concerned about the money in their 
stock trust being used to support the market whenever the government asks. 
 
6.4.4.8. Sexual Harassment Prevention Committee 
18 responses were received. Most people were not aware that this mechanism 
existed and they thought the committee was quite unimportant in such a male-
dominated workplace. More publicity was suggested to raise awareness of it. 
This committee seems little more than symbolic in SteelCo, due to the 
numerical domination of male workers. 
However, sexual harassment prevention has become an important issue 
promoted by the government. SteelCo, as a model enterprise, has the 
responsibility to practise governmental policy. Following these years of my 
observation, there is a slow increase of female workers in SteelCo. Sooner or 
later, SteelCo has to take an efficient way to deal with this issue. 
 
6.4.4.9. Departmental Meeting 
13 respondents commented on the departmental meeting in the company. The 
main concern was that this kind of meeting does not function well, because 
employees may not have a chance to participate. As usual, departmental 
meeting implies the concern that suitable employees may not be available to 
address their needs and issues. 
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6.4.4.10. Summary 
A follow-up question asked how people view the relationship of the union and 
non-union mechanisms. 185 squad leaders agreed that the union has played an 
important role in the operation of non-union representation. They thought the 
union was professional and knowledgeable and represented all workers as a 
unity. Employees needed the union to watch the company and to demonstrate 
the power of labour. They also supposed that the union was necessary to 
balance the employment relationship in the company. 
However, to examine each mechanism, it is easy to see the Sexual Harassment 
Prevention Committee is the least regarded committee in the company. 
Fundamentally, the nature of the company makes the committee a purely 
symbolic icon rather than an essential entity. Most workers do not think gender 
is an important issue and wonder why the committee exists. 
The Employee Welfare Committee, the Labour-Management Meeting and the 
Labour Safety and Health Committee are three fairly important and well known 
mechanisms, in the squad leaders’ view. 
Two issues arise from the respondents’ comments and suggestions. One is the 
needs of new staff, who are currently a minority in the company but may desire 
different benefits and welfare from those who joined the company a long time 
ago. The other is the opposition between operational workers and professional 
workers. They may have different experiences in receiving rewards, attending 
departmental meetings and so on. Professionals tend to have better 
opportunities. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that only the squad leaders who were dissatisfied with 
the representative mechanisms declared their opinions and comments about 
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non-union representation, so most comments were in general negative. Overall, 
squad leaders have a fair understanding of non-union representation and have 
a similar awareness to that of general workers. Legislation and issues still 
matter when it comes to knowing the different mechanisms. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Labour representatives of non-union representation are elected by all workers 
but union members or union representatives have the right of election to those 
positions when a union is legally set up. Therefore, the labour representatives in 
SteelCo and SugarCo are elected according to each union’s internal regulations. 
The numbers of labour representatives in the workplace are relatively low, so 
they may not be close to ordinary workers who do not work in the same office. 
Moreover, not everyone can be elected a labour representative. People who 
have a better chance are usually supported by the union or the company, 
otherwise it is not easy to gain votes from most employees or union members. 
Besides, the position of labour representative is usually seen as ‘professional’ 
so people may not consider taking them. People think they need more skills 
than their own working techniques to become labour representatives. Working 
as a labour representative can be self-fulfilling since workers become 
‘professional’ and learn new things. 
Trade union support influences the way in which labour representatives act in 
committees. When there are internal pre-meetings of labour representatives, 
they can integrate and consolidate opinion from the labour side. The union has 
an important role in ensuring the proper implementation of worker 
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representation, especially when the state legitimises various representative 
committees without providing a fine or penalty for management who do not 
implement them. 
The survey result shows that employees have fairly good understanding of non-
union representation as a result of the union’s efforts. The union works hard to 
deliver information on non-union mechanisms to members and to internalise 
non-union representation in its own structure. The union is key to understanding 
non-union representation in the workplace because those mechanisms are not 
directly related to workers who may not be close to their labour representatives. 
Accordingly, the implementation of non-union representation is a practice of 
paternalistic ideology. It offers trade union legitimacy to indirectly engage in 
non-union representation. Mechanisms of worker representation regulated by 
the state are commonly found in all types of business whilst trade unions always 
formalise internal committees to support their worker representatives. The 
practice of non-union representation helps the economic regulation and job 
regulation by trade unions whilst trade unions gain efficacy at the same time. 
Trade unions also provide a platform of self-fulfilment for members as labour 
representatives. 
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Chapter 7. Collective Identity with the Trade Union 
Workplace is a domain in which to shape individual identity. The way that 
people see themselves at work is influenced by the workplace and influences 
how they act there. When people recognise their collective identity with the 
trade union at work, they react by supporting and agreeing with the trade union. 
The labour representatives using different non-union representation 
mechanisms have different experiences in the workplace through encountering 
different issues and situations. Originally people under the ideology of 
paternalism believe that there is not much difference between management and 
labour. However, having confrontations in meetings makes labour 
representatives rethink their status and that of their colleagues in the company 
and realise that workers and employer having conflicting interests. Support from 
the trade union helps labour representatives to face this difficult situation and 
respond logically. 
In SteelCo, a large workplace with 10,000 members, the trade union has 
divided them into small squads to reach each individual more efficiently. Squad 
leaders are appointed to deliver information from the union to members. 
Therefore, the trade union has to familiarise the squad leaders with the 
organisation and function of the union. Squad leaders in general have a fair 
understanding of their union, but they still express paternalism in their identity. 
That is, people feel they are members of the company family and the union is 
part of this family, too. This reflects the paternalistic view of the trade union but 
also implies that the corporate trade union exists only when the corporation 
exists. 
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Ordinary workers are the majority in workplaces and first approach their union 
as the source of some kind of service or benefit. The trade union offers a variety 
of services and welfare to attract members to visit the union office before they 
can understand the mission that their union has. Being a service provider helps 
the union to be recognised by members and generates their identity as a 
function of their participation in the union. Existing trade unions in Taiwan take a 
soft approach to achieving the goal of independence, because collective identity 
at work has not been established on the basis of class conflict. Trade unions 
need other methods than conflict to take root in the workplace. 
Paternalistic traditions and labour cooperation offer trade unions resources in 
the workplace, but labour conflicts are concealed rather than disappearing. If 
necessary, trade unions must mobilise members to demonstrate their power 
and organisation, such as protests in the workplace. Steel-U had a successful 
mobilisation to enable it to use paternalism as a tool to further members’ 
interests. These kinds of occasions are important to prove that trade unions 
have accumulated resources and developed their organisations based on the 
foundation of paternalism, and further acted as the agent of collective labour in 
the workplace. 
 
7.1. The Changing Identity of Labour Representatives 
Identity may be affected by one’s range of experiences and roles in the 
workplace. Apart from their original job, people who represent others in non-
union mechanisms may experience a sphere completely different from their 
work. For example, the SteelCo interviewee, CHH, held a basic position in the 
company as a technician responsible for controlling the engineering process of 
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cold rolled steel products. He also had to take shift rotations with fellow workers 
because production continued around the clock. When he was presented as the 
convenor of labour representatives at the employee welfare committee, he had 
to deal with welfare issues in the workplace, understanding the welfare fund, 
reviewing public tenders for welfare business, etc. For CHH, the two roles 
composed his life at SteelCo and contributed to his identity there. 
Workers representing others in different non-union mechanisms may behave 
differently from each other due to their different experiences. For example, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, CHH felt much fulfilled when acting as a 
labour representative of the labour safety and health committee, because safety 
and health issues had more at stake and were more serious, so the labour had 
fewer rejections of their proposals than in other committees. 
Thus, whilst some representatives experience more confrontations, others may 
have smoother conversations with management. The interviewee, CCL, who 
was the employee representative of SteelCo labour-management meeting said, 
“The company president always claims publicly that there is no 
labour-management relationship in SteelCo because everyone is 
treated in the same way and wears the same uniform. However, the 
positions of labour and management representatives are quite 
distinct from each other in meetings. It is quite common for both 
sides to find a mutual consciousness hard to achieve.” 
As a result, labour representatives are sometimes not satisfied and feel an 
atmosphere of conflict between themselves and management at meetings due 
to too many unresolved issues. They may never have thought of themselves in 
a workplace confrontation before they actually became a representative. The 
213 of 303 
interviewee, HHC, who was the labour convenor of the SteelCo labour-
management meeting, described it in this way, 
“I found that we usually have different needs from the company and 
that is why we are in a labour-management meeting, but I had never 
thought of the huge differences between labour and management 
before I had the chance to join the committee. I always thought the 
company and ourselves should be a big family and I could not 
believe the first time when I had some argument with the 
management representative … In fact, no issues would ever arise 
and be defended if no confrontation ever took place between labour 
and management.” 
The experience of being a labour representative apparently transforms 
experience from not being consciousness of the distinctive nature of workers’ 
interests to identification with the inferior status of labour. Sometimes labour 
representatives are surprised at this kind of change going on in their mind, but 
then they understand this this is the fundamental character of the workplace, 
which they are cannot deny. 
Interestingly, in their interviews administrators from both cases held similar 
views on labour-management meetings. The SteelCo administrator, HMW, said, 
“We must have the most intensive labour-management meeting in 
Taiwan, because we have too many issues to discuss in depth. 
However, we already have many kinds of channels in the company 
so they should not raise all issues at the labour-management 
meeting. Instead, quite a few cases can be discussed in 
departmental meetings when employees can directly relate to their 
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managers. Some cases in particular, that are not general, should be 
dealt at department level, because department managers would 
understand them better. Representatives of the labour-management 
meeting might not know those specific situations so any discussion 
there would only be a kind of waste of time.” 
HMW actually had a close relationship with the union; in the observation he 
could often be found around the union office, but he may not always have 
agreed with labour representatives. As the person in charge of the 
administrative affairs of the meeting, he seemed to care more about his 
business than about the functioning of the meeting. 
Besides, the SugarCo administrator CWC had the feeling that their own 
employee engagement meetings in each branch operated better than the official 
labour-management meetings. CWC stated, 
“We have started employee engagement meetings once a month 
when branch head and managers speak and listen to employees. It 
is also an opportunity for the company to announce any policies. 
Employees can raise all kinds of issues; some ask questions, some 
make complaints and some even give constructive suggestions 
which can be applied immediately. For example, a fingerprint check-
in system, paperless office, electronic leave system, etc. are issues 
which have been discussed in the past. It is two-way and instant talk 
to basic employees. All meeting minutes are sent to the Human 
Resources Department for the record and uploaded to the intranet 
where employees can read and search. Human Resources 
administrators from the headquarters visit each local branch every 
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three months and the meeting attendance is better when we visit 
them. Employees feel respected because generally if they are not 
union officials they cannot often meet higher management. It usually 
takes a trigger, such as a roundtable meeting or a meeting room with 
sofas, nibbles and drinks provided and so on.” 
CWC at the same time was acting as a consultant of Sugar-U since he was also 
a union member; he tried to strike a balance between SugarCo and Sugar-U. 
Apparently, the company administrators from their perspective viewed those 
statutory committees as among their duties and attended them among their 
other tasks, such as departmental meetings and so on. They put their assigned 
duties first and looked at representative mechanisms from a more managerial 
standpoint, so both of them suggested that the channels set up by the company 
were better than its legal requirements. This is clearly a reflection of 
paternalistic management. 
In addition, issues to do with committee membership may influence the 
identities of representatives whilst controversial items may enforce division 
between labour and management. Involvement in committees seems to 
generate multiple identities for labour representatives. Some labour 
representatives stand for election because they want fulfilment in their personal 
careers or to pursue higher social status, whilst others experience inequality in 
their work and so look for a way to remedy it. There are also some 
representatives who are actually persuaded by the union to participate in 
committees. Support from the union is a factor in the identity generating process 
and at the same time a stronger union can result in stronger representation for 
labour. 
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Labour representatives have quite different experiences in representative 
mechanisms since they have different labour processes. Some representatives 
may feel more powerful than others, such as those on safety and health 
committees. Some may have unpleasant feelings from their interaction with 
management, for example, at labour-management meetings. Their identities in 
the workplace are shaped not only by their original working environment, but 
also changed by their experience of representing others in the workplace. 
 
7.2. Union Support to Labour Representatives 
Corporate trade unions have the legitimacy and privilege of engaging in the 
selection of labour representatives as the legislation guarantees. Therefore, 
Steel-U and Sugar-U take advantage of the election of employee 
representatives. Steel-U tries to urge those members who may act helpfully to 
the company and the union on a representative committee to stand for election, 
regardless of whether they have been active in trade union duties. Undoubtedly, 
this implies that what Steel-U would like to see is ‘appropriate’ labour 
representatives on committees; this would make better use of the system than 
offering such people the bribe of a sought-after position. 
As a result, employee representatives have to be knowledgeable about issues 
related to their committees, so they can speak and discuss properly with 
management representatives in pursuit of consensus. In both research cases, 
most employees are blue-collar operational workers and may not be equipped 
with enough knowledge before being elected as labour representatives. Hence, 
Steel-U and Sugar-U provide necessary consultation and support to their 
employee representatives to help them deal with workplace issues. In Steel-U, 
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a pre-meeting of all the formal representatives takes place to reassure them 
that labour concerns are being clearly investigated and integrated from the 
labour side and to help employee representatives to address any issues 
requiring further assistance. 
In formal meetings, employee representatives express their opinions confidently, 
conscious of full support from their union. If any issue remains unresolved, they 
bring it back to the union for further discussion. As representative committees 
sometimes may not have any actual effect on matters closed due to 
management reluctance, the union then plays another important role in backing 
up worker representatives. This combines with the trade union power of 
collective bargaining to force employers to treat each mechanism seriously and 
to provide employee representatives with a protective environment in which to 
carry on their responsibilities. 
Non-union representation is helpful for trade union activities and sustains union 
power. Following the good tradition of collective bargaining in SteelCo, Steel-U 
uses the labour representatives at the labour-management meetings as ex 
officio negotiators in collective bargaining. This setting offers consistency in 
discussing bargaining issues. The union chief secretary HCC observed, 
“As you may have noticed, we run the labour-management meeting 
each month and we have new items on the agenda every month as 
well. It means the labour representatives of the meeting have to deal 
with all kinds of issues in our company. In addition, we have 
collective bargaining every three years to renew the collective 
agreements and it always takes plenty of official meetings before we 
can conclude an agreement. Instead of organising a new group of 
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people every three years only for collective bargaining, these labour 
representatives are the best people to take on the responsibility. 
They have experience negotiating with the management and they 
have an ideas of current issues. The union president and the 
executive directors of the union board are part of the negotiating 
team too.” 
Through the whole process of practising non-union representation, union 
support to labour representatives may be a key element to the practical and 
successful representation of non-union mechanisms. Trade union support and 
backup are very important performance of labour representatives and their 
understanding when they attend the designated meetings. Worker 
representatives who are supported by the union tend to be more confident in 
speaking out on behalf of fellow members when they confront management. 
The identities of worker representatives gradually changed over their period of 
participation in the worker representation systems, from unconsciousness to 
identification with their class as workers. 
In addition, sustaining labour representatives indirectly gains recognition for the 
union from management. The union also plays a crucial role in the 
implementation of the mechanisms of representation. The legislation has by 
now provided workplace unions with a legitimate vantage-point from which to 
embrace the non-union representing mechanisms. What trade unions have to 
do is take the initiative in supporting and sustaining labour representatives to 
deepen their involvement in the workplace and reinforce their union recognition 
by the employer. 
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7.3. Trade Union Squad Leaders 
The Labour Union Act, before its amendment in 2010 which took effect on 1 
May 2011, used to regulate that a union could set up affiliates, branches and 
squads within its organisation. A squad usually consisted of five to twenty 
members, a branch consisted of three or more squads and an affiliate consisted 
of three or more branches. Members in a squad voted for their own squad 
leader and deputy leader, who each held office for a year and could be re-
elected. Nevertheless, in order to boost the autonomy of trade unions, the new 
Labour Union Act removed these rules and deregulated the organisation and 
structure of trade unions; however, most existing trade unions still keep the 
structure. 
Following its establishment in December 1980, Steel-U passed its 
Organisational and Operational Rules of Squads in January 1981 and set up 
union squads according to the company’s business system, together with a 
distribution of members among departments and working shifts. Squads are 
directly supervised by the union’s board of directors; the squad leader is in 
charge of daily business and is assisted by a deputy, both being voted in place 
by the squad. Both squad leader and deputy leader remain in office for two 
years and can be re-elected. However, members who serve as union officials, 
such as members’ representatives or on the board of directors or supervisors, 
should not act as a squad leader nor his deputy. 
Every year the union runs a two-day off-site training session for squad leaders 
to help them understand their responsibilities and roles as well as the union’s 
operation and organisation. The union asks the company to give official paid 
leave for attending and this make it mandatory. In order to encourage and 
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recognise members’ participation and dedication, a squad leader who has 
served five (not necessarily continuous) terms in office is given an award during 
the training session. Each squad leader is entitled to this award once, to 
encourage members to take part in more union activities and the squad leaders 
to take their role more seriously and carefully. 
 
7.3.1. Experience as a Squad Leader 
Using the results of Survey II, this section first examines the personal 
experience of being a squad leader. The average term of office in this survey 
was 4.5 years and the longest term of office reported was 27 years. 129 people 
had served as a squad leader for less than 5 years, whilst 41 of the 
respondents were in their first term of office. Another 60 squad leaders have 
served 5-9 years and 20 have been in this position for 10 years or more. 69.3% 
(149 people) had no previous experience of any position in the trade union, 57 
people had first been a deputy squad leader and 18 respondents had been q 
trade union official of some kind of, such as a member representative, a 
representative of the Employee Welfare Committee or the like. A few of them 
had filled more than one role in the union. 
Most respondents (184) said that the main reason for becoming a squad leader 
was being elected by fellow members, whilst 57 people said that they had been 
keen to serve, 46 want to help the operation of the trade union, 25 had had an 
interest in the position and 17 had alluded to the rotation of duties in the squad. 
As a squad leader, 92.1% (198) agreed that the function of this post was to 
pass information about the trade union to the members and 88.4% (190) said 
that expressing members’ needs and opinions was fairly important. 76.3% (164) 
221 of 303 
thought they were the bridge linking the trade union with members and 60.5% 
(130) defined the function as assisting the business of the union. 
The Steel-U Organisational and Operational Rules of Squads regulate the 
duties of squad leaders, which were used for the self-assessment of their 
performance by the respondents to Survey II. They distinguished what they had 
done very well from what required improvement and the results are shown in 
Table 7-1 below. 
Table 7-1 Results of Steel-U Squad Leaders’ Self Evaluation 
Unit: number 
Duty Done very well To be 
improved 
Uniting members to concentrate on production 45 65 
Executing trade union decisions 96 56 
Carrying out squad activities 132 47 
Suggestions for improving labour efficiency 31 72 
Suggestions for improving labour conditions 48 109 
Suggestions for welfare and other union affairs 119 94 
Carrying out surveys 62 16 
Recommendation of outstanding members 62 37 
Mediating in members’ disputes 12 50 
Expressing the union’s sympathy in connection 
with a member 
95 16 
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Reporting changes of membership 78 13 
Promotion of labour regulations 89 36 
Expressing members’ difficulties 126 28 
 
From their own reviews, it appears that the three best performed tasks were 
carrying out squad activities, expressing members’ difficulties and making 
suggestions for welfare and other union affairs. Only 12 people thought they 
have done well in terms of mediating member disputes and only 31 respondents 
were satisfied with their suggestions for improving labour efficiency. 
Among the duties which they thought they could have done better, the three 
main items are were suggestions for improving labour conditions, suggestions 
for welfare and other union affairs and suggestions for improving labour 
efficiency. The least important thing they thought should be improved was 
reporting changes of membership and the second least was either carrying out 
surveys and expressing the sympathy of the union in connection with a member. 
It is interesting to see that many squad leaders believed they ought to offer 
more suggestions about issues in the workplace. Suggestions for welfare and 
other union affairs seem to have gone especially well for some but needed to be 
improved by others at the same time. The same variation occurred over 
suggestions for improving labour efficiency. Overall, however, it seems that 
most squad leaders have clearly understood the duties requested of them by 
the union and have done a fair job as squad leaders in the workplace. 
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7.3.2. Relations with the Trade Union 
As the channel of communication between the trade union and fellow workers 
and supposed to have more interaction with the trade union, most squad 
leaders do not visit the union office very often. 88 leaders said they visited once 
every two or three months, 60 visited two or three times a month and 32 almost 
never. Only 11 leaders visited it once a week and 6 visited two or three times a 
week. Their purposes in visiting the union were mainly to submit insurance 
applications (136 counts), submitting minutes of meetings (121) and helping 
members to make applications (110). 
If squad leaders need to make a complaint or raise any concern with the union, 
187 of them usually speak to a union representative. 52 respondents might go 
directly to a union director or supervisor, 30 would go to a union secretary, 11 
would contact the union chief secretary and 9 would talk to the union president. 
Only 10 respondents mentioned the worker representatives at the labour-
management meeting and 3 chose the labour representatives of other 
representative committees. 
Questioned about the trade union’s efforts in the workplace, 189 squad leaders 
agreed that the union had played an important role in maintaining harmonious 
labour relations in the company, because it was the union’s duty and the union 
was strong enough to fight for labour rights. Workers needed the union to 
supervise management and the union ought actively to defend members. 
In terms of participation in Steel-U labour movements such as strikes, protests 
or other collective events organised by the union, 33 respondents participated 
every time, 62 joined most of them, 56 occasionally attended, 35 rarely took 
part and 20 were never present at any of them. With regard to social events 
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organised by the union, such as family trips, mountain climbing, soccer contests 
and so on, 21 people attended all events, 56 took part in most of them, 72 
occasionally showed up, 40 seldom participated and 18 never joined. However, 
199 squad leaders encouraged their members to join in union activities or 
events, although they thought only about half the members were interested. 
Moreover, squad leaders were asked whether they were interested in becoming 
a union official such as a member representative, director or supervisor, and 
also in representing non-union committees. Most of them were not interested in 
the prospect of being a union official, and only 36 said they would like to serve if 
they had the chance. In most cases, people were too busy, not knowledgeable 
enough, or simply unwilling. Quite a few of them people wanted to see the 
younger generation becoming union officials; they could be expected to bring in 
new ideas and more energy. Importantly, some respondents mentioned that 
being a union official would conflict with their duties and line managers. 
50 squad leaders would be interested in being a labour representative in the 
future, slightly more people than wanted to serve as a union official. Most of 
them believed that it would be a good opportunity to learn something new and 
understand the implementation of representative committees. They would also 
like to fight for themselves and their colleagues to get better working conditions 
and welfare. Those who were not interested expressed similar concerns about 
their availability, capability, knowledge, and so on. 
It seems that the squad leaders imagined that acting as a union official or a 
labour representative of the non-union representation would be different. As 
they saw it, participating in the non-union mechanisms would be more helpful 
225 of 303 
than in union activities. This reflects the paternalistic ideology of preferring 
direct interaction as a better way of encountering the management. 
 
7.3.3. Interactions with General Members 
The important responsibility of squad leaders is to interacting with their 
colleagues. In order to deliver union messages to other members, the most 
common way is face to face in speech (156 respondents). Office bulletin boards 
(113) and circulars (108) are useful as well, but only a few squad leaders use 
emails (52). In fact, even though everyone has a business email account, most 
members are not used to the company email system, and not all operating 
fields and factories have internet access. 
Asked about the content of messages, from squad leaders’ point of view, the 
most useful messages for members concerned welfare issues (204 leaders) 
activities (120), union business reports (84) and union welfare commodities (82). 
Apparently, welfare is the most important issue in the workplace, following the 
trend of workplace paternalism. 
Each squad had to convene a members’ meeting every two months according 
to the union’s Organisational and Operational Rules for Squads; the meetings 
could involve either an individual squad or several squads in the same working 
area, and the union subsidises each member who attends with 40NT$ for drinks 
and refreshments. To claim the subsidies, squad leaders have to pass minutes 
of these meetings to the union in the first fifteen days after the meeting. The 
data show that 192 squads held meetings regularly and 63 of them had joint 
meetings. Apart from discussing union affairs and proposing suggestions, some 
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squad leaders take it as a chance to chat and mingle with members as well. A 
few squads hold members’ meetings along with their official division or group 
meeting, since all the members work in the same unit. 
Some squad leaders think that joint meetings are beneficial, because squads 
wanted to make good use of union resources (35 respondents), to 
accommodate the availability of the invited delegates (30), to interact and 
communicate with other squads (25), or to discuss similar work-related issues 
(19). 29 squad leaders said they usually held a joint meeting with another squad, 
3 squads organised a joint meeting of 12 squads and 1 squad joined a joint 
meeting of 14. However, 19 leaders did not call meetings regularly, mainly 
because their members did not work in the same field or shift and everyone was 
too busy. 
All union officials including member representatives, members of the boards of 
directors and supervisors and the union president and chief secretary may be 
invited to attend a squad meeting. A squad leader or a union member 
representative is entitled to convene a squad meeting. The survey showed that 
189 squad leaders organised their own meetings and 14 squads had member 
representatives to convene meetings. Regarding guests, most squads invited 
member representatives (171 counts), some invited union directors and 
supervisors (80), but only a few invited other union officials, such as managing 
directors and supervisors (35), the union president (17) and the union 
secretaries (4), or departmental managers (12). The main reason to invite 
delegates is to facilitate communication between the squad members and the 
union or the company. 
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Most squad meetings take place during working hours (183 respondents) and 
meetings usually last one hour (162 counts). 130 squad leaders are responsible 
for taking the minutes of their meetings and only a few squads ask a deputy 
leader or member (the same person always or members in turn) to do it. The 
most popular agenda items are welfare suggestions (191), the delivery of union 
messages (187) and discussion of internal events (115). 
The last questions about interaction with members asked whether they 
organised casual events for members and whether they had any personal tips 
or tricks in organising members. Only 69 squad leaders said they organised 
informal events for members, such as dining out together, playing baseball, 
going bowling and mountain hiking, to bring members closer to each other. 
Most people mentioned that having enough people available, unfortunately, 
made it difficult to organise such events. In order to organise members, squad 
leaders believed that the key lay in being enthusiastic, friendly, concerned and 
honest, caring for members’ needs, providing important information, wanting to 
communicate and wanting to serve. 
Overall, squad leaders passed messages to their members face to face at work 
and the most important and interesting messages were still welfare affairs. It is 
easier to organise squad meetings and other events in the working day, 
because outside work everyone’s availability was different. Because squads are 
a spontaneous structure of the union rather than an entity formally regulated by 
the law, the union has to offer more encouragement and inspiration if it wants to 
involve squad leaders. Having squad leaders gives more members the chance 
of self-fulfilment in trade union activities in such a large workplace. 
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7.3.4. Collective Identity of Squad Leaders 
Squad leaders are a special group in Steel-U. They are not official union 
representatives whose rights and obligations are protected by the Labour Union 
Act, but they help to link the union and the members. Steel-U is a single plant 
union with numerous members, unlike Sugar-U which organises its members in 
various branches in local companies. In order to improve communications and 
interactions with the members, Steel-U facilitates the mechanism of its squad 
leaders. The union provides some incentives to encourage and help squad 
leader involvement, such as off-site training and five-term awards. However, 
their understanding of non-union representation, their interaction with squad 
members and their relationship with the union are examined, they turn out to 
depend on whether each squad leader is in favour of these actions. An 
interesting finding about their identity reflects the ideology of paternalism: they 
identify themselves first as a SteelCo employee before identifying themselves 
as a Steel-U member and they agree that they are a member of the big SteelCo 
family. The ‘factory as one family’ is still a common axiom among workers. 
However, for the sake of the union, equipping squad leaders with a package of 
training and support helps in organising members. 
Survey II asked each squad leader to define his role in the workplace by giving 
a number to each of six roles: a SteelCo employee, a Steel-U member, a squad 
leader, a member of the big SteelCo family, a member of a department at work 
and a worker. A score of 1 showed the most important role in the company and 
6 the least. In order to compare them, the items rated as 1 are weighted as 6, 
so items rated as 6 get a score of 1. Then, each role was assessed on the 
weighted index (see Table 7-2). 
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Table 7-2 Identity of Steel-U Squad Leaders 
Unit: number 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Weighted 
Index 
A SteelCo employee 119 30 19 2 6 1 5.42 
A member of the big SteelCo family 41 35 72 47 15 3 4.18 
A Steel-U member 14 72 41 28 18 4 4.14 
A member of a department at work 23 25 26 29 32 4 3.76 
A squad leader 6 10 54 32 40 22 3.05 
A worker 9 4 8 10 18 70 2.03 
 
From the survey result, it seems that being a SteelCo employee is the most 
important role of all. A few respondents commented that the union exist only 
when company existed, so being a SteelCo employee was more important than 
being a SteelCo Union member. A big SteelCo family is a very traditional way to 
describe SteelCo – as a kind family taking care of its dependants. Most 
businesses wanted to use ‘neutral’ terms to conceal the implicit labour conflicts 
and to persuade workers to ‘love’ the company. 
A respondent gave his interesting explanation for his rating: 
“Being a SteelCo employee is the duty, being a member of the 
department is the responsibility as a line manager, being a member 
of the big SteelCo family is to cooperate and to assist, being a Steel-
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U member is to protect myself, being a squad leader is to serve 
others and being a worker is the minimum requirement.” 
Again, the paternalistic ideology is not simply adopted by the management, but 
in fact is rooted in the minds of the employees who have been influenced by 
their working environment to shape their identification of themselves in this way 
with others. The deepest threat for corporate trade unions is that they only 
legally exist if the corporation that they represent exists. Squad leaders share 
this sense of their contingence and acknowledge the importance of being a 
company employee. 
People were next asked if they had encountered any conflict between these 
different roles and, if so, how they had tried to resolve it. 166 people said no. 
Unfortunately, some squad leaders misunderstood the question and answered 
the question whether they had encountered any conflict in the workplace. 
Nevertheless, a few respondents still gave some good examples: 
“My duties are working as management, but I am in fact a worker.” 
“Being a SteelCo employee and being a Steel-U member are both 
good to the company.” 
“The line manager has always warned me about getting involved in 
militancy.” 
“I am pleased to serve members and carry out the squad leader’s 
role and duty, but the line manager is sometimes unhappy because 
he thinks I go beyond my proper responsibility at work.” 
Under the paternalistic ideology, management is still authoritarian and expects 
loyalty and docility from its workers. Any antagonistic or adverse action is 
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unwelcome in the workplace. People are expected to do their own job and do 
not go beyond their working domain. Therefore, instead of waiting for people to 
discover it for themselves, trade unions have to actively offer the chance for 
people to understand issues beyond their responsibilities at work. 
 
7.3.5. Discussion 
The function of squad leaders is to widen members’ participation in the union 
and to improve communication between the two. Ideally every worker has a 
chance to become a squad leader or a deputy squad leader since each term of 
office is two years and the union also sets up an award to encourage members 
to serve five times as a squad leader. From the background of survey 
respondents, it can be learned that 129 of them had served as a squad leader 
for less than 5 years and at the same time that 20 had had 10 years of 
experience or more. It is actually good to see new people serving in this position, 
but at the same time some experienced squad leaders still dedicate themselves 
to the union. 
Most people start serving as squad leaders simply because they are elected by 
their colleagues. However, this is a good chance for them to get familiar with the 
union. Every year the union offers all squad leaders two days of off-site training 
which usually takes place in a tourist spot and includes courses on union 
organisation and operation delivered by union officials as well as external 
academics and practitioners. Afterwards, squad leaders are the main contacts 
in the workplace when the union has to spread information to or mobilise its 
members. 
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Squad leaders mostly feel they have done very well at suggesting welfare and 
related affairs, but at the same time they feel they could offer more and better 
welfare suggestions. Welfare is the main issue in the workplace and seems 
from the views of squad leaders to be more important than other affairs. In 
terms of agendas of squad meetings, the discussion of welfare remains the 
main item. Apart from their duties, squad leaders also care for the welfare of 
members of the union and their representation. In general, welfare is important 
and direct to workers. Improving welfare means that people’s needs and 
concerns are valued and considered, no matter where the welfare and benefits 
come from. 
Welfare-related issues of non-union representation attract squad leaders as well, 
but squad leaders in general have a fairly good understanding of non-union 
representation and agree that the union plays an important role in the 
implementation of non-union representative mechanisms. Issues still matter 
since squad leaders feel that these statutory committees are more important 
than other mechanisms. Like the ordinary workers, the squad leaders find the 
sexual harassment prevention committee to be the least important. 
According to the responses, most squad leaders (187 of 215) speak directly to 
union member representatives when they need to raise any concerns or make 
any complaints, but very few would talk to non-union representatives at the 
labour-management meeting or at another committee. Most squad leaders visit 
the union office though not very frequently, but 32 respondents almost never 
visit. However, approximately 70% of respondents take part in union-led events, 
whether labour actions or social gatherings. Most of them (93%) also encourage 
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their fellow workers to participate, though they think only about half the 
members are interested. 
Squad leaders were asked explicitly about their identities in the workplace. An 
interesting result is that their identification with the enterprise outweighs 
identification with the union. This implies a problem of workplace unions 
because a union is localised in a workplace rather than an industry or an 
occupation. Therefore, should the enterprise not exist, the union would not 
legally exist. In this sense, workplace unionism is quite limited. 
 
7.4. General Member Participation in the Union 
Steel-U is a large labour union with 10,000 members, as a result of the former 
policy of compulsory union membership. The change of the Labour Union Act to 
free union membership has not resulted in any membership decline in Steel-U. 
However, it is not easy for Steel-U to reach out to every individual member, for 
union staffing is very limited. In order to make members aware of its trade union 
functions, the direct and efficient way is to provide various regular welfare 
benefits and services which closely connect the members’ everyday lives with 
the union. In general, Steel-U offers a variety of non-financial services and 
member benefits to attract members to itself. 
 
234 of 303 
7.4.1. Non-Financial Services 
Steel-U provides quite a few non-financial services to deal with members’ daily 
anxieties and problems beyond their work, including a mediation committee, 
legal consultation and property insurance desks in the trade union office. 
For the many cases such as car accidents, contract disputes and so on which 
arise and sometimes influence the daily work and lives of union members, 
Steel-U has set up a mediation committee to assist members in navigating their 
way out of their difficulties. There are 17 members of the mediation committee 
who are recommended by the Steel-U board of directors as well as its board of 
supervisors. These committee members are usually people who ae famous for 
their justice and power of argument. Members can contact Steel-U to arrange 
free mediation appointments whenever they need professional assistance. 
In addition, the union has appointed two lawyers as legal counsellors who offer 
free legal advice and consultation every week to members of the trade union. 
One lawyer is in the office every Monday afternoon from 13:30 to 16:30 and the 
other attends every Friday morning from 8:50 to 11:30. Members usually make 
appointments before meeting a lawyer. However, members can ask for other 
extra legal assistance for which the lawyers may charge. If they do, the union is 
not involved in paying their fees. 
In addition, some private insurance companies are interested in offering 
discounted products to employees in SteelCo because it is potentially a large 
market with thousands of families. Therefore, Steel-U rents part of its office out 
to three different insurance companies which provide discounted life insurance 
packages or insurance for health, cars, property and so on. Trade union 
members can handle their insurance affairs without having to leave work early 
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and moreover, they can easily observe the trade union functions whilst they are 
waiting. 
Overall, Steel-U offers these services and assistance with a view to saving the 
time and effort of members dealing with personal or private issues that may 
distract them at work. Steel-U acts as a free service provider in order to link up 
with members’ general needs so its members may gain something more easily 
and quickly through their connection with the union. 
 
7.4.2. Members’ Benefits 
Apart from non-financial services, Steel-U offers other welfare benefits, 
including two kinds of financial assistance covering solatium and also mutual 
financial help, children’s scholarships and commercial goods exhibitions to 
members. 
Steel-U set up its compensatory pension fund to help and support members and 
their families if accident, natural calamity or fire should lead to death, handicap, 
hospitalisation or long-term outpatient care. This fund comes from regular 
membership fees and every member is eligible to apply. 
SteelCo is in heavy industry and sometimes a worker passes away as a result 
of industrial injuries, so Steel-U set up mutual help funding in 1981 soon after 
the union was established. According to its rules, each individual who agrees to 
join the funding group pays approximately £5 when a member dies. 
Moreover, Steel-U provides children’s scholarships every two years to offer 
encouragement and motivation to members and their children. Members are 
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always very keen to apply to this fund since obtaining a scholarship means that 
their children are honoured and approved by others. 
Displaying goods for sale is a way of striking a balance between union, 
members and external commercial suppliers. Like those insurance companies 
who occupy a desk in the union office, external suppliers have been very 
interested for some time in the potential market of consumers that SteelCo 
represents. Therefore, Steel-U made a decision to manage what could be sold. 
Goods of any kind of goods can go on display and be sold in the trade union 
office, e.g. credit cards, books, mobile phones and clothes, as long as suppliers 
agree to offer discounts for Steel-U members and pay a small few 
administrative fee which contributes to the Steel-U strike fund.  
The union office is located in the Welfare Building in the workplace and is open 
from 7:30 to 16:30, Monday to Friday, so workers can visit it in the normal 
working day. This is where the union president, the chief secretary and the 
secretaries for different matters can be found, together with some insurance 
desks and displays of affordable goods and discounted merchandise. Members 
of the boards of directors and supervisors, members of the mediation committee 
and lawyers also show up regularly to offer their services. 
 
7.4.3. Visiting the Union Office 
The union offers a variety of services to members and their families. The 
president, CPW, thinks it is vital for the union to look after members’ lives: 
“Our members work hard in the company but may not have the time 
to deal with some issues after work. If we can provide them with help, 
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they can save time by visiting the union. It is very good to see 
members around - it means that we are of help to them.” 
When I was working in the union, I saw members coming and going every day 
and the secretaries always busy with enquiries from members. However, they 
were always happy and ready to talk to members. The survey results (see 
Table 7-3) show that most respondents visit the union, though the frequency of 
their visits varies. 35.8% of respondents visit the union a few times every month, 
but 10.8% never visit. 
Table 7-3 Frequency of Members’ Visits to the Steel-U Office 
N=120 
Visiting Frequency # % 
Once every six months or more 33 27.5 
Once every two or three months 31 25.8 
Two or three times per week 18 15.0 
Never 13 10.8 
Two or three times per month 11 9.2 
Once per week 9 7.5 
Almost daily 5 4.2 
 
In terms of visiting purposes (see Table 7-4) most people come to the office for 
the services provided by the union, especially for purchasing or renewing 
insurance. In addition, members visit the union to buy discounted merchandise 
from external providers, or to submit applications for subsidies, and so on. A 
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few workers come to ask questions or exchange information, though only two 
persons said they might come if a grievance arose. 
Providing a series of services and benefits is a good way to attract members to 
the office, where they may gain more understanding of the union during their 
visits from their observations and conversations with union officials and 
members. Members come to the union when they find it can supply their needs 
and save them time and money. 
Table 7-4 Purposes in Visiting the Steel-U Office 
N=126 
Purpose # % 
Insurance renewal or purchase 86 68.3 
Discounted merchandise purchasing 46 36.5 
Submitting applications 44 34.9 
Questions and enquiries 28 22.2 
Information exchange 27 21.4 
Passing by 10 7.9 
Grievance or complaint 2 1.6 
 
Members indicated which official usually hears their opinions or comments on 
work (see Table 7-5); their line managers and union representatives are the 
main ones. These people are easy to find, since everyone is supervised by a 
line manager at work and there is a union representative in each unit, all of 
whom are relatively empowered to report issues. However, other people such 
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as departmental managers, union officials, secretaries and the president, or 
labour representatives, seem more distant from workers and thus only a few 
people would bring them opinions or comments about work to them; but it is a 
little surprising to see that squad leaders, who are supposed to look after the 
five to twenty members in their squad and to call squad meetings every two 
months, are not the main people as well. 
Table 7-5 SteelCo’s Channels of Opinion and Comment about Work 
N=126 
Channel # % 
Line manager 94 74.6 
Union representatives 84 66.7 
Departmental manager 26 20.6 
Union boards of directors and supervisors 24 19.0 
Squad leaders 13 10.3 
Union secretaries 10 7.9 
Union president 9 7.1 
Other labour representatives 8 6.3 
Labour representatives of the labour-management meeting 6 4.8 
Unwilling to or seldom express opinions 5 4.0 
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7.4.4. Union Periodicals 
In the history of the labour movement in Taiwan, open publications such as 
writings and documents are an important means to pass on information and 
experience to followers and the public (Son, 2012). Therefore, publication is 
always a good way of delivering messages. 
Steel-U publishes a website and monthly periodicals reporting its operation, 
providing information relevant to workers and giving them a forum to speak out; 
members get a money reward when their submission is accepted. It 
progressively educates members who are slowly developing a sense of 
employment relations and class conflict. When a serious issue affecting most 
workers arises, the union under scrutiny lets members know that this is a time 
when it needs their help. Aware that it helps them generously in many ways, 
members and even their families feel it is their turn to give something back and 
they want to support it. 
The monthly periodical of the union is independent from the company. 
Information about union activities, opinions from members, academic issues 
and discussions relevant the union are published in it. Not only are members 
rewarded for contributing to the journal but each year the union organises a 
workshop for writing, typesetting and editing, to improve the quality of 
periodicals and encourage members to become involved in theirs. 
Each issue contains 40 colour-printed pages, including front and back covers. 
The contents of issue 105 of 26 December 2007 are as follows: 
 Front cover to page 2: photos of union activities. 
 Page 3: table of contents 
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 Page 4: a message from the union president. 
 Pages 5 and 6: decisions of the board of directors and responses to squad 
meetings. 
 Page 7: report on the election of the 10th president and union 
representatives. 
 Pages 8 to 11: summary of items of the labour-management meeting and 
reports of fees and the strike fund. 
 Pages 12 to 14: a scholarly paper 
 Page 15: article from a labour organisation. 
 Pages 16 to 21: submissions from members discussing employee stock 
ownership, comments on the union. 
 Pages 22 and 23: medical information from a doctor. 
 Pages 24 to 36: various pieces of writing from members, such as 
discussions about the company, stories, travel notes. 
 Page 37 and back cover: photo submissions from members. 
The periodical contains information about union activities, opinions from 
members, academic issues and discussions related to the union. Apart from 
reports on union activities and summaries of representative committees, most 
items are submissions from union members. Steel-U encourages all members 
to submit their writing by the system of rewards. All kinds of articles are 
welcome; members may submit their personal thoughts, life experiences, other 
kinds of writing, and so on. 
A contrasting publication is SteelCo’s regular newsletter for internal 
communication, which comes out on the 1st and 16th of each month. Each issue 
consists of 20 pages of important news of the company. 
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Take issue 766, for example, which was published on 16 December 2007. 
 Page 1: report on a conference about improving steel technology for 
producing manual tools. 
 Page 2: report on the company’s award of excellence from an academic 
association. 
 Page 3: release of new products and events held by the company’s jogging 
society. 
 Page 4: technical report of a supplementary restraint system. 
 Page 5: receiving the premium award for its training quality system from the 
Council of Labour Affairs and announcement of the publication of the 
SteelCo’s document of corporate social responsibility. 
 Page 6: events held by SteelCo’s educational foundation and praise to 
employees who did not pocket money that they picked up. 
 Page 7: a piece of writing from an employee’s spouse and the 2008 annual 
calendar. 
 Page 8: an award from a foreign organisation and events held by the 
mountain-climbing society. 
 Page 9: summary of business last month and events organised by the 
travel agent. 
 Pages 10 and 11: a piece of writing from an employee and announcements 
affecting personnel. 
 Page 12: a piece of writing from an employee’s spouse and some rental 
advertisements. 
 Page 13: a piece of writing from an employee. 
 Pages 14 and 15: SteelCo’s history and events held by the care society. 
 Pages 16 to 19: a few pieces of writing from employees’ spouses. 
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 Page 20: photos of SteelCo. 
To analyse the contents, it is clear that the company newsletter is used to 
spread recent developments or awards for the company. Submissions from 
employees or their spouses and the events of company societies are part of the 
newsletter, but not the main components. Critically speaking, this is a channel 
to promote the company among its personnel. It shows professionalism and 
strengthens links between workers. 
Nevertheless, Steel-U not only uses the periodical to report its working progress 
but also values it as a means of interacting with members. Members pay more 
attention to its publication of the periodical and also supervise its contents. All 
periodicals now appear as electronic versions and are put on the union website 
for members and the public to read online. In this way members who do not visit 
the union frequently can still receive updates about Steel-U. 
Moreover, Steel-U’s periodical has become a learning model for trade unions 
nearby. During the participant observation, I saw that other unions were sending 
their periodicals to Steel-U and were clearly learning from the way that Steel-U 
edits its periodicals. 
 
7.4.5. Union T-shirts 
It is not always easy to amass a large strike fund in Taiwan; most unions rely on 
donations alone. Therefore, in order to accumulate a strike fund, the Steel-U 
president, CPW, introduced the idea of making its own t-shirts and selling them. 
Wanting to frequently check the quality during the manufacture, the union 
placed orders in some local textile factories, at the same time promoted and 
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helped local business. As a result, union t-shirts were always reasonably priced, 
approximately only £1.5 to £2, and of good quality, so members were keen to 
order them for themselves and their families. Following this success, Steel-U 
created a new design every year to keep up sales. Even the workers in some 
corporations nearby ordered Steel-U t-shirts; Steel-U meanwhile sent t-shirts to 
other unions or offered them to visitors as souvenirs. 
When the new t-shirts arrived one day during the participant observation, 
everyone in the union helped to distributing them in their thousands to members. 
Some squad leaders would order them as a gift for their squad members and 
many members ordered one for themselves and more for their families. I found 
when chatting with members who came to collect them that they bought quite a 
few because they liked the quality and good value and they were enthusiastic to 
support local businesses and their union. Every consignment of t-shirts sold out 
very quickly and Steel-U had repeatedly to order more to meet the demand. 
For the union, the t-shirt was a very handy as a souvenir for visitors or in their 
visits to other unions or organisations. They also used it as an incentive for 
members to join in union activities, especially strikes. In addition, they provided 
free t-shirts to their interns so the students working in the union office could 
wear them and members could easily pick them out. 
When he was elected president of the municipal federation of trade unions, the 
Steel-U CPW president brought with him the idea of t-shirts. Gradually, other 
unions in the same city started to design their own t-shirts, which might also be 
sold to the public. More and more unions started making t-shirts to identify their 
members and supporters. 
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Later, as well as the company uniform, some employees started wearing union 
t-shirts at work. They sometimes wore a union t-shirt under their uniform and 
might take off their uniform at work. Some employees wore simply a union t-
shirt with their uniform trousers and shoes. They thought it was appropriate in 
the workplace, since the t-shirt bore a Steel-U logo. Gradually, therefore, it has 
been unofficially accepted in SteelCo that employees may wear union t-shirts 
on shifts, for most line managers did not discipline their staff. 
Moreover, I could from time to time see people in the street wearing SteelCo 
uniforms or Steel-U t-shirts after work. Following the idea of the SteelCo spirit 
extolled by a former chairman of the company (Wang, 2002, Wang, 2006), 
employees were in general quite proud of being part of SteelCo. Therefore, 
uniform is not only a managerial means, but also a symbol of pride within the 
ideology of paternalism. 
If dress is a symbol of identity, wearing union t-shirts in the workplace implies 
that workers may voluntarily identify with the union as well. A huge number of 
members may not be a mere number for the record but also a source of power 
when people identify with the union and the union represents them as a whole. 
 
7.4.6. Direct Presidential Election 
In December 2000 the general meeting of union representatives had passed the 
Rules of Presidential Election and Recall, to make this union the first workplace 
union to qualify under the rules. In November 2001, the union held the first 
direct presidential election of its kind in the Taiwanese labour movement, at a 
time when it was lawful for the union president to be elected on behalf of the 
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union by its board of directors who had been directly elected by the members. 
In this first direct election, four candidates competed and 96.8% of the members 
voted. The elected candidate won 4,270 votes, 50.5% of the total ballot.  
The union’s Rules for Presidential Election and Recall requires each candidate 
to pay a deposit of 100,000NT$ (approximately £2,325), which will be returned 
in three days once the result is announced, or will be diverted to the strike fund 
if the candidate fails to achieve 10% of the total votes. After the first election, 
however, one candidate who only gained 9.2% of the vote and could not 
retrieve his deposit accused the union of an illegal presidential election. The 
Kaohsiung District Court eventually judged the election legal and without 
offense against the Labour Union Act after the second instance in March 2003. 
The candidate pursued the appeal to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the 
appeal in July 2003 and confirmed the legality of the union’s direct presidential 
election. 
The union has held five direct presidential elections (see Table 7-6). The 
second was held in November 2004, again with four candidates. The rate of 
turnout was 96.8% and the president won by 53.7% of the ballot. The third 
election in November 2007 had only one candidate, the president hoping to 
have a second term in office. 89.7% of the members voted and 84.8% elected 
him. The fourth election, in November 2010, had five candidates, the maximum 
so far. The poll was 94.1% of the members and the elected person got 3,301 
votes, 38.7% of the total. In the latest election in November 2013 two competed 
and the president seeking a second term eventually won with 5,021 votes. 
Table 7-6 Summary of Steel-U’s Direct Presidential Elections 
247 of 303 
Year 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Number of Candidates 4 4 1 5 2 
Registered Members 8,735 8,565 8,990 9,059 9,642 
Turnout Rate 96.8% 96.8% 89.7% 94.1% 93.3% 
Percentage of Votes for the 
Elected Candidate 
50.5% 53.7% 84.8% 38.7% 55.83% 
 
CPW, the president who won the first direct election, said, 
“Members should be allowed to decide their leader and people enjoy 
the feeling of making decisions of their own and playing a part. Once 
they have elected someone, it is very likely that they will pay more 
attention to how well this person works, since they want to know 
whether their choice is appropriate. At the same time, the elected 
person has to be very careful and work hard to maintain members’ 
support.” 
It is not easy to involve all the members in the operation, since the union is so 
large union and it is possible that members feel detached from union affairs. 
The union takes direct elections as a way of increasing members’ participation 
in the union activities and the high turnout at each implies that members care 
about the union’s operation and leadership. However, the votes gained by the 
successful candidate may point to the degree of support enjoyed by the 
presidency. 
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7.5. Mobilisation: Collective Identity among General Members 
Following the discussion in previous chapters, it is clear that the ideology of 
paternalism has influenced management, workers and trade unions in this 
workplace. Employees feel a fairly strong identification with the corporation and 
view it as a big family taking care of them. Workers are proud of working in a 
model enterprise such as SteelCo which offers better salary than many, good 
welfare and benefits, a stable working environment and a fine reputation. 
When they have to join this union, workers may not understand why they need 
such a thing until they get a chance to know it better. New employees are 
usually enrolled in Steel-U on the first day of work at SteelCo; the union 
regularly invites new members to visit the union office for a briefing about its 
organisation and operation and encourages them to join in union events or 
make use of union services and benefits. During the participant observation in 
2015, I noticed a young union director taking some newcomers to visit the office 
and introducing them to the president and other officials and secretaries. I 
learned in a brief chat with him that he was also new to SteelCo comparing to 
other union officials and was serving his first term as union director. He was 
quite enthusiastic about getting new colleagues to understand Steel-U and felt 
hopeful that more members of the newer generation would join. 
In the interview with the assistant general manager of the Human Resources 
Department, HJT, she talked about the challenge of elderly workers in SteelCo, 
and mentioned that the company has been aware of this issue for years and 
has been rolling out a plan to renew its human resources. Every year it 
calculates the retirement rate in three years’ time and recruits enough new 
people to ensure sufficient time for the handover, giving old and new staff the 
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chance to work together for around three years. She further commented on 
Steel-U’s response to the question of age when I mentioned the change of 
people I had observed serving as union officials, 
“ … several union officials are going to retire in a few years. We 
notice that the union has in fact been working on the generational 
inheritance for years. Most of their officials keep an eye on new 
colleagues and introduce them to union activities. They also 
encourage young people to elect union member representatives or 
union officials. It seems they are quite ready to adapt to the changes 
in the near future.” 
 
7.5.1. Protest in the Workplace 
The workplace is not always peaceful and quiet since one essential of labour 
and management relations is always the conflict of interests. Even under the 
ideology of paternalism, there are still confrontations when workers do not 
agree with the employer. Sometimes labour cooperation is not the solution for 
everything in the workplace. Eventually, members join the trade union so as to 
speak out for their rights. 
As a demonstration of their accumulated power and resources from the tradition 
of workplace paternalism, the union led a successful workplace protest 
regarding a new policy of performance evaluation and the issue of official leave 
for trade union officers on the very first day of my participant observation in July 
2003. Around 3,000 members gathered together in front of the SteelCo 
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auditorium to ask for their rights, more than the management would have 
expected. 
The company implemented a new system of performance evaluation in 2002 
which asked each unit to give 10% of employees the second grade. The result 
of performance evaluation was related to the end of year bonus and people 
were unhappy that their work performance had to be restricted by a fixed 
proportion of people not doing well. The union president and the boards of 
directors and supervisors had held several negotiations with the company on 
the issue but members’ grievances were still being received that some line 
managers strictly maintained the quota of the second grade at the evaluation in 
2003. 
Moreover, for a while the company had seemed heavy handed to the union 
because some officials dealing with two accidental deaths of members at work 
had been asked by their line managers to take personal unpaid leave in lieu of 
the paid leave for union affairs regulated by the Labour Union Act. Some line 
managers insisted that these union officials could take only paid leave for 
regular union meetings. The union had been in touch with the management a 
few times but did not receive any positive feedback. 
As a result, the union called an extraordinary general meeting of member 
representatives and invited the management to sit in to respond to members’ 
queries. Because the management representatives did not give an acceptable 
response in the meeting, the union member representatives eventually 
approved a decision to protest. 
After the extraordinary general meeting, all the union representatives used their 
lunch break and the time between shifts to stand outside distributing flyers to 
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members, demonstrating protest banners were placed outside the trade union 
office and along the routes of the company buses to raise a consciousness of 
unfairness and show their determination to confront the company. All the squad 
leaders were given flyers to pass on to the members and were encouraged to 
participate for the sake of their rights. 
Two days before the protest, the union president, officials and secretaries all 
stood by the intersections which members passed on their way to work and held 
posters and banners to remind them of the action. All the members of the board 
of directors had been in touch with the squads to emphasise the importance of 
joining the action. The day before the protest, the president wrote the slogans 
on the protest banners by hand to underline the appeal from the union. 
On the morning of the protest day, all the union secretaries and interns 
prepared boxes of bottled water, towels, headbands, union t-shirts and other 
necessary items. Around 3 pm, some officials arrived in the office to get ready 
for the action. Later members spontaneously gathered in the plaza outside the 
auditorium. All the participants got a headband quoting the protest banner along 
with a bottle of water and a towel, to relieve the summer heat. More and more 
people joined after 4:30pm when the normal shifts finished and the handover 
was made to the next shift. 
The union president, CPW, stood on the platform outside the auditorium with 
other union directors and supervisors, and they all spoke about their demands 
in turn. Many neighbouring unions and local politicians joined them onstage to 
support the workers and many media reporters came to broadcast the action. 
More and more people gathered together to shout for their claim for workplace 
justice. Even the family members of workers took part in the protest. 
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Figure 7-1 Steel-U Members’ Protest 1 
 
Around 5:30pm, the SteelCo president on behalf of the corporation finally came 
to the platform to respond to workers. He promised to clarify the issues raised 
and wrote this clearly in an internal memorandum, which is an official format of 
SteelCo’s documents. Finally, the union president and the company president 
came to an agreement and the union president, CPW, announced end of the 
protest at 6pm. 
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Figure 7-2 Steel-U Members’ Protest 2 
 
On the next day, there was huge media coverage of Steel-U’s collective action. 
It was a marked success for the union because so many members gave their 
support, about one third of the total. To encourage member participation, all 
those who attended were able to exchange their headband at the union office 
for a free union t-shirt, which was normally sold at 90NT$ to swell the strike fund. 
It was also a union strategy to distribute bottled water, towels, headband 
banners and t-shirts at the meeting. The union therefore could keep count of the 
total number of participants to counter the company’s claim to the media that 
the protest had involved only hundreds of people. 
The union president CPW believed, 
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“If we want to mobilise, we ought to do it properly. Otherwise, we 
would lose everything. If two or three workers protested, no-one 
would notice. Twenty or thirty, well, the security pals could dismiss 
them in a few minutes. Two or three hundred, the management might 
notice or call the police but would not take it seriously; only when two 
or three thousand people or more get together, should the boss 
seriously face the problem and be willing to solve it.” 
Apparently, a labour dispute is the time to show how powerful the trade union is, 
for two reasons. The union president said, 
“We go on strike for two reasons: one is to force the company to look 
upon us with respect; the other is to prove to our members that we 
are definitely doing something important for them. We take it 
seriously, not as a game, because we know it might destroy 
management and the members’ trust in us.” 
It is quite clear that the president CPW understands the importance of 
recognition by the employer and members which empowers trade unions in the 
workplace. However, the military strike is the very last weapon of the trade 
union and once a mobilisation is called it has to be successful. If the trade union 
failed to lead a successful dispute, it would immediately fold, since members 
would not trust it and the management would not respect it ever again. 
Therefore, CPW was very cautious in calling a protest or strike and preferred to 
retain power and strength ready at hand, just in case. 
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7.5.2. Trade Union Leadership towards Partnership Unionism 
There have been three different presidencies of Steel-U since the beginning of 
this research. It may be worthwhile to address their similarities and differences 
and thereby trace the movements of Steel-U. 
CPW was union president when the research began. He was indirectly elected 
by the board of directors in 1998. Before acting as the full-time union president, 
he was a technician in the steel product factory and worked in the union as a 
members’ representative. During his first term of office, he brought in the idea of 
directly electing the union president because he judged the indirect process 
bureaucratic and political and wanted a broader participation of union members. 
The union board of directors approved the idea and it was passed by the annual 
general meeting of members’ representatives. 
Steel-U ran its first direct presidential election in 2001, as addressed in the 
previous section, and CPW won it. At the time the Labour Union Act still 
stipulated the indirect election of union presidents and therefore a defeated 
candidate sued the union for staging an illegal vote, but the result was approved 
in court.  
Steel-U has regulated that the president may have only two continuous terms in 
office and has never changed this rule. At the end of CPW’s second term it was 
rumoured that CPW might run for another term since he had had only one term 
of elected office and could claim the right to stand for another. However, he had 
already announced that he had already been president for two terms and so 
would not be a candidate ever again. 
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During CPW’s two terms of office, worker directors first sat on the board of 
SteelCo, the first renewal of the collective agreement and the success of the 
litigation to include a food allowance for night shift workers in their wages. When 
the company declared that food allowance should not be included, 1,441 
members joined the litigation. The calculation of this wage influenced the 
calculation of other items such as overtime pay and pensions and the Labour 
Standard Act clearly regulated that all regular payments, whatever they were 
called, had to be included in wage calculations. It took more than five years to 
win a favourable verdict in the highest court and the company finally had to pay 
compensation. 
CPW went to graduate school to obtain a master’s degree in labour studies, 
since he thought people did not like the union, for one thing, because union 
officials did not behave well and gave the impression of abusing people’s legal 
rights. He further encouraged other union officials and members to pursue 
higher education to learn more about labour affairs and laws. It also gave 
people confidence, for most people in the lowest ranks of SteelCo had little 
education. Overall, CPW did his best to improve the union and made Steel-U 
distinctive in Taiwan’s labour history. 
In the second direct presidential election, STW was chosen. Unlike CPW, who 
held a basic position, he was an engineer in the steel product factory. He used 
to be a members’ representative and a member of the board of directors during 
CPW’s terms of office. STW was re-elected in 2007 and thus also held office as 
president for two terms. 
During STW’s presidency, Steel-U renewed its collective agreement and called 
a protest in the workplace to keep the SteelCo chairman, who had resigned 
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when the Ministry of Economics, the biggest shareholder in SteelCo, appointed 
a new chairman. About 2,000 members joined the protest and 7,000 members 
signed the petition. 
Steel-U also worked hard to keep a certain amount of stock shares owned by 
the Ministry of Economics, a fair calculation of paid leave for people who had 
joined before privatisation, and so on. Overall, during the time of STW, things 
became more institutionalised and the company and union gradually worked out 
a way of reaching mutual agreement more often. 
Later, CCW was elected as president in 2010 and re-elected in 2013, as the 
third union president recorded in the research. CCW was a technician in the 
steel product factory and had been a union members’ representative and held 
some other union positions under CPW’s presidency. He was quite familiar with 
union affairs and, with is mind on the generational gap in the union, started 
looking for members of the younger generation who would play their part in 
Steel-U. 
The third renewal of the collective agreement came in 2014, marking the 
collective bargaining in SteelCo as an important and enduring tradition since the 
first agreement of 1997. 
Following the deregulation of the Labour Union Act, on 1 May 2011 Steel-U 
called for a new organisation of the trade union in all sub-companies of SteelCo 
group. The new Steel Group Union was set up on 7 May 2011 to cover all 
employees of the SteelCo group who wanted to be unionised. When it was first 
set up, some Steel-U members joined the Steel Group Union as well to help run 
it. Steel-U also helped the Steel Group Union get a free office in SteelCo and a 
secretary paid by the company. 
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In the participant observation in December 2015 at the annual general meeting 
of union members’ representatives, it was interesting to sense how the 
atmosphere had changed. More and more new faces appeared and more and 
more young people had joined the important older people who still remained. In 
addition, it was a surprise this time to see that the agenda items did not include 
so many matters arising. The secretariat even allowed extra time for 
representatives who might want to comment. 
In the experience of the above three union presidents, trade union can now be 
observed to act in favour of partnership unionism under the ideology of 
paternalism. Steel-U has been seeking to cooperate with the employer because 
the practice of partnership and the paternalistic ideology help Steel-U to act as 
a partner of the company. In the meantime, with more issues now settled in the 
workplace, the union looks back on its own sustainable development. 
 
7.6. Paternalistic Identity: Union Members and Family Members 
The workers are the majority in a workplace and may be powerful and influential, 
but they are even more powerful when they are properly organised by a union. 
Workers may not be fully aware of their subordination to management but 
suppose it to be akin to a family or a partnership. At the same time, they may 
not understand the mission and functions of a union, given that union 
membership was automatic and compulsory from the first day of employment, 
regardless of their choice or awareness. A large membership is not the same as 
relatively great power until a trade union can strategically mobilise its members. 
Therefore, Steel-U aims to participate in workers’ lives by offering a variety of 
services and welfare benefits, such as discounted insurance, free legal advice 
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and mediation, marriage gifts, scholarships for children, subsidies for continuing 
education, mutual funds and so on. Because it looks after members and their 
families in so many ways, members are constantly visiting the union office and 
thus they gradually identify themselves as union members. 
Various functions of the union formalise part of each worker’s life in the 
workplace. Therefore, even if they do not know the main mission of the union, 
they still know they can get various kinds of help or benefits from it. For workers, 
the union is part of their working life in its economic and social functions. If they 
need help but do not know where to go, they can come to the union for advice. 
If SteelCo is a big family, the union is part of it and cannot be replaced or 
ignored. 
Non-union representation seems quite important in that its mechanisms deal 
with various issues relevant to workers, but without direct influence on them. 
Workers have some awareness of the representing mechanisms, but if they are 
not involved, they are not fully aware how each mechanism is implemented. If 
they are not close to their union or a labour representative and do not pay much 
attention to notices in the workplace, they seldom know what non-union 
representation is. After all, non-union representation still requires only a small 
group of people to represent the whole, so ordinary workers feel distant from 
those mechanisms. 
Workers usually visit the union office on necessary errands, such as 
applications, insurance, etc., but visiting the office can be fun as well. In my 
observation, quite a few members if they find themselves near the welfare 
building simply look in to say hi and chat with the union officials or secretaries. 
They may come in to see who is there or get any latest news. People in the 
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office are always ready and happy to talk, no matter how busy they are, whether 
a caller is a frequent visitor or rarely drops by. Some members call to share a 
few souvenirs or snacks with everyone in the office and officers are always 
happy to share with other members or visitors. It seems more like visiting 
friends than a business visit and makes a break in the working day. 
Industrial relations in Taiwan usually function in practice like family relationships 
or partnerships. In this sense, Taiwanese industrial relations are peaceful and 
not violent. However, the fieldwork shows that this climate is helpful for the 
development of trade unions, because all the ‘family members’ management 
and labour alike treat the union as part of the family if one exists. This enables a 
union to perform and function better as a collective power. The workers’ 
perception of a family relationship in a workplace may help and not harm the 
existence of a trade union there. 
From the survey of squad leaders in SteelCo (Table 7-2 Identity of Steel-U 
Squad Leaders), it is interesting to find that most of them think their 
membership of SteelCo takes precedence before their roles as members of 
Steel-U. Moreover, they agree that SteelCo is a big family and Steel-U is part of 
it. 
Unlike the structure of trade unions in Western societies, it is a something of a 
danger that Steel-U, as a workplace union, would not survive if SteelCo ceased 
to exist. However, because of the tradition of setting up unions to support the 
state and capital, trade unions are members of the company family just as much 
as their members are. 
The links with family relationships need not harm employment relations. 
Identification with the union is based on the assumption that union is part of the 
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big factory family. It is possible, even common, for family members to have 
problems or conflicts with each other, but they are still a family. 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
Labour representatives of non-union representation are only a small group with 
experience which may differ from that of workers in general. Following the 
paternalistic ideology, any confrontation they have with the management in a 
meeting makes them aware of the difference between labour and management. 
The trade union helps the labour representatives to understand and deal with 
the difficulties. 
Squad leaders are not union officials but help the union to reach the mass of 
members. In theory, squad leaders should be familiar with trade union affairs in 
order to be an effective bridge with their union. However, Steel-U’s experience 
reveals that in such a large workplace with different shifts of duties in various 
sections, much depends on the way that squad leaders define themselves and 
whether they are willing to connect their fellow workers and the trade union. 
Thanks to their regular off-site training by Steel-U, squad leaders gain a basic 
understanding of their duties, but how they practise is another issue awaiting 
investigation. 
Workers have a good relationship with the union because it offers many kinds of 
service and welfare benefits related to their needs; it provides help and save 
members time and money. Members may identify with the union simply 
because of the services and benefits. Identity is an important factor of 
mobilisation strategy, for it encourages members to participate. A trade union 
262 of 303 
consolidates its power and resources through a range of functions. Its functions 
and services affect members’ attitudes to and perspectives on itself. In order to 
persuade individuals to participate in the union, it must deliver services and 
benefits of all kinds until it becomes part of the members’ life and family. Even if 
members cannot easily understand its efforts in collective bargaining, they can 
get some impression of the good or practical services offered by the union. 
When individuals drop by the union office for some service, they can interact 
and connect with the union through its staff and then they may start thinking of 
trade union functions. This may further establish the existence of the trade 
union in their minds. 
Therefore, no matter what role a worker may have in the workplace, collective 
identity first builds on the paternalistic ideology, giving people the sense that 
they are part of the big family of the corporation. The union needs a different 
strategy to gain member recognition so that eventually it may wield the power of 
mobilisation. Following its development in this paternalistic context, it can be 
seen that the trade union moves in the direction of partnership unionism to work 
with the management for the sustainable development of the workplace as a 
whole. 
Trade unions equip themselves with the power and resources gained from the 
workplace paternalism, and practise labour cooperation as their first preference. 
However, they understand that they must be able to mobilise the members 
should they have to, as a signpost of what trade unions are supposed to act as 
collective labour agents. They take mobilisation more seriously as the most 
significant means, because they only look for ultimate success to retain their 
recognitions of employers and workers.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion: Transition of Trade Unions in 
Taiwan 
Paternalism is the top-down ideology introduced and used by the state in 
Taiwan to maintain a docile and loyal labour force for economic and political 
purposes. Employers manipulate workers in an authoritarian, benevolent and 
moral way in the workplace, and trade unions have been established in this 
context, especially in state-owned and privatised corporations. It has influenced 
collective identity in the workplace and people do not have the same class 
identity as Western countries sometimes have. Non-union representation is also 
a practice of paternalism introduced by the government. 
To investigate the corporate trade unions in the workplace with such factors as 
paternalism, non-union representation and collective labour identity, this 
research provides answers to the following questions: first, whether and how 
the existing (old) corporate unions could wield any influence in today’s 
workplace; second, whether and how far paternalism has influenced trade 
unionism in Taiwan; third, whether Taiwanese trade unions may operate and 
function as agents of labour rights; fourth, what the relationship is between 
Taiwan’s trade unions and non-union representation; and last, what kind of 
collective identity may be found in the workplace and whether there is a chance 
of building up a class identity among workers. 
This research contributes to the field of labour studies in Taiwan as an original 
perspective on how paternalistic traditions can constitute an advantage for trade 
unions rooting themselves properly in the workplace. Non-union representation, 
for example, is a formalised means to help trade unions gain power and 
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resources. Labour cooperation has been rarely discussed in Taiwanese 
literature, but it is truly the strategy that paternalistic trade unions have to 
account for. 
Last, the limitations of this thesis and some suggestions for future research are 
outlined, together with some implications of the findings for practice and policy. 
 
8.1. Paternalistic Autonomy of Trade Unions 
Paternalism has dominated Taiwanese industrial relations for a long time to 
tame workers into supporting economic growth, political peace and social 
stability. The policy of the ‘factory as one family, factory as one school’ has 
always been propagated by the government and remains essential at present. 
The three characteristics of paternalistic management, authority, benevolence 
and morality, make paternalistic employers different from those with absolute 
authority or dictators; the impression is that they look after their employees to 
conceal the fact that conflict exists in the workplace. 
Paternalistic management has further tolerated the development of corporate 
trade unions and provided trade unions with the necessary resources and 
support to deeply root themselves in the workplace. Employers have developed 
a less antagonistic view of trade unions and instead try to embrace trade unions 
as affiliated organisations within the workplace which are part of the corporate 
social responsibility. Trade unions were not initially brought in for the sake of 
labour autonomy, but have gained the privilege of stable and solid development 
with few obstacles. 
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Whilst quite a few critics argue about the disadvantages of paternalism – that it 
prevents autonomous industrial relations and creates a tame, loyal and silent 
workforce, this research points out that we cannot ignore the important fact that 
corporate trade unions, especially in state-owned and privatised enterprises, 
have benefited from the ideology of paternalism for a long time. The 
paternalistic view of the workplace or the image of family relationship does not 
simply damage labour relations, and it has become the foundation of present-
day trade union development. Free offices and facilities, staff, funding and so on, 
and, most important for future development, employer recognition, all offer a 
workplace trade union the chance to be officially recognised and responsible for 
its actions. 
Therefore, this research provides an original contribution in showing how 
Taiwanese corporate trade unions, albeit less aggressive, maintain their 
organisation and development by absorbing resources and power from the 
benefits of paternalism. This research argues that trade unions have generated 
paternalistic autonomy in the workplace.  
 
8.2. Responsibility for Non-Union Representation 
Labour legislation has regulated that all enterprises shall have certain types of 
non-union representation mechanisms in place, whether the workplace is 
unionised or not. Both the corporations in the case study have implemented 
non-union representing committees for this purpose, to meet government 
requirements. Apparently, the practice of non-union representation is also a 
product of the paternalistic ideology. As employers are benevolent and moral, 
non-union representation offers them a chance to express their willingness to 
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listen to the workers, and it also contributes to their corporate social 
responsibility. 
The legislation has provided trade unions with legitimacy to manipulate matters 
of non-union representation. Trade unions hold the privilege of selecting non-
union labour representatives which has influence on the implementation of non-
union representing committees. Providing support to those representatives 
further gives trade unions the opportunity to become indirectly involved in a 
variety of company affairs. Following this kind of indirect involvement, trade 
unions enhance their power and efficacy to receive sufficient information and 
propose proper suggestions in the workplace. 
Previous studies such as Cheng (2000), Huang et al. (2003), and Wei (2003) 
have shown that Taiwan’s legislation for non-union representation in the 
workplace is weak in enforcement and sanctions. Nevertheless, from the 
research case of Steel-U, it appears that the involvement of trade unions helps 
to enforce the practice of non-union representation, for the trade unions help 
their labour representatives properly and seriously to present data and perform 
well in meetings, not taking these duties as mere play-acting. 
Eventually, non-union representation again strengthens the employer’s 
recognition of the union in the workplace. As trade unions gain legitimacy and 
efficacy through the practice of non-union representation, unions gradually 
become more autonomous. Trade unions taking non-union representation 
seriously forces management to respond more formally. Making good use of 
non-union representation expands trade union influence. This is important since 
non-union representation is rarely excluded from a workplace when it is a 
governmental requirement. 
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Besides, non-union representation reveals the functions of trade unions 
including self-fulfilment, job regulation and economic regulation. Some issues 
discussed on non-union platforms are related to working terms and conditions 
and mutual decision-making is practised. Moreover, being a labour 
representative helps members to fulfil themselves. Following the ideology of 
paternalism, taking responsibility for non-union representation widely allows 
trade unions to take root in the workplace. 
Overall, trade unions manipulate non-union representation as their means to 
officially maintain employer recognition. Non-union representation expresses 
management benevolence and morality. Practice of non-union representation 
does not compete with trade unions but fundamentally enhances the 
importance of trade unions in the workplace. 
 
8.3. Collective Identity in the Workplace 
Paternalistic ideology has influenced not only management but also workers. 
Some research (Marsh, 2002, Marsh, 2003, Shieh, 1997, Wu, 1994, Wu, 1996) 
has argued that the Taiwanese working class does not have the same class 
identity as some Western countries do because of various background factors 
and social and economic transition. The result of this research confirms this and 
further argues that collective identity in the Taiwanese workplace is built not on 
labour conflict but on paternalistic harmony. It was generated for economic and 
political purposes and is still essential in the workplace. 
‘Working in a big family’ is not inappropriate to the workplace, since both 
management and labour assume this before any conflict occurs. Interestingly, 
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as a result of paternalistic management, the corporate trade union is also part of 
this big family, which underlies union recognition in the workplace. Unlike many 
Western countries where trade unions are established by the workers’ class 
identity, Taiwanese trade unions founded with past support from the 
government originally had hardly any link to class identity. 
Workers have multiple identities in the workplace as a result of their 
experiences. They consider the paternalistic enterprise first before they think 
about the trade union, because in the tradition of Taiwanese trade unions their 
identification with the trade union arises from their identification with the 
enterprise. When they have an idea of the workplace union, they sense that 
both the union and its members belong to the corporation. The research case 
addressed the view that the workers’ union identity is based on that of their 
enterprise as a family identity, so collective identity with the union comes 
second to collective identity with the corporation. 
Collective identity with the trade union is an important factor of union 
mobilisation in Taiwan and has to be generated by trade unions. As the sense 
of mutual contradiction of labour and capital is not rooted in Taiwan’s 
employment relations, its trade unions have to take a top-down strategy to 
generate a class identity with class consciousness that will reinforce union 
recognition. It becomes the trade union’s responsibility to formalise labour 
identity in Taiwan, rather than the reverse. 
The traditional presumption of Taiwanese labour identity can be changed 
provided that the trade unions make more effort. Due to the compulsory 
membership instigated by the previous regulation, a worker’s identity does not 
influence his/her participation in a trade union, but trade union activities do 
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influence members’ identities. For example, Steel-U first stresses its function of 
member services to increase members’ involvement in the union before talking 
about labour conflicts. It familiarises members with the union and sets up a 
need for it, whether or not people completely understand the union’s mission. 
Workplace unionism may limit the development of trade unions since a 
corporate union loses legitimacy when the corporation ceases to function. 
However, labour’s identification with the trade union, based on the perception 
that it is part of the big corporation family, is a powerful advantage for trade 
unions. Workers understand that family members may have problems or 
arguments with one another, but they are still related. Overall, the paternalistic 
concept of family implies mutual help between members rather than 
management by the single authority of parents. The actions of the corporate 
trade union therefore consolidate this element of paternalism. 
 
8.4. Trade Union as Agent of Labour Rights 
Offering members services, especially welfare and benefits beyond what 
management offers, is a very important and effective means of connecting 
workers with the corporate trade union before it can think of mobilising them. 
Under the concept of paternalistic care, welfare is the major concern in a 
workplace after working terms and condition. 
To have influence on members, the corporate trade union as a service union 
offers in the first instance various kinds of welfare benefits and services 
Gradually, the union also provides information about its responsibility to help 
members become familiar with what it does in addition, through such means as 
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periodicals, bulletin boards, squad leader off-site training, and so on. The union 
changes and influences members unobtrusively and imperceptibly, rather as the 
essential idea of paternalism does. 
The function of organising and mobilising comes only afterwards but does not 
replace the function of service, because the union’s recognition of its members 
has to be secured before any action. To mobilise members successfully, the 
trade union has to arouse the sense of helping the union. The issue of 
mobilisation is crucial: anything meriting such a step must certainly be relevant 
to general workers to convince them of the unfairness of the issue and the need 
to defend their interests. Eventually members are mobilised even when some of 
them do not completely understand the purpose behind mobilisation. From the 
idea of the family, workers realise that it does not mean that management will 
respond to only one kind of demand. Every family member has different needs 
to take note of. 
It is important for the corporate trade union management to gain recognition 
from both members and the employer if it is to have enough power to confront 
management in the workplace. However, mobilisation is the last weapon of a 
trade union and must not be abused. Under the asymmetrical relationship of 
labour and management, the employer always controls most of the workplace 
resources. The trade union has to retain its power with solid recognition from 
members and the employer and show its full power only when it has no choice 
because it cannot survive failure. Should a failure of mobilisation occur in a 
paternalistic workplace, it not only destroys the trust of members, but also 
demolishes the respect of the employer. Most seriously, it kills off the corporate 
trade union, which has no chance to survive. 
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Labour conflicts are concealed by the tradition of paternalism but never 
disappear. To act as agents of labour rights, trade unions widely cooperate with 
management and at the same time have to be ready for any possibly unsettled 
conflicts. Whenever mobilisation is necessary, trade unions need to make sure 
they are able to win. 
 
8.5. Transition to Autonomous Partnership Unionism 
The existing trade unions before the enactment of new labour legislation in 
2011 have the disadvantage in general of workplace unionism which is limited 
to the existence of their parental enterprises. That is, a workplace union may 
lose its legitimacy when its employer corporation shuts down, because they no 
longer have any object to fight. 
After rooting its organisation in a paternalistic workplace, the corporate trade 
union has to mobilise member identity in a gentle and gradual approach; it 
should not directly challenge the paternalistic ideology of the workers in a 
radical way when they identify with the paternalistic workplace setting. The 
understanding of capital and labour conflicts is not immutable and at any given 
moment different people interpret the relationship between the trade union and 
the corporation differently. However, labour and management conflicts still 
unavoidably arise in a paternalistic workplace, and are not due to inherent 
conflicts of interest. 
Rather than transforming itself to classic unionism as militant opponents to 
management, the old corporate trade unions in Taiwan sought instead strategic 
partnership unionism, which combines their paternalistic advantages and 
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reduces their paternalistic disadvantages. Trade unions choose cooperation 
rather than confrontation in the workplace, in order to maintain and enhance the 
recognition by management. For example, Steel-U helps to implement company 
policy, gain the agreement of the trade union chief secretary, and so on, to build 
a good relationship with the corporation. 
Cooperation with management does not mean the elimination of the trade union, 
but emphasises its existence and importance. In fact, the union understands it 
is difficult for it to resist management all the time because its substantial 
resources are always limited and it has much less than the company has. 
Engaging in the practice of non-union representation, although it was originally 
a means of managerial control, is another way toward partnership unionism. 
Rather than replacing trade unions, non-union representation relies on their 
support. 
As noted above, the union’s different background and development from those 
in Western countries such as the UK, make embracing non-union 
representation and shaping labour’s collective identity two important strategies 
for revitalisation of trade unions in a paternalistic workplace. Workplace 
harmony based on the tradition of paternalism is still essential; trade unions 
have to actively engage members in their daily activities and target members 
who belong to different groups, such as labour representatives of non-union 
representation and squad leaders. In addition, offering welfare is a practice of 
paternalistic management for the employer and at the same time is the 
servicing function which attracts members to make contact with the trade union. 
To conclude, this research argues that paternalism has rooted corporate trade 
unions in state-owned and privatised workplaces as the governmental auxiliary 
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and the management affiliate. It empowers trade unions to engage in workplace 
affairs with legitimacy, efficacy and autonomy. To revitalise themselves from the 
paternalistic ideology, it is expected that the unions will adopt partnership 
unionism with the manipulation of non-union representation and a top-down 
process of shaping labour’s collective identity. 
To move a further step from criticising the incapability and underdevelopment of 
trade unions, as has been frequently discussed in Taiwanese labour studies, 
this research points out the feasible possibility of trade union development 
based on the tradition of paternalism and investigates the benefits which trade 
unions have gained from it. The importance of labour cooperation has been 
addressed in detail. An original and different perspective on Taiwanese trade 
unions has been offered in this study. 
 
8.6. Limitations and Future Research 
Following the deregulation of the Labour Union Act from 1 May 2011, the 
formats of trade unions were changed to corporate unions, industrial unions and 
craft unions. This research has investigated only the corporate unions that used 
to be established under the ideology of paternalism. These trade unions used to 
be the auxiliary to the government rather than an agent of labour. After the trend 
of liberation and democratisation, these unions will have to transform 
themselves in the direction of partnership unionism if they are to revitalise. 
This research is not aiming to offer a universal solution to all trade union 
revitalisation in Taiwan, since each kind of union has its own face. For example, 
274 of 303 
it would be interesting to analyse in the future whether new corporate trade 
unions may take the same route as SteelCo or find a different way of flourishing. 
As very briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Steel-U helped to establish a 
new trade union for all subsidiaries of the SteelCo Group in 2011. In the future It 
would be worth following up and investigating how the SteelCo Group Union 
operates and what sort of relationship develops between Steel-U and the 
SteelCo Group Union. 
The case of the Taoyuan Flight Attendants Union and other new trade unions 
set up after 1 May 2011 will also be a brand new trend to research. It currently 
implies that the appearance of the labour movement may change into 
something rather more like that in Western countries, led mainly by outside 
cross-company trade unions independent of corporations. However, this takes 
time and relies on long-term observation to follow up, for it is not yet clear 
whether more cases will arise or the phenomenon never recurs. 
In terms of paternalism, paternalistic employment relations are traditional and 
may be challenged by the introduction of human resources management and so 
on. It needs further observation to find out whether there is a chance of 
paternalism’s disappearance from the workplace. 
 
8.7. Implications for Practice and Policy 
At present, paternalistic management is still persuasive and the state remains in 
favour of industrial peace. It is very important to re-emphasise the policy of non-
union representation as a channel for the labour voice in the workplace. For the 
unionised workplace, it helps trade unions to gain recognition and power if they 
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seriously take part in implementing committees for non-union representation. 
For nonunionised workplaces, it provides workers with a platform to express 
their needs and complaints in an official way. The government may consider 
adding a penalty or fine for the negligence of non-union representation. 
Collective identity at work is based on individualism, because paternalistic 
management looks after individual lives. People cannot automatically generate 
their collective identity unless they have personal experience of difficult 
industrial conflict or gain knowledge and information about it. Therefore, labour 
education is an important domain to look at. Trade unions have a responsibility 
to educate their members in a variety of ways. Some labour organisations 
outside the workplace may work on educating workers and trade union officials 
about organising and mobilising. In any case, the present system of labour 
education focuses only on vocations and skills, and will have to add more 
varieties of worker education that include labour organisation and 
consciousness. The state also has to think about introducing materials on 
labour rights to the compulsory education system to give everyone a chance to 
understand what work is like before starting a job. The process of education 
cannot reach its destination in a single leap but takes time. 
Theoretically labour cooperation is not a strange idea to paternalists, because 
paternalism looks for collaboration rather than coercion. Employers should not 
view trade unions as merely a scourge to avoid, but should consider as a 
second thought the possibility of working with trade unions as partners for the 
sustainable development of corporations. The corporate trade unions 
understand that their survival is based on the existence of the corporation, so 
seeking mutual success in the workplace may be the answer to both parties.  
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